Theodor Mommsen
German historian and philologist (1817-1903), Nobel Prize winner in 1907, publisher of the gigantic Corpus of Latin inscriptions, author of the History of the Romans in eight volumes, as well as works on Roman law.
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Success had crowned the projects born of the genius of Hamilcar:he had prepared the ways and means of war, a numerous army, tried and tested, accustomed to victory, and a fund that was filling up every day. But suddenly, when the time came to choose the place of the fight and the route to follow, the leader failed in the company. The man who, carrying his head and heart high in the midst of everyone's despair, had known how to open the way to salvation for his people, this man has just disappeared, barely entering his career. Why did Hasdrubal stop attacking Rome? Did he believe the times were not yet propitious? Politician rather than general, did he not dare to believe himself at the level of the company? I could not decide - Be that as it may, at the beginning of the year 534 he fell under the sword of an assassin, and the officers of the army of Spain elected for his successor Hannibal, the eldest son of Hamilcar. The new general was still very young:born in 505, he was in his twenty-ninth year. But he had lived a lot:his memories of childhood showed him his father fighting in a foreign country, and victorious on Mount Eirctè; he had been present at the peace concluded with Catulus; he had shared with the unconquered Harmilcar the bitterness of the return to Africa, the anguish and the perils of the Libyan war; as a child he had followed his father to the camps:barely a teenager he had distinguished himself in combat. Nimble and robust, he ran and handled arms excellently; he was the boldest of squires; he didn't need sleep; like a true soldier, he savored a good meal, or endured hunger without difficulty. Although he had lived in the midst of the camps, he had received the usual culture among the Phoenicians of the upper classes. He learned enough Greek, having become a general, and thanks to the lessons of his faithful Sosilon of Sparta, to be able to write his despatches in that language. As a teenager, he had made, as I have said, his first arms under the orders and under the eyes of his father:he had seen him fall at his side during the battle. Then, under the generalate of her sister's husband, Hasdruhal; he had commanded the cavalry. There, his brilliant bravery and his military talents had immediately marked him out among all. And now the voice of his equals was calling the young and skilful general at the head of the army. It was up to him to carry out the grand purposes for which his father and brother-in-law had lived and died. Called to succeed them, he knew how to be their worthy heir:Contemporaries wanted to cast all sorts of stains on this great character:the Romans called him cruel, the Carthaginians called him greedy. In fact, he hated as Oriental natures know how to hate:general, money and ammunition failing him at all times, he had to procure them as best he could. In vain anger, envy, vulgar feelings have darkened its history, its image still stands pure and great before our eyes. If you put aside miserable inventions which carry their condemnation with themselves, and the faults put under his name and which must be referred to their real authors, to his second generals, to Hannibal Monomakh; to Magon the Samnite, you find nothing in the accounts of his life which is not justified either by the condition of the times or by the law of the people of his century. All the chroniclers credit him with having brought together, better than anyone else, composure and ardor, foresight and action. He had above all the spirit of invention and cunning, one of the characteristics of the Phoenician genius; he loved to walk in unexpected ways, proper to himself alone. Fertile in masked expedients and stratagems, he studied with incredible care the habits of the adversary he had to fight. His army of spies (he had some at home even in Rome) kept him informed of all the enemy's plans:he was often seen, in disguise, wearing false hair, exploring and probing here and there. His strategic genius is written on all the pages of the history of this century. He was also a statesman of the first order. After the peace with Rome, we will see him reforming the constitution of Carthage; we shall see him, banished and wandering abroad, exercising an immense influence on the policy of the Eastern empires. Finally, his ascendancy over men is attested by the incredible and constant submission of this mixed army of races and languages, which, in even the most disastrous times, did not once revolt against him. Finally, a great man, in the truest sense of the word, he attracts all eyes.
No sooner had he been promoted to command than he wanted to start the war without delay (spring of 534). Serious reasons impelled him to it. The Gauls were still fermenting. The Macedonian seemed ready to attack Rome. By putting himself immediately into the field, he could choose his ground, and that before the Romans had had time to begin the war by a descent into Africa, a more convenient undertaking, in their eyes. His army was complete, his coffers had been filled by a few great raids. - But Carthage showed itself nothing less than eager to send its declaration of war, and it was more difficult to give within its walls a political successor to Hasdrubal, the leader of the people, than to replace him, general, in Spain. There, the peace faction had the upper hand, and then put all the men of the other party on trial. She who had mutilated and diminished Hamilcar's undertakings, would she be more favorable to this unknown young man, who yesterday commanded beyond the Straits, and whose reckless patriotism was about to be unleashed at the expense of the State? Hannibal backed down:he also did not want to declare war on his leader, putting himself in open revolt against the legitimized authorities of the African republic. He then resolved to push the Saguntines to acts of hostility:the Saguntines contented themselves with lodging a complaint with Rome. This one having dispatched its ambassadors on the spot, Hannibal tried, by dint of disdain, to push them to denounce the rupture. But the commissioners saw the situation well; they were silent in Spain, reserving their recriminations for Carthage itself, and telling Rome that Hannibal was armed, and that the struggle was near. Time was running. Soon the news spread of the death of Antigone Doson, which occurred suddenly and almost at the same time as the end of Hasdrubal. In the Cisalpine, the Romans led with redoubled activity and energy the construction of their fortresses; and from the first days of spring the Republic proposed to put an end to the outcry of the Illyrians at once. Every day that passed was an irreparable loss:Hannibal took his side. He let Carthage know without further ado that the Saguntines, squeezing closely the Torboletes, Carthaginian subjects, he was going to lay siege to their city; and without waiting for an answer, he invested (from the spring of 535) the allied city of the Romans. It was to start the war with the Republic. The news came like a thunderbolt in Carthage. What was the impression felt? What deliberations ensued? We can realize this by recalling the effect produced in Germany and in a certain world by the capitulation of General York (in 1813). All the “men in high places,” say historians, disapproved of this “unsanctioned” government assault. It was necessary to disavow these reckless officers of the army, to hand them over to the Romans!... to go back, or also that the inertia of the minds was stronger than the very necessity of a decision, we decided not to take any:and without putting our hand in the war, we let Hannibal do it. . Sagunto defended itself, as only the Spanish cities know how to defend themselves. If the Romans had shown any of their customers' energy; if, during the eight months of the siege, they had not wasted their time in miserable combats against the pirates of Illyria, masters, as they were, of the sea and the landing places, they would have avoided the ashamed of this protection so promised and yet ridiculous:they would perhaps have taken military events on a completely different path. But they delayed, and Sagunto was finally taken by assault. At the sight of the immense treasures sent by Hannibal to Carthage, patriotism and belligerent ardor awoke among the most refractory. The spoils shared, reconciliation was no longer possible with Rome. She nevertheless sent her ambassadors to Africa, even after the destruction of Sagunto, demanding the surrender of the Carthaginian general and the Gerousiasts who assisted him in the camp. Excuses were tried, but the Roman orator cut them short, and gathering the folds of his toga, he said to the Carthaginians; that he held therein peace and war, and that it was necessary to choose. Driven by a movement of courage, the Ancients replied to the Roman that he would have to make his choice himself. The ambassador opted for war, and the challenge was immediately taken up (spring of 536).
Sagunto's stubborn resistance had cost Hannibal a whole year. The campaign over, he returned to Cartagena, taking up his winter quarters there as usual (535-536), and preparing there both for his next expedition and for the defense of Spain and Africa. Like his father and his brother-in-law, he had command over the two countries, and consequently also fell to him the duty of watching over the protection of the metropolis. His united forces consisted of about one hundred and twenty thousand men, foot, sixteen thousand horse, fifty-eight elephants, thirty-two quinqueremes armed in war, and eighteen quinqueremes unarmed, not counting the elephants and the ships left at Carthage. With the exception of a few Ligurians placed in the light troops, he no longer had any mercenaries in his troops. There were also some Phoenician squadrons there; but the bulk of the army was almost exclusively formed of contingents from the subjects of Libya and Spain. To ensure their fidelity, Hannibal, with his profound knowledge of men, had given them a mark of great confidence:they were all given a holiday during the winter. In his broad-minded patriotism, very different from the narrow-mindedness of his compatriots, the general had promised under oath to the Libyans to confer upon them the right of citizenship in Carthage, if they one day returned victorious from Rome to Africa. Moreover, he did not employ all his troops on the Italian expedition. Twenty thousand men returned to Africa, the smallest number to go and defend Carthage and the proper Punic territory; the largest division remaining confined to the western tip of the continent. Spain kept twelve thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred horses, about half the elephants, and the fleet which continued to be stationed on the coast, Hannibal giving supreme command there to his younger brother, Hasdrubal. If he only sent weak reinforcements in the Phoenician region proper, it was because Carthage, if necessary, could suffice there for everything. In the same way in Spain, where the new levies were recruited without difficulty, he secured his rear sufficiently by leaving only a nucleus of solid infantry, with the addition of what constituted the strength of the Carthaginian army, namely, a good cavalry and elephants. At the same time he took the most exact measures to always have easy communications between Africa and Spain:he left the fleet on the coast, as we have just seen, a numerous corps occupying West Africa. In order to be still more certain of the fidelity of his soldiers, he had shut up in the stronghold of Sagunto the hostages of the Spanish cities; and transporting his troops to the countries farthest from the place where they had been raised, he had preferably kept under his immediate orders the militias of East Africa, sent the Spaniards into West Africa, and the Africans from the west to Carthage. He had therefore provided for everything on the defense side.
The arrangements for the offensive were no less grandiose. Carthage was to send twenty-fifths of a thousand armies, with the mission of descending on the western coast of Italy and wreaking havoc there. A second squadron of twenty-five sails had Lilybee for its objective:this city was to be reoccupied. But these were only the more modest and incidental details of the enterprise:Hannibal thought he could rely on Carthage for their proper execution. As for him, he had decided to leave for Italy with the great army, taking in hand the execution of the plan undoubtedly conceived before him by his father. Just as Carthage was directly attackable only in Libya; in the same way, Rome could only be reached by Italy. Rome certainly wanted to descend on Africa, and Carthage could no longer, as before, limit itself to secondary operations, such as the struggle in Sicily, or the defensive on its own territory. Defeats involved the same disastrous consequences there:victory did not ensure the same results. - But how, by where to attack Italy? Assuredly the roads of land and sea led there; but if the enterprise was not a sort of desperate adventure, if Hannibal dreamed of a serious expedition, having a vast and strategic goal at the same time, he needed a base of operations closer than Spain or Spain. Africa. Rome being mistress of the sea, a fleet, a maritime fortress constituted a bad support. He could not count more on the regions occupied by the Italian Confederation. At other times, despite the powerful sympathies aroused by the Greek name, it had held firm before Pyrrhus:one could not expect to see it dissolve at the appearance of a Carthaginian general. Between the network of Roman fortresses and the strong chain of Rome's allies, wouldn't an invading army soon be crushed? Only the Ligurians and the Gauls offered Hannibal all the advantages which the Poles assured Napoleon in his campaigns against the Russians, analogous in so many respects to the Carthaginian expedition. These peoples still shuddered after the war in which their independence had perished:strangers to the Italics, threatened in their lives, seeing rise among them the first enclosures of the Roman citadels and these great roads which enveloped them, would they not believe to see saviors in the Carthaginian army, where the Celts of Spain fought en masse? Would they not be for Hannibal a first and solid point of support? Would they not furnish him with both supplies and recruits? He had already made formal contact with the Boïes and the Insubres, who had promised guides to his army, a warm welcome to their brothers in race, and provisions on the road. They were to rise as soon as the Carthaginians set foot on Italian soil. Events in the East were no less conducive to invasion. Macedonia, whose victory at Sellasia had just consolidated the empire in the Peloponnese, was at odds with Rome. Demetrius of Pharos, who, betraying his alliance with the Republic, had gone over to the Macedonians, and had seen himself driven from his little kingdom, had taken refuge at the court of the king of Macedonia, and the latter had refused his extradition. Where, other than in the plains of the Po, could one attempt to unite against the common enemy the armies coming from the banks of the Betis (Guadalquivir) and the Strymon (Kara-sou or Strouma)? Thus, circumstances pointed to northern Italy as the real point of attack:and already, in 524, new proof of the serious plans of Hamilcar, the Romans, to their great astonishment, had come up against, in Liguria, against a detachment of Carthaginian soldiers. - It is less clear why Hannibal preferred the land route to the sea route. Neither the naval supremacy of the Romans, nor their alliance with Marseilles could prevent a landing on the coast of Genua (Genoa):this is understandable alone, and what followed showed him well. But Hannibal had to choose between two pitfalls. He probably preferred not to expose himself to the unknown dangers of a crossing, to the vicissitudes of a naval war, which always leave less hold to human prudence, and he thought it wiser to go to the - in front of Boies and Insubres, whose assistance was seriously promised to him, no one can doubt it. Besides, disembarking at Genua, he still had the mountain to cross, and it was not given to him to know that the passes of the Alps were more arduous and difficult than the passes of the Apennines, in Liguria. . Finally, the route he followed was that of the ancient Celtic migrations; swarms more numerous than his army had penetrated into Italy by way of the Alps. The ally and savior of the Italian Gauls did not think he was reckless in following in their footsteps.
Therefore, at the opening of the season, Hannibal gathered under Cartagena all the troops composing the great army:ninety thousand infantry and twelve thousand horses; two-thirds African, one-third Spaniards. He takes thirty-seven elephants, rather to impose on the Gauls than as effective combat reinforcement. His infantry no longer had anything in common with that of Xanthippe, hiding in fear behind the line of these large animals. He was no man to ignore that this was a double-edged sword, bringing defeat to friendly ranks as often as to the enemy. So he only used elephants sparingly, and in small numbers. Such was the army with which he left Cartagena, and marched towards the Ebro, in the spring of 536. sweated enough to give even the common soldier confidence. The latter, whose military instinct had been developed under arms, sensed everywhere the clear and bold views, the sure and strong hand of his general, and he followed him with blind faith in his unknown ways. Then, when by his fiery words he showed them the humiliated fatherland, the insolent demands of Rome, the imminent enslavement of that Carthage which was dear to them, the shameful extradition of their general and his officers imposed as a condition of the peace, he dragged them along with him, eager for war, carried away by the impulse of good citizenship.
In Rome, the situation was what it often is in the midst of the most firmly established and far-sighted aristocracies. Certainly the government knew what it wanted, and it acted. Unfortunately it was neither good nor timely. The gates of the Alps could have been closed a long time ago, and done with the Cisalpines:now the Alps had been left open, and the Cisalpines were still formidable. We could have lived in peace with Carthage, and in lasting peace, on the condition of faithfully observing the treaty of 513. If we wanted the ruin of Carthage, the legions could and should have reduced it a long time ago. But in fact, the treaties had been violated by the confiscation of Sardinia, and during the twenty years of respite which it had enjoyed, Carthage had regenerated itself. Nothing could be easier than to live in good relations with Macedonia:but its friendship had been sacrificed to a feeble conquest. There had not been found in Rome one of those great statesmen who look down on the situation and direct events. Everywhere we had done too much or too little. Now here comes the war the enemy could freely choose his hour and the place of the fight, and the Romans, while being fully and justly aware of their military superiority, had at the beginning of the campaign neither plan nor aim. , nor guaranteed walking. They had half a million soldiers on hand. Their cavalry alone was less good, and all things considered, less numerous than that of the enemy. Among them it was only one-tenth of the total strength, while among the Carthaginians it amounted to one-eighth. But the Roman fleet numbered two hundred and twenty quinqueremes, all recently returned from the Adriatic:what people engaged in the next war could have put so many in line, and how easy it would have been to take advantage of this overwhelming force! For many years it had been understood that at the first outcry, the legions would land in Africa:later, events having worked, it was also necessary to think of a combined descent into Spain, to retain the army of occupation there, who. otherwise it could immediately be carried under the walls of Carthage. It would have been acting again in accordance with this same plan of campaign, to throw a Roman army into the Peninsula, on the news of the opening of hostilities by Hannibal, in 535, and of the investment of Sagunto. But, it would have been necessary to run there before the fall of the city; and they remained deaf in Rome to the advice of a better strategy, as well as to the injunctions of honor. Sagunto held out for eight months; his heroism was useless. It had fallen, that Rome had no ready landing army. There remained the region between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. The peoples who inhabited it were still free. Natural allies of Rome, the promise of prompt help had been made to them as to the Saguntines. From Italy to Catalonia there is no further for ships than for troops leaving Cartagena by land. If, after the formally declared war, the Romans had set out at the same time as the Carthaginians, that is to say with the month of April, Hannibal could have found the legions already posted on the line of the River Ebro. - Be that as it may, the bulk of the Roman army remaining reserved for the African expedition, the second consul Publius Cornelius Scipio receives the order to go and defend the border river in Spain; but he takes it easy, and a revolt occurring in the plain of the Po, he. goes there with his troops ready to embark. The expedition to Spain will be carried out by means of other legions in the process of being formed. Meanwhile, Hannibal has arrived on the Ebro. He is welcomed there by a stubborn resistance. But in the present circumstances time is more precious to him than the blood of his soldiers. In a few months he crushed the natives, and with his army already reduced by a quarter, he reached the Pyrenees. The culpable delays of Rome have a second time caused the loss of its Spanish allies. This disaster was easily foreseen as much as delays could have been easily avoided. Moreover, the landing of the legions, if it had taken place in good time, would probably have put an obstacle to the invasion of Italy, of which it seems that even in the spring of 536 the Romans had not yet had the forecast. As for Hannibal, in going to throw himself into the territory of the enemy, he had no intention of acting desperately and abandoning his "Spanish kingdom." The time employed in the siege of Sagunto and in the submission of Catalonia; the considerable body left by him in the conquered country north of the Ebro; all the precautions taken, finally, demonstrate that if the legions had come to dispute the empire of Spain with him, he would not have contented himself with evading their attacks; but had the Romans only delayed his departure from Spain for a few weeks, a capital advantage was thereby acquired for them. Winter closed the passes of the Alps before the arrival of the Carthaginians, and the expeditionary force bound for Africa accomplished its descent there without firing a shot.
Arriving in the Pyrenees, Hannibal sent some of his soldiers home. Measure premeditated from the beginning, and which testified loudly in the eyes of the army of the general's confidence in the success of the enterprise, at the same time as it was a denial given to those who believed that it was one of those whose no one returns. It was with fifty thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry only that he crossed the chain without encountering any difficulties. Then, along the coast in the region of Narbonne and Nîmes, it quickly opens a passage in the middle of the Gallic peoples, made favorable by previous negotiations, or bought on the spot by Carthaginian gold, or finally tamed by arms. At the end of July, he arrived on the Rhône opposite Avenio (Avignon). Here awaits, it seems, a more serious resistance:the consul Scipio had landed at Marseilles (at the end of June):on his way to Spain, he learned that it was too late, and that Hannibal had not only passed the Ebro, but also crossed the Pyrenees. At this news, which finally shed light on the direction and the goal of the Carthaginian expedition, the consul abandoned his plans for Spain for the moment, and decided to make his connection with the Celtic peoples of the region. all obeying the influence of the Massaliots and by the Massaliots the Roman influence. He will therefore receive Hannibal on the Rhone, and will close to him the passage of the river and the entrance to Italy. Fortunately for the Carthaginians, they had in front of them, on the place of their projected passage, only a few Gallic militias. The consul, with his army (twenty-two thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry) was still at Massalie, four days' march downstream. The envoys of the Gauls hastened up and gave him notice of the arrival of the enemy. The latter saw himself obliged to cross the rapid torrent in all haste with his numerous cavalry, his elephants, under the eyes of the Gauls, and before the Roman showed himself. He did not have a basket. Immediately and by his order, all the boats employed in the country in the navigation of the Rhone are bought at any price; others are built by cutting down the trees in the vicinity. In a short time the preparations are made. The army will be able to complete its passage in a single day. During this time a strong detachment commanded by Hannon, son of Bomilcar; goes up the river a few days' march above Avignon, and finding an easier and undefended place, he lands on the other bank by means of rafts quickly assembled; then he descends towards the south, to fall on the backs of the Gauls, who stop the bulk of the army. The morning of the fifth day after his arrival, three days after the departure of Hanno; Hannibal sees a column of smoke rising in front of him, an agreed signal which announces to him the presence of his detachment; immediately he gave the impatiently awaited order to attack. The Gauls, at the first movement of the enemy flotilla, hasten to the shore; but suddenly the fire set behind them in their camp surprises them and stops them. Divided, unable to resist those who attack them, nor those who cross the river, they flee and disappear.
During this time, Scipion takes council in Massalie, and inquires about the points which it would be advisable to occupy on the Rhone. The Gauls may have sent him the most pressing messages, but he did not see fit to march against the enemy. He does not want to believe the news that is brought to him, and is content to send a small corps of cavalry to scout the left bank. This corps collides with the entire Carthaginian army, which has already passed beyond the river, and is helping to transport the elephants left on the right bank. He completes his reconnaissance, by delivering a lively and bloody combat, - the first combat of this war, - against a few squadrons of Carthaginians who were also battling the plain (not far from Avignon); then he turns quickly, and goes to report the situation to headquarters. Then Scipio marches off by forced marches; but when he arrives, already for three days the Carthaginian cavalry, after having protected the passage of the elephants, has followed the bulk of the army. It only remains for the consul to return ingloriously to Massalia with his tired troops, madly affecting the contempt of those Carthaginians who have cowardly fled. - In fact, it was the third time that the Romans, through pure negligence, abandoned their allies and lost an important line of defense. Then, as after the mistake had been made, they had passed from unreasonable immobility to more unreasonable haste; as they had just done, without a plan, without result, what, a few days earlier, they could and should have, in complete safety, executed in a useful way, they thus put themselves in no condition to repair their faults. . Une fois de l’autre côté du Rhône, il n’y avait plus à songer à empêcher Hannibal d’atteindre le pied des Alpes. Du moins Scipion pouvait-il encore, à la première nouvelle du passage du fleuve, s’en retourner avec toute son armée :en passant par Genua il ne lui fallait que sept jours pour arriver sur le Pô. Là, il opérait sa jonction avec les corps plus faibles stationnés dans la contrée :il attendait l’ennemi, et le recevait vigoureusement. Mais non, après avoir perdu du temps en courant sur Avignon, il semble que Scipion, homme habile pourtant, n’ait eu alors ni courage politique, ni tact militaire; il n’ose pas prendre conseil des circonstances, et modifier la destination de son corps d’armée; il le fait embarquer pour l’Espagne en majeure partie, sous le commandement de Gnœus, son frère, et revient à Pise avec le reste.
Hannibal, le Rhône franchi, avait convoqué une grande revue de ses troupes, leur annonçant quels étaient ses projets, et les abouchant à l’aide d’un interprète avec un chef gaulois, Magilus, venu de la région du Pô; puis il s’était de suite remis sans obstacle en marche vers les passes des Alpes. Là, choisissant sa route, il ne prit en considération ni la moindre longueur des vallées, ni les dispositions plus ou moins favorables des habitants, quelque intérêt qu’il eût d’ailleurs à ne pas perdre une minute dans des combats de détail ou dans les détours de la montagne. Avant tout, il devait préférer le chemin le plus facilement praticable pour ses bagages, sa nombreuse cavalerie et ses éléphants, celui où il trouverait bon gré mal gré des subsistances en quantité suffisante. Bien qu’il portât avec lui des approvisionnements considérables chargés à dos de bêtes de somme, ces approvisionnements ne pouvaient alimenter que pendant quelques jours son armée forte encore, nonobstant ses pertes, de cinquante mille hommes valides. Quand on laissait de côté la route qui longe la mer, et dont il ne voulut pas, non parce que les Romains la lui barraient, mais parce qu’elle l’eût éloigné du but2. Dans ces temps anciens, deux passages seulement, méritant ce nom, conduisaient des Gaules en Italie par les cols alpestres :l’un franchissait les Alpes Cottiennes (mont Genèvre) et descendait chez les Taurins (à Turin par Suse où Fenestrelles) :l’autre, par les Alpes Gréees (le petit Saint-Bernard), conduisait chez les Salasses (pays d’Aoste et d’Ivrée). Le premier est plus court :mais après avoir quitté le Rhône, il conduit dans les vallées difficiles et infertiles du Drac, de la Romanche et de la haute Durance, au travers d’âpres et pauvres montagnes; il demande sept à huit jours de marche. Pompée le premier a tracé là une voie militaire, afin d’établir la plus directe communication possible entre la Gaule cisalpine et la Gaule transalpine. - Par le petit Saint-Bernard, le chemin est un peu plus long; mais quand il a dépassé le premier contrefort des Alpes, à l’est du Rhône, il longe la haute Isère, qui, courant non loin de Chambéry, remonte de Grenoble jusqu’au pied du col, ou, si l’on veut, jusqu’au pied de la grande chaîne, et forme la plus large, la plus fertile et la plus peuplée des vallées alpestres dans cette région. De plus, le col, en ce point, y est le moins élevé de tous les passages naturels des Alpes dans la contrée (2,192 mètres) :il est de beaucoup aussi le plus commode; et, quoique nulle route n’y ait jamais été construite, on a vu en 1815 un corps autrichien le traverser avec de l’artillerie. Ne coupant, comme on voit, que deux chaînes, la passe du petit Saint-Bernard était devenue la plus fréquentée dans les anciens temps, et c’est par là que les grandes bandes gauloises opéraient leurs descentes en Italie. En réalité, l’armée d’Hannibal n’avait pas à choisir :par un concours heureux de circonstances, sans qu’elles aient été pour lui un motif déterminant, les peuplades cisalpines avec lesquelles il avait fait alliance habitaient jusqu’au pied du col. Par le mont Genèvre, au contraire, il serait arrivé chez les Taurins, de tout temps en guerre avec les Insubres. - Je crois donc que la grande armée carthaginoise marcha directement vers le val de la haute Isère, non pas, comme on pourrait le supposer, par le chemin le plus court, en longeant la rive gauche de l’Isère inférieure (de Valence à Grenoble), mais en traversant « l’Ile des Allobroges, » ou le massif déprimé, riche alors et populeux, que confinent le Rhône au nord et à l’ouest, l’Isère au sud et les Alpes à l’est. Ici encore Hannibal négligea la ligne directe, qui l’obligeait à traverser un pays de montagnes âpre et pauvre, tandis que l’Ile est moins montueuse et plus fertile, et que, dans cette direction, il n’avait qu’un faîte à franchir pour déboucher ensuite dans le haut val d’Isère. La traversée de l’Ile, en remontant le Rhône d’abord, et en se jetant ensuite sur la droite, lui demanda seize jours. Il ne rencontra pas de difficultés sérieuses et, dans l’Ile elle-même, ayant su mettre à profit les hostilités qui venaient d’éclater entre deux chefs allobroges, l’un d’eux, le plus considérable, se déclara son obligé, donna lui-même la conduite à l’armée dans tout le bas pays, pourvut à ses approvisionnements, et remit aux soldats des armes, des vêtements et des chaussures. Mais arrivés à la première chaîne qui s’élève comme une muraille à pic, et n’est accessible que par un seul point (montée du mont du Chat, par le village de Chevalu), un incident fâcheux les arrêta tout à coup. Les Allobroges occupaient en nombre le col. Hannibal, prévenu à temps, évita de se laisser surprendre. Il campa au pied du mont, et, la nuit venue, pendant que les Gaulois étaient rentrés chez eux dans la bicoque voisine, il s’empara du passage. Les hauteurs étaient conquises, mais à la descente rapide qui conduit vers le lac du Bourget, les chevaux et les mulets perdirent pied. A ce moment, les Gaulois apostés attaquèrent, moins dangereux d’ailleurs que gênants par le désordre qu’ils jetaient dans la marche de l’armée. Mais bientôt le général s’élance sur eux à la tête de ses troupes légères, les repousse sans peine et les rejette en bas de la montagne après leur avoir tué beaucoup de monde. Le tumulte du combat avait augmenté les périls et les embarras de la descente, surtout pour le train et les équipages. Arrivé enfin de l’autre côté, non sans de sérieuses pertes, Hannibal enlève d’assaut la cité la plus voisine, pour châtier et effrayer les barbares, et pour se remonter en chevaux et mulets. On se repose un jour dans la belle vallée de Chambéry, puis on côtoie l’Isère sans trouver d’obstacle ni du côté des vivres ni du côté de l’ennemi. Mais en entrant le quatrième jour sur le territoire des Ceutrons (la Tarentaise), les Carthaginois voient la vallée se resserrer peu à peu; là, il faut être de nouveau sur ses gardes. Les gens du pays les attendent à la frontière (environs de Conflans); portant des rameaux et des couronnes; ils donnent de la viande, des guides et des otages; il semble qu’on soit en territoire ami. Mais quand les Carthaginois ont atteint le pied de la haute chaîne, au point où leur chemin quitte l’Isère, et, remontant un. âpre et étroit défilé le long du ruisseau de la Récluse, s’élève peu à peu vers le col du petit Saint-Bernard, voici que soudain les Ceutrons se jettent sur eux par derrière, et les assaillent de flanc du haut des rochers qui enserrent la passe à droite et à gauche :ils espèrent couper l’armée de ses équipages et de ses bagages. Hannibal, avec sa finesse habituelle, les avait devinés. Il savait qu’ils ne l’avaient bien accueilli d’abord qu’afin de ne pas voir leur pays ravagé, préparant d’ailleurs leur trahison, et comptant sur un pillage facile. Dans la prévision d’une attaque, il avait envoyé son train et sa cavalerie en avant. L’infanterie tout entière venait derrière et couvrait la marche. Les projets hostiles des Ceutrons, étaient donc déjoués :toutefois, accompagnant l’infanterie dans sa marche, et lançant ou roulant sur elle de lourdes pierres du haut des rochers voisins, ils lui font éprouver des pertes sérieuses. On atteint enfin la Roche blanche (elle porte encore ce nom), haute masse calcaire surplombant à l’entrée des dernières pentes. Hannibal s’y arrête et y campe, et protége durant la nuit l’ascension de ses chevaux et de ses mulets :le jour suivant, le combat recommence, et se continue sanglant jusqu’au sommet. Là enfin les troupes ont du repos. On s’arrête sur un haut plateau, facile à défendre (le cirque d’Hannibal), qui se développe sur une longueur de deux milles et demi (allem., environ cinq lieues), et d’où la Doire (Duria), sortant d’un petit lac (lac Verney ou des Eaux rouges), descend vers l’Italie. Il était temps. Déjà les soldats perdaient courage. Le chemin devenu plus impraticable tous les jours; les provisions épuisées; ces dangereux défilés, où un ennemi inattaquable attaquait sans cesse, et incommodait la marche; les rangs qui allaient s’éclaircissant; leurs camarades tombés dans les ravins; les blessés abandonnés sans espoir, tous ces maux n’avaient pas laissé que d’ébranler le moral des vétérans d’Espagne et d’Afrique. Tous déjà, à l’exception du chef et de ses intimes, ne voyaient :plus qu’une chimère dans l’entreprise. Mais la confiance d’Hannibal ne se démentit pas. De nombreux soldats se retrouvèrent qui avaient roulé sur la route; les Gaulois alliés étaient tout proches; on était au point de partage des eaux; on avait devant soi la descente, dont la vue réjouit toujours les yeux du voyageur en montagne. Après s’être un peu reposée, l’armée a repris courage, et commence la dernière et plus difficile opération, qui doit la conduire au bas du passage, l’ennemi ne l’incommode plus beaucoup :mais déjà la saison devenant mauvaise (on était aux premiers jours de septembre) remplace à la descente les incommodités essuyées à la montée par le fait des barbares. Sur les pentes raides et glissantes des bords de la Doire, où la neige fraîche avait détruit toute trace des sentiers, hommes et animaux s’égaraient, perdaient pied, tombaient dans les abîmes. Au soir du premier jour on arriva à une place de deux cents pas de longueur, où déferlaient à toute minute les avalanches détachées des pics abruptes du Cramont, recouverts toute l’année par les neiges, durant les étés froids. L’infanterie put passer, mais il n’en fut pas de même des éléphants et des chevaux. Ceux-ci glissaient sur ces masses de glace polie, cachées par la nouvelle neige, mince et friable. Hannibal campa plus haut avec les éléphants et la cavalerie. Le lendemain, les cavaliers, train, à force de travaux, rendirent la voie praticable pour les chevaux et les mulets; mais il fallut trois jours d’efforts, où les soldats se relevèrent les uns après les autres, pour faire arriver les éléphants de l’autre côté. Le quatrième jour, toute l’armée était enfin réunie :la vallée allait s’élargissant et devenait plus fertile. Enfin, après trois autres jours de marche encore, la peuplade des Salasses, riverains de la Doire, et clients des Insubres, reçut les Carthaginois comme des amis et des sauveurs. À la mi-septembre, l’armée débouchait dans la plaine d’Ivrée (Eporedia), où les soldats épuisés furent mis en cantonnement dans les villages, où, pendant vingt-quatre jours de repos et de bons soins, ils se refirent de leurs épouvantables fatigues. Si les Romains, chose qui leur eût été bien facile, eussent eu chez les Taurins un corps de trente mille hommes frais et prêts au combat, s’ils eussent attaqué à une pareille heure, c’en était fait sans doute de la grande entreprise d’Hannibal; heureusement pour lui, comme toujours, ses adversaires n’étaient point là où ils auraient dû être, et ses troupes prirent tout à l’aise le repos dont elles avaient tant besoin3.
On touchait au but, mais au prix de grands sacrifices. Des cinquante mille fantassins, des neuf mille cavaliers vétérans qui composaient encore l’armée au delà des Pyrénées, il en avait péri la moitié sur le champ de bataille, dans la marche et au trajet des rivières. Hannibal, de son propre aveu, ne pouvait plus mettre en ligne que vingt mille hommes de pied, dont les trois cinquièmes étaient Libyens, les deux autres cinquièmes Espagnols. Il lui restait en outre six mille cavaliers, démontés pour la plupart. Les pertes bien moindres de la cavalerie témoignent et de l’excellence des Numides et aussi du soin particulier et des ménagements dont ces troupes choisies avaient été l’objet de la part du général en chef. Une marche de 526 milles ou de trente-trois jours en moyenne, commencée et exécutée sans accidents graves ou imprévus, marche qui eût été impossible peut-être sans les hasards les plus heureux ou les fautes les plus inattendues de la part de l’ennemi; cette seule marche avait coûté énormément cher ! Elle avait épuisé et démoralisé l’armée, au point qu’il lui avait fallu un plus long temps encore pour se remettre en haleine. Disons-le :en tant que stratégie, il y a là une opération militaire contestable; et l’on est en droit de se demander si Hannibal lui-même a pu vraiment s’en targuer comme d’un succès. Pourtant ne nous hâtons pas d’infliger un blâme au grand capitaine. Nous voyons bien les lacunes du plan qu’il a exécuté, mais nous ne pouvons décider s’il aurait pu les prévoir. Sa route le menait il est vrai, en pays barbare, inconnu; mais oserions-nous soutenir, encore une fois, qu’il aurait dû plutôt longer la côte, ou s’embarquer à Carthage ou à Carthagène ? Eût-il couru de moindres dangers de ce côté ? Quoi qu’il en soit de la route choisie, l’exécution dans les détails révèle la prudence consommée d’un maître :elle étonne à tous les instants; et soit par la faveur de la fortune, soit par l’habileté même du général, le but final de l’entreprise, la grande pensée d’Hamilcar, la lutte avec Rome transportée en Italie, tout cela devenait aujourd’hui une réalité. Le génie du père avait enfanté le projet; et de même que la mission de Stein et Scharnhorst a été plus difficile et plus grande peut-être que tous les exploits d’York et de Blücher, de même aussi l’histoire, avec le tact sûr et le souvenir des grandes choses, a mis en première ligne dans ses admirations le passage des Alpes, cet épisode final du grand drame héroïque des préparatifs d’Hamilcar; elle loue même et glorifie ce haut fait plus encore que les victoires fameuses du lac Trasimène et de Cannes.
Notes
1. (Le général York, qui commandait le corps prussien de la grande armée, capitula et passa aux Russes, comme chacun sait, à la nouvelle des désastres des Français en 1813. Cette défection a été le signal de la guerre de l’indépendance allemande.)
2. La route du mont Cenis n’a été rendue praticable pour une armé qu’à l’époque du moyon âge. Quant à la passe plus à l’est, par les Alpes Pennines ou le grand Saint-Bernard, qui devint route militaire sous César et Auguste, Hannibal ne pouvait songer à la-prendre.
3. Toutes les questions topographiques, relatives au fameux passage des Alpes par Hannibal, nous semblent à la fois vidées et résolues, quant aux points les plus essentiels, dans la dissertation, étudiée de main de maître, de MM. Wickham et Cramer (Dissertation on the passage of Hannibal over the Alps. Oxford, 1820 - V. aussi dans le même sens :De Luc (André), Histoire du passage des Alpes par Hannibal, depuis Carthagène jusqu’au Tésin, d’après la narration de Polybe, comparée aux recherches faites sur les lieux, etc... Paris et Genève, 1818. M. Mommsen a complétement adopté leur système, qui paraît d’ailleurs le plus plausible, notamment en ce qui touche le passage par le col du petit Saint-Bernard *). Quant aux difficultés chronologiques, elles ne sont pas moindres :essayons quelques remarques tout exceptionnelles à ce sujet. Lorsque Hannibal arriva au sommet du Saint-Bernard, « déjà les pics se couvraient d’une neige épaisse. » (Polyb., 3, 54). Il y avait de la neige sur la route (Polyb., 3, 55) :mais peut-être qu’elle n’était pas récente, et provenait seulement des avalanches de l’été. Sur le petit Saint-Bernard, l’hiver commence à la saint Michel (fin de septembre) :les neiges tombent en septembre. A la fin d’août, les deux Anglais Wickharn et Cramer n’y en trouvèrent pas sur la route; mais des deux côtés, il y en avait sur les pentes de la montagne. Il faut conclure de là, qu’Hannihal a dû arriver à la passe au commencement de septembre, fait qui se concilie très bien avec ce que dit Polybe :« déjà l’hiver était proche. » Les mots [en grec dans le texte] (Polyb., 3, 54) ne veulent pas dire davantage; et surtout il ne faut pas leur attribuer ce sens qu’on était alors l’époque « du déclin de la pléiade » (vers le 26 octobre. V. Ideler, Chronolog. (Chronologie), 1, p. 241). - Si donc l’on calcule qu’Hannibal est entré en Italie neuf jours plus tard, c’est-à-dire vers la mi-septembre, il reste suffisamment de temps pour placer dans l’intervalle tous les événements qui suivent jusqu’au jour de la bataille de la Trébie (fin de décembre [en grec dans le texte] Polyb., 3, 72.); et notamment pour faire arriver de Lilybée à Plaisance les troupes de l’armée expéditionnaire d’Afrique. Ces dates se concilient de même avec la grande revue du printemps précédent ([en grec dans le texte], Polyb., 3, 34•, de la fin de mars, par conséquent), et avec le jour où fut donné l’ordre de marche; avec la durée de toute la campagne, enfin, qui dura cinq mois (six mois suivant Appien, 7, 4). Si donc Hannibal atteignit le petit Saint-Bernard au commencement de septembre, comme il lui fallut trente jours pour y arriver depuis le Rhône, il en faut conclure aussi qu’il était au commencement d’août sur le Rhône. D’après cela, constatons que Scipion, qui s’était embarqué dès le premier été (Polyb., 3, 41), au commencement d’août, au plus tard, ou avait perdu bien des jours en route, ou était resté plus longtemps encore inactif dans Marseille.
* (De toutes les routes assignées par les critiques à l’armée d’Hannibal, celle qui la fait arriver à l’île Barbe sur la Saône, au-dessus de Lyon, puis gagner de là le Saint-Gothard par la vallée du Rhône et la Furka, est assurément aussi celle qui doit être rejetée d’abord. L’île des Allobroges n’était autre que la vaste contrée enfermée par les fleuves venant des Alpes (diversis ex Alpibus decurrentes, T. Liv., 21, 31), le Rhône et l’Isère; et il est certain qu’Hannibal eût perdu trop de temps à remonter tout le Valais ! - Quant au passage par le mont Genèvre, détendu par Letronne (Journal des Savants), par Fortia d’Urban (sur le passage d’Hannibal, Paris, 1821), par le général de Vaudoncourt (Milan, 1812), il semblerait plus facile d’y croire; mais comment, de 1’île des Allobroges au nord de l’Isère, peut-on raisonnablement ramener Hannibal au sud chez les Tricastins, les Tricoriens et les Voconces (dép. des Hautes-Alpes) ? Les assertions de Tite-Live et de Polybe sur ce point indiquent, celles de Tite-Live surtout, la connaissance fort peu claire des localités)