The Siege of Khe Sanh is a battle of the Vietnam War which opposed the American army to the Vietnamese People's Army and the troops of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Viet Cong). It took place at the beginning of 1968, during the famous Tết offensive. It began on January 21, and lasted 77 days. Concluded by an American victory, it had no real strategic implications.
The base
Location
The American base of Khe Sanh was in the north of South Vietnam, 100 km from Hué on the coast, and at the beginning of the mountainous zone. It was barely 10 km from the Laotian border and only 23 km south of the demilitarized zone which separated North and South Vietnam.
Birth of the base
In July 1962, the first special troops of the American forces began to build, not far from the place of Khe Sanh, what was initially only to be a training center for the fighters, near a former colonial plantation. For the rest of 1962, the base troops were reinforced. In September 1962, a 400 meter long airstrip was built. The base was gradually massively developed and strengthened. It served as a starting point for explorations against the Ho Chi Minh trail, in the region, and even beyond the Laotian border. It also made it possible to control one of the great valleys which led from the south-east of Laos to the base of Da-Nang, as well as to monitor the demilitarized zone between the North and the South of Vietnam.
The combat base
The combat base itself stretched about 1.8 km along the Rao Quan River and a plateau. The central element was a 1,200 m long runway which had been built with aluminum plates and allowed large aircraft, such as the C-130 Hercules, to take off and land. The runway did not have a taxiway so the planes had to turn on the main runway in order to position themselves.
South of the runway were the accommodations and command posts of the 26th Marine Battalion, rangers, as well as the command posts of the field artillery and airfield control. On the east side of the runway was the base's ammunition stockpile. The base also had a second ammunition depot further south.
The defenders had 18 M101 105 mm howitzers with 12 km range, 6 M114 155 mm howitzers with 14.5 km range as well as six M30 107 mm mortars with 4,020 m range. To this were added long-range 175 mm M107 guns, placed at a place called "Rockpile" and in "Camp Carrol", which could take the access roads to the base under their fire. For the direct defense of the base, there were 6 M48 tanks, 10 M50 rocket launchers, 4 M42 armored vehicles as well as several trucks equipped with M2 field guns.
In addition, the marines occupied the 881 hills which were located north of the base, as well as the 861 hills and the plateau to the south, and guarded the 558 hills which closed the valley of the Rao Quan river. On Hill 950, east of the river, a radio relay station was installed. Other hills were occupied, such as Hill 64 which rose out of the plain, and from where the marines could provide artillery support to much of the base.
First fruits of the battle
Location of the base
During Operation Scotland, at the end of 1967, multiple patrols around the base as well as the Niagara I electronic surveillance operations had revealed groups of Vietnamese placed under the command of the 304th Division, having already served against the French at Ðiện Biên Phủ, and passing through the east of the demilitarized zone, in the region of Khe Sanh.
General Westmoreland then reinforced the troops of Khe Sanh to be able to resist a possible attack. Just as the French had sought a decisive battle at the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ, he intended to use Khe Sanh to wrest the decision in the conflict with North Vietnam. The Vietnamese consented as willingly as the Americans to this battle. A victory at Khe Sanh would have paved the way for the control of the region by Ho Chi Minh's troops and would thus have facilitated the supply of the Việt Cộng in the south.
In the days that followed, sporadic attacks took place against Marine positions around Khe Sanh. The latter did not remain inactive, and undertook several counter-attacks against the Vietnamese positions, including the artillery positions installed on a hill to the northwest of the base. An attack by the 26th Marine Platoon on January 20, 1968, the day before the siege began, nearly drove the enemy back from Hill 881 to the north. But that same day, a Vietnamese intelligence agent working for the Americans warned the base of an impending massive attack, and American troops were withdrawn and placed in defense, while the base was placed on high alert.
The battle
The opposing forces
Allied forces consist of the following units (strengths in parentheses):
Command Company, 26th Marine Corps Infantry Regiment(191)
1st Battalion, 26th Marine Corps Infantry Regiment (1,301)
2nd Battalion, 26th Marine Corps Infantry Regiment (1,254)
3rd Battalion, 26th Marine Corps Infantry Regiment (1,279)
1st Battalion, 9th Marine Corps Infantry Regiment (1,192)
1st Battalion, 13th Marine Corps (Artillery) Regiment (397)
Forward Operation Base 3, Special Forces (588)
37th South Vietnamese Ranger Battalion (318)
The North Vietnamese forces consist of the following units:
304th division
320th division
324Be division
325Ce division
270th independent regiment
16th Artillery Regiment
45th Artillery Regiment
84th Artillery Regiment
204th Regiment artillery
675th artillery regiment
208th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
214th anti-aircraft artillery regiment aerial
228th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment
7th Sapper Regiment
198th Armored Battalion (equipped with light tanks PT- 76)
independent sapper battalion
independent communication battalion
Start of the battle
On January 21, 1968, shortly after midnight, Hill 861 was bombarded by North Vietnamese mortars. Shortly after, sappers attempt to blow up the Marines' positions on the summit while infantry troops attack. The attackers were however repelled, among other things because they had neglected Hill 881 to the south, and found themselves under fire from other, higher positions during the attack. At 5:30 a.m., the bombardment of mortars and artillery positioned on the surrounding mountains began on the base itself. One of the first shells hit the main ammunition depot, where more than 1,500 tons of ammunition, or 90% of the base's reserves, were stored. Huge explosions follow one another inside, lasting more than 48 hours, killing 18 American soldiers and seriously injuring 43 others. At the same time, North Vietnamese troops attack the village of Khe Sanh, held by South Vietnamese marines and rangers. The first attack breaks the defense but a counter-attack is always possible. After a second attack, the defenders withdrew inside the base, abandoning the village to the North Vietnamese. The following days, the Vietnamese carried out armed explorations right up to the defense lines of the marines, but the expected great attack could not be launched. Instead, North Vietnamese artillery guns continued to shell the base, which received 300 shells a day.
The Tet offensive which has just begun takes the American army by surprise. The intelligence services had planned a battle, but not a general offensive. The Tet offensive mobilizes the entire American army, making it impossible to immediately send relief to Khe Sanh. The American soldiers surrounded in the base, with reduced ammunition, are therefore in a bad position.
Khe Sanh under bombardment
Bombardment by North Vietnamese artillery for the next two months became a habit for the embattled marines. To cope with the bombardment, the marines consolidated their cantonments and shelters, which could withstand mortar and light artillery shells, and built a network of trenches and ditches throughout the base.
Supplying the base was difficult to organize for the next two and a half months. Soldiers' rations must be limited. The soldiers sleep in the mud, often with the rats. Despite the consolidations, the hits of the artillery still cause injuries and deaths. Due to the onset of the rainy season, the cantonments, as well as the entire base, quickly turn into a completely muddy landscape.
The besieged are under strong psychological pressure, waiting at any moment for a new attack from the North Vietnamese hidden in the surrounding mountains. Artillery duels between the guns of the base and those of the North Vietnamese are long and frequent.
At the White House, President Johnson keeps up to date on the situation every day through a scale model of the base. The chiefs of staff assure him that the base must be held. For the first time since the start of the Vietnam War, the White House Crisis Center is open 24 hours a day.
Fighting in Lang Vei
Lang Vei camp was established when special forces joined Khe Sanh base in 1966. This camp was located about 9 kilometers from the base, close to Laos. In the two years following its establishment, until 1968, a small camp had developed there. There were 4 defensive positions built in X, inside which was a reinforced concrete command center. The base had been surrounded by barbed wire and a minefield 50 meters wide. The defensive positions were reinforced with wooden beams and sandbags, and had a very good line of fire. Mutual fire protection was also possible.
The camp was defended by about 200 green berets. Four 57 mm recoilless guns were available, as well as two 106 mm, two M2 machine guns and, since January 24, around 100 M72 anti-tank ammunition. These had been brought to the camp after aerial reconnaissance and reports from Laotian auxiliaries had reported tank movements. Added to this were about 290 South Vietnamese irregulars who had been settled for a long time in the Lang Vei camp, a few hundred meters from the special forces camp.
At 12:42 a.m. on February 6, the Vietnamese attack on the camp began, supported by 11 Soviet-made PT-76 tanks. To clear the way for the tanks, sappers preceded them to practice a passage through the barbed wire installed around the camp. When the first flares light up the sky, the defenders become aware of the situation and open fire on the attackers. Two tanks are destroyed by 106 mm guns. However, many anti-tank weapons do not work properly, or the ammunition fails to explode on impact. The Vietnamese, still having tanks, maneuver around the wrecks and manage to break the outer defense of the camp.
The PT-76 tanks, although subjected to heavy fire, seized the positions of the green berets. Quickly, the defenders found themselves dispersed, surrounded and isolated from Khe Sanh, from whom they had hoped for reinforcement. But the Vietnamese occupied the whole region overnight, making any air reinforcement impossible. Route 9 can no longer be used by reinforcement units, because it would have to pass through the village of Khe Sanh occupied by the Vietnamese. The only support for the defenders, an Air Force pilot flew over Lang-Vei for a long time with his observation plane, allowing him to guide fighter-bombers to carry out bombardments, putting two other tanks out of action. But the enemy being very close to the American defenders, it was impossible to use napalm or cluster bombs.
A few hundred meters away, in the old camp, the South Vietnamese were captured or neutralized. Commander Eugene Ashley attacks with Laotian and native troops, but they are held back by enemy fire, and he is mortally wounded in a final attempt to reach camp. The surviving American soldiers continue to defend themselves, and manage to flee under the protection of air attacks. Of the 24 special forces soldiers, four were killed, 9 captured, and the rest managed to escape. The 165 men of the irregulars suffered the highest casualties. In total, the defenders lost 217 men. The losses of the assailants amounted, according to American estimates, to a number of men between 250 and 500.
With the capture of the camp of Lang Vei, the Vietnamese have the possibility of transporting material by road 9 for the continuation of the battle. In addition, the danger on the southwestern flank of the attackers is eliminated. Historians see it as the reason why General Giap used tanks during the conquest of the camp. But most of them were destroyed during this assault, so a tank attack on Khe Sanh, which would have caused a lot of damage, was no longer to be feared.
Aerial supply
Supplying the 6,000 soldiers stationed at Khe Sanh and defending the base required around 120 tons of material every day. Since the base has been completely surrounded by the enemy, this supply must be carried out completely by air. This is not easy, because the North Vietnamese have set up several air defense points equipped with machine guns, which often take heavy and slow supply planes under fire. Added to this are the artillery and mortar fires that sometimes bombard the taxiing planes on the runway.
To supply the base, C-130 Hercules are implemented with 20 tons of cargo capacity, as well as C-123 Provider with 7 tons of capacity, and C-7 Caribou with 3 tons of capacity.
Supply airdrop
At the start of the siege, planes landed and unloaded their cargo in the conventional manner. On February 11, a Marine Corps KC-130 was hit by a mortar shell and exploded with 10 tons of kerosene shortly after landing. Six crew and passengers were killed. The airfield had to be closed, and the Americans looked for an alternative solution for supplying the troops. A few days later, air traffic was reopened for smaller planes like the Providers and the Caribou, these only using part of the runway. But these had too low a freight capacity to ensure the supply on their own.
One of the possibilities was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction. To perform this maneuver, the aircraft flies about 2 meters above the runway. Loading pallets are extracted from the aircraft through the rear cargo door through the deployment of a parachute. There were, however, some spectacular incidents when pallets fell en masse on shelters and damaged them.
In another procedure, also in low-altitude flight, a cable is stretched across the runway and the paddles are pulled by a hook to which they are attached (similar to a landing).
Most supplies, however, are launched by parachute. The base's drop zone is just outside its boundaries, to the east, and is about 300 meters long and 100 meters wide. The release timing must be very precise; a delay or advance of one second means the supply misses the drop zone. The base is equipped with a radar which allows good coordination with the planes, the drops are precise and almost never miss the drop zone.
During the 77 days of the battle, more than 8,000 tons of supply material were dropped during more than 600 parachute drops. 4,000 tons are unloaded by ground procedures. 3 C-123 planes are shot down by the enemy flak.
The struggle for outposts in the hills
The positions of the marines on the hills surrounding the base were essential for the defense. The loss of one or more positions would have meant a quick end for the besieged. For this reason, up to 20% of the troops (about 1,200 men) are posted on the hills.
The marines built many forward positions on the hills, around which the North Vietnamese constantly fought. In direct combat, both sides suffered high casualties, with the American casualty rate being around 50%. In addition to direct attacks, there is artillery bombardment, which the Americans try to combat with the massive use of fighter-bombers and artillery.
Each position on the hills has its own Air Controller (Forward Air Force Observer) who directs fighter-bombers for attack missions. Mortars fire white smoke by day, and flares by night, to mark targets. The corrections and deviations are then communicated by radio to the pilots who have launched their weapons in part on targets located less than 200 meters away from the American positions. “We could feel the heat the of burning napalm on our faces,” wrote one Marine in his memoir. The fight continues around the clock.
The supply of these outposts is only possible by helicopter - each ammunition, each ration, fuel, soldier - everything must be airborne. This proved increasingly difficult over time, as the North Vietnamese took the helicopters under fire during the approach. As soon as they arrived in the area, they were the target of rockets and mortars. The losses are high, and the supply of the troops is increasingly difficult.
SuperGaggle
The supply helicopters suffered heavy losses, and the situation at the outposts became critical. To deal with this, the marines have developed a heavy tactic to implement.
The helicopters no longer approach alone above the objective, but in groups of 16 aircraft, with observation and attack helicopters. An airborne command, often an aircraft, is deployed for each of these operations.
Additionally, at the start of the operation, four A-4 Skyhawks attacked known North Vietnamese air defenses, often mortar and missile positions, with bombs and napalm. Two other Skyhawks then deploy a curtain of smoke along the approach corridor, to mislead the North Vietnamese lookouts. Thirty seconds later the CH-46 SeaKnights then approach under cover of UH-1 gunships, while four more Skyhawks fly nearby for possible support. The transport helicopters then follow one another with 10-second intervals to drop off their cargo (usually at the end of a rope). They only land if necessary, to bring in new reinforcements or evacuate the wounded. "We were literally thrown out" ("we were literally thrown out of the helicopter") writes Dave Powell in his memories. A swarm of helicopters approaches like noisy geese, which quickly earns these expeditions the nickname of Supergaggle (“super herd”). These operations last a maximum of 5 minutes, and ensure the supply of external stations. With this way of proceeding, only 2 helicopters are shot down, which demonstrates the effectiveness of this type of operation.
Air support
The battle of Dien Bien Phu had demonstrated the impossibility for the besieged to defend themselves independently, and the Americans did everything to prevent such a thing from happening. General Westmoreland therefore requested Operation Niagara, a joint USAF and US Navy operation. The name was chosen by Westmoreland.
Operation Niagara I (January 14 to January 21, 1968)
In the months preceding the start of the attack on the Khê Sanh base (January 21, 1968), when the vast movements of troops from North Vietnam had been discovered, a vast reconnaissance and intelligence operation had been planned around Khe Sanh base.
In addition to patrols along the border, which had become the specialty of the 101st division, reconnaissance planes launched listening microphones. These had been launched in advance on supposed and known sectors of operations, and warned the control center of hostile movements. It was from here that information was transmitted to the air force and navy, and orders to attack were given to them. The information gathered allowed the Air Force to react quickly to North Vietnamese troop concentrations and movements before each attack.
Operation Niagara II
When the North Vietnamese attacked the Khê Sanh base on January 21, 1968, air attacks became a major objective of the air force and navy. Operation Niagara I continues and changes in scope. The navy mainly uses fighter-bombers to attack enemy positions. If the weather is favorable and there is no fog or cloud making the approach impossible, fighter-bombers and ground attack aircraft can attack hostile positions 24 hours a day, following the instructions of the controllers base air. There are sometimes several dozen missions a day, and during the 77 days of the siege, approximately 50,000 tons of bombs and 10,000 tons of napalm are dropped on the area around the base.
To this must be added the bombardments carried out by the B-52Stratofortress bombers during Operation Arc Light. Coming from Guam, Thailand or even from the base of Okinawa in Japan, the bombers approaching every 90 minutes pour, 24 hours a day, 23 tons of bombs with each bombardment on the enemy positions. Until February 18, they observe a safety distance of 3 km around the base, so as not to touch the American soldiers. But the Vietnamese have a system of galleries and trenches which comes very close to the lines of the marines, and after February 18, under the guidance of the ground radar of the base, the bombers carry out bombardments until less 1 km from the base. When the success of such actions is proven, the security zone around the base is reduced to 1 km, and the enemy camp is constantly overflown. In total, the B-52s dropped, during 2,548 sorties, approximately 60,000 tons of bombs on the region around the Khe Sanh base. On average, the bombardments are three times more intense than those of the Second World War.
The end of the battle
Direct attack
Attacks on the base itself were limited at first to more or less powerful exploration missions, the main purpose of which was to test the defenses and find its weaknesses. This ceased on February 26 when the North Vietnamese 66th Battalion attacked the base's western defense line, held by the South Vietnamese 37th Ranger Battalion. The defenses of the base then come into action. Artillery guns bombard the Vietnamese with heavy fire.
The Vietnamese troops are caught at the same time under the fire of the American heavy artillery located on the Carrol and Rockpile hills, while the Vietnamese units that remained behind suffer heavy losses from massive air attacks. The surviving attackers are caught in the direct fire of the defenders, and the attack fails.
As shelling from North Vietnamese guns had become a habit for the Marines, listening mics recorded during the last week of March a sharp spike in movement around the base that went hand in hand with an increase in shelling from artillery. On March 23, more than 1,000 shells fell on the base, with an average of 100 shells per hour. The defenders then expect to face a massive attack, but precisely the opposite is happening:the enemy is withdrawing most of their troops from the area, leaving only about 5,000 Nord- Vietnamese.
The marines, after weeks spent not straying more than a few hundred yards from the base, can undertake attacks, more or less strong and aggressive, on the positions of the North Vietnamese in the hills, and sometimes succeed to dislodge them.
On March 31, the US 1st Cavalry Division, units of the 1st and 26th Marine Infantry Regiments, and the 2nd South Vietnamese Airborne Force began an attack along Route 9. This was the start of the Operation Pegasus.
The units of marines and the South Vietnamese advance along the road and, at the same time, the 1st Cavalry Division protects the flanks of the relief column by going to inspect and neutralize the North Vietnamese positions in the hills to the north and south of the road. Early in the afternoon of April 6, the first units of South Vietnamese rangers reached the base of Khe Sanh. Two days later, the partly destroyed Route 9 is free and passable again, after pioneers have reconstructed it. The First Cavalry Division reaches the base, to relieve the Marines. Operation Pegasus officially ended on April 14, after Vietnamese units and the 1st Cavalry Division joined all isolated posts on the plateaus. There, they see the effects of the bombings of Operation Niagara by discovering hundreds of dead North Vietnamese, sometimes insufficiently buried.
Repair and demolition of the base
The 26th Marine Division finds itself in the media spotlight after April 18. On May 23, she received a Presidential Citation from President Johnson.
The Khe Sanh base was then largely rebuilt, but only a few artillery positions continued to support operations in the western Quang tri province. When it became clear that President Johnson would not approve of an expansion of the conflict into bordering Laos due to the difficult political situation in America, it was decided to evacuate the base, which was done on June 23, the day it was finally closed. evacuated. From then on, there are no more mobile units available in the sector, the base not being necessary to attack the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Result and analysis
Military
The American General Staff considered the siege of Khe Sanh a victory. After more than two months of fighting during which the US Air Force rained several thousand tons of bombs on the hills around Khe Sanh, the US military estimated that at least 13,000 Vietnamese had been killed. During Operation Pegasus, the First Cavalry Division recovered thousands of weapons and supplies from the North Vietnamese army in the Khe Sanh region (the biggest prize of the war), as well as numerous books and letters belonging to soldiers. The prisoners were relatively few in number, but several said that their regiments had been decimated by the American air force. General Westmoreland, commander of the MACV, claimed that Khe Sanh was a "Dien Bien Phu in reverse".
Overall
Militarily, the battle is an undeniable American victory, but the aim pursued by the Vietnamese is unclear. For some this battle was a Vietnamese strategic victory, as it allowed them to fix a large amount of American troops away from the cities where the Tet offensive was simultaneously taking place. This indeed served the Vietnamese designs. Le but de la bataille n’aurait donc pas été de battre l’armée américaine, mais de retenir troupes matériel et moyens, chose que les Vietnamiens ont réussi à faire. La discussion n’est pas close à ce jour.
Apparitions