However, Katanga still refuses to cooperate, and the drama will be intensified by the death of Dag Hammarskjôld, killed in a mysterious plane crash while traveling to Katanga to negotiate with Tschombé. As it was necessary at all costs to restore the badly shaken prestige of the United Nations, the "blue helmets" were authorized to take part in an action against Katanga. In December 1962, the secession of Katanga will end and Tschombé will be sent into exile.
Those who thought that the disappearance of Lumumba would put an end to extremism in the Congo are very disappointed. The conditions that brought Lumumba to power remain. We can even say that they were aggravated by the uprisings of previous years. Unemployment is still rising and rural areas have not received any improvements. Moreover, the Congo now has its elite, and what an elite! A colorful amalgamation of overpaid soldiers and politicians, civil servants, both incompetent and extravagant.
The unrest grows. The government does not know how to remedy this state of affairs. Under pressure from the military and right-wing politicians, Adoula ousted Stanleyville chiefs from key positions, and Gizenga was arrested in January 1962. As a reaction to the obvious signs of an impending crisis, Adoula, which now has no adviser, only knows how to spread threats.
In the regions particularly affected by the economic crisis or which were the strongholds of the M.N.C. before independence, the agitation gradually turns into anarchy. Bands of guerrillas go into action in eastern Congo and near Léopoldville. This serious threat, added to the rumors circulating about a Chinese intervention in the Congo, causes great concern in Léopoldville and far beyond. Americans and Belgians then increased their aid to the Congolese army and Tschombé returned from exile in June 1964 to take Adoula's place. He brought with him bands of white mercenaries and secured the financial support of those who made Katanga an impregnable citadel.
Against such power, the guerrillas have no chance. A revolutionary regime has been established in Stanleyville, but its leaders have difficulty controlling the uprisings, which remain essentially local. The situation will reach its crisis point when Belgian paratroopers are released on Stanleyville in order to deliver the white hostages who are held there.
This action allows Tschombé's forces to seize the city and, thereafter, to definitively crush the uprising. With this goal achieved, Tschombé's role was over, and in November 1965 Mobutu—now a general—announced that the army was once again seizing power.
Mobutu's main objective by doing so seems to be to prevent the Congo from descending into civil war and to adopt a policy more in harmony with that of other African states. He will therefore consolidate his own power, put an end to the worst excesses of the Congolese elite, renew relations with neighboring countries and make slightly more advantageous agreements with the Mining Union. All this will be possible because some changes have taken place also in the structures.
At the end of the 1960s, the shoddy elite of the early days of independence gave way to better trained and more “evolved” executives; Congolese participation in the country's economy is greater; in the cities, the situation has improved. It is clear that the stability of the country depends entirely on the maintenance of these conditions.
But the future of the Congo is still uncertain. Because even in African states with a more stable regime, a serious crisis can erupt from one day to the next. This will be the case of Nigeria.