Although the war in 1918 was essentially a fight of infantry, the Americans had powerful armour, artillery and air support; they could field 189 Renault Ft17 light tanks, nearly all of them under the command of the original, and brilliant, Lieutenant-Colonel George Smith Patton Junior, the same man who was to prove the most impetuous of tank commanders in World War II. allied forces.
But, in 1918, what could Patton do with his small and rather slow tanks, destined to operate in a melee of infantry? His intervention in the battle was brief; he was, in fact, seriously wounded on the first day of the offensive. To the driver of the ambulance that was evacuating him, he ordered in his usual language:“To the P.C. of the 35th division! And no reply! »
As far as aviation is concerned, the Americans had 842 aircraft under the command of Colonel William Mitchell, the “father” of United States military aviation. In front of them 302 German planes only; but during the battle the mastery of the air was not always to belong to the Americans. thus obtaining local superiority on the battlefield. The American air force, almost entirely occupied by the aerial struggle, intervened only very little in support of the infantry. It had no strategic bombing force, and your ground forces ignored the use of close air support and proper signals. On the other hand, the weather was bad during almost the entire battle. Colonel Mitchell's air force therefore made a contribution above all of a psychological nature.
The guns should have provided the infantry with the most valuable support. The Americans had 2,700 artillery pieces, mostly 75 mm field guns, and 155 mm howitzers, some borrowed from the French. Major-General Charles P. Summerall, an artillery specialist, did introduce some flexibility into the use of artillery in support of infantry; but more often than not the guns dragged too far behind the infantry on rutted and congested roads.
The number and quality of the equipment favored the Americans, but the terrain favored the Germans:their observation posts and their artillery positions were perfectly sheltered by the heights which dominated the valley of the Meuse. This limited the sector on the right. The left limit, passing right in the middle of the Argonne forest, was exposed to enemy fire from the escarpments that bordered the Aire valley.
The attack was therefore to develop in a kind of defile which would undoubtedly favor the murderous crossfire. The defile itself was invaded by thick foliage:the Argonne forest did not lend itself well to the deployment of a large-scale attack. There were also ridges and hills to conquer, notably that of Montfaucon. Finally, the last obstacle, even more formidable than the other defensive positions:the Kriemhilde line which ran along the heights of Cunel.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh A. Drum Chief of Staff of the 1" U.S. Army, described the area as "the most defensive ground I have ever seen or heard of; nature has provided it particularly well with crossfire positions. and flanking tins, not to mention camouflage possibilities.”
The attack could therefore only succeed by the effect of a rapid advance, and if the Kriemhilde line, 16 kilometers further on, was conquered before the Germans had even had time to reinforce their defences.
On the night of September 26, at 2:30 a.m., the Allied artillery unleashed a terrible three-hour barrage on the enemy's forward positions; this firing, raised at 5:30 a.m., was followed by a creeping barrage, when the lines of infantry rushed forward in the fog, on a front of 32 kilometers. They met little resistance at first, the bulk of the German forces keeping well back from the front lines and thus having escaped the effects of the bombardment.
The first day, all the army corps reached their objectives, the next day, the 79th division conquered the important position that constituted the Montfaucon ridge. But from then on the German resistance hardened. "Where, the day before, one could walk upright, the men had to squat or crawl," wrote Colonel Christian A. Bach, chief of staff of the 3rd corps. The 35th Division, made up of men from Kansas and Missouri, which had had to face the elite German unit that was the Prussian 1st Guards Division, lost at least 6,000 men. It had to be relieved on the 1st " October.