The Sahel, a European Afghanistan?

In that line there are already analysts who, viewing a "domino effect" in the rapid fall of the Afghan cities until reaching Kabul, they consider that the jihadists could try to transfer it to other places, among them the Sahel, a consideration based on the intuition of a potential intention of those, emboldened by the observation of victory over the US and allies in Afghanistan.

Its foundation, the consideration to keep in mind that, for the jihadists, at the base of their thinking, from their imaginary, all defeat or victory is delivered by Allah:defeat as evidence for their mistakes that, corrected, will make them stronger, and every victory as wisdom for good future work towards the achievement of the global caliphate.

Likewise, there are those who point out that the fall of Afghanistan and the creation of an Islamic Emirate has led to the resurrection of Al Qaeda (given its relationship with the Taliban), which could weaken the fight against jihadist terrorism in the Sahel. Everything is possible, including the fact that the statement made some time ago that the Sahelian territory is "the African Afghanistan of Al Qaeda" could now be true.

But before venturing into any intuitive comparison, it is necessary to know the reality of the Sahel in order to verify whether the stated statements really resist, in part or in all, said reality, analysis From which we collect here, by flying the pen, the most essential.

The Sahel, a focus of regional instability…

We are talking about a Sahel that has not been, until now, well known, given that information about this region generally came from abroad, from powers interested in its natural wealth (oil and mainly gold) or, sometimes in an exaggerated way, by the Sahelian countries themselves who sought benefits from international support.

However, now, interested in the danger it poses for Europe and, therefore, for Spain, not only for the jihadist action, but for being the support of illegal commercial transactions , those of the "three businesses" (weapons, drugs and people , shops in which jihadist terrorists intervene, offering protection and transportation to such products), we know that in the Sahel, as a place of passage and life for tribal movements, there has long been violent, inter-community, between sedentary people, semi-nomads and nomads, and that today there are violent conflicts between the natives, passing migrants, members of organized crime, traffickers of all kinds and various groups of jihadist terrorists.

A territory that, as a whole, is made up by weak governments, with highly divided societies , which endure violent clashes between various local groups (governmental or not) with the intervention in many cases of foreign forces. Problems to which must be added an announced irreversible desertification with chronic famines that could expel its inhabitants to the north, with the transfer at the same time of terrorist groups that would bring their settlements closer to the southern shore of the Mediterranean, with the possibility , if they become strong there, to jump to the north shore of said sea and then enter Europe.

A space that has been incorporated into Western geopolitics/geostrategy, initially from a militaristic point of view; vision that also reached politicians, academics, analysts, journalists..., who, followers of the North American approach, believed that, remembering the military defeat of the Islamic State in Syria/Iraq, that was the only viable solution for the security of the territory and to put an end to terrorism.

Even more so now when several States in the region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) have been slipping, from their institutional fragility, to becoming failed States, some militarized after coups (Niger, Chad and Mali), forming a Sahel unprotected in the absence of authority, a Sahel full of vulnerabilities exploited by jihadists.

Militarist approach that continues to be present in the Sahel under three possible forms:

On the one hand, the isolated intervention of the armed and security forces of the affected country.
On the other, the intervention of these forces with foreign support belonging to those countries that are allowed to intervene.
And, finally, the intervention of local forces supported by hired mercenaries, a solution that Western military forces do not like but that is viable for those African countries, with untrained and unarmed forces, jealous of their sovereignty.

…and a tinderbox in the back room of Europe

Reason why, at present, and given that the Sahel is one of the most unstable regions in the world with the possibility of it reaching the Maghreb, it is considered, from that military vision, as the «powder keg of Europe» . There is therefore fear that, given the increase in power of Sahelian terrorism and that of violent groups of bandits, independent or subject in some way to the former (increasingly confused with each other), a jihadist corridor from Lake Chad to Mali, base for its expansion to the north and to other parts of the African continent.

It can be admitted then, and the Maghreb and Sahelian countries know this, that, apart from possible neocolonial interests, Western forces, including the Spanish, are there for the alluded fear; based fear, as Semmami states, of “an international awareness of the aggravation of the threats [exposed] and [of] a will to strengthen the security of African countries, at the same time that there is a need to support the necessary political change ”.

Term, that of fear, which, logically, before the public is not recognized as such, but as fear, or better, as concern. A concern that, in a certain way, has already become an essential and permanent part of Western/European militarist propaganda in favor of armed intervention in the Sahel as the only viable way out of the risks arising from migration and human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms trafficking and jihadist terrorism, and, at the same time, as the only way to achieve the necessary security for the economic development of the region. Thus, at least initially, it was thought that the military victory of Western superiority was more important than pursuing and achieving reconciliation/peace in the region through security development.

Concern that needs to be framed anyway in the time of fulfillment of that which produces it; Thus, the process of the passage of jihadism from the Sahel to the Maghreb countries due to their resistance, together with the foreign intervention that would surely take place, is a long-term concern; however, the fear of attacks occurring on European soil commissioned by North African and Sahelian jihadists is a permanent and current fear.

Concern, preventive respect, which, in any case, should not be taken into account when analyzing the real situation of the Sahelian region in order to avoid any subjectivity and possible comparison given that we are in a completely different territory from others affected by jihadism, although deep down their fanatical religious vision of the world is the same.

An analysis that is better carried out on the basis of known and current data of the reality in situ , experienced on the ground by analysts or by others close to them, than on those developed within an «opinion bubble», without any contact, not even superficial, with the environment of said reality:that is, it must be a analysis supported by direct knowledge, not superficial, and constantly updated, about those territories, their cultures, traditions, religion...

Ingredients of an explosive cocktail

Thus, to this end, as initial parameters that allow us to move in that direction, we must take into account the assessment of the positive and negative factors that condition the development of the problems of security mentioned:on the one hand, the actors in conflict, on the other the geography that sustains them, the imaginaries that move them and, finally, the foreign interventions that seek to solve those problems.

Regarding the actors in conflict, the following protagonists should be noted:

On the one hand, the US (and other countries related to its interests) are in favor of a frontal (military) action against the groups, mainly terrorists, that create insecurity in the region.
Other foreign authors such as the EU, the AU and other individual countries (with an incipient presence), which support local governments, both in the military, structural and social fields.
Private military groups (mercenaries) hired by those governments that, due to their ineffectiveness, outsource their security.
Armed paramilitary militias to fight terrorism and organized crime (sometimes participating in pre-existing ethnic violence).
The set of terrorist groups (national and international) that are located and act in the region.
Local governments with serious difficulties in maintaining their authority and territorial sovereignty.
The different regional ethnic groups and other local autochthonous leaders who put pressure on local governments and their societies with their political (and sometimes armed) struggle.
The mafias dedicated to organized crime (dedicated to drug, arms and people trafficking) in the region, on many occasions in an interested relationship with terrorist groups.
And, finally, civil society, victim of terrorist actions, of the violence of organized crime and, in its case, of the incoherence of its politicians, ethnic groups and local leaders who subjugate them in their interest; inconsistency sometimes accompanied by violence from their FAS, police and even local militias.

Regarding geography that supports such actors, it must be taken into account that they are in a desert terrain with a climate that presents serious difficulties for life, permanence and maintenance of weapons and material... especially for the foreign forces that act against the violent and not so much for terrorists adapted to them.

And in relation to their imaginaries :

That of the terrorists, based on the rigorous, fanatical and violent vision of Islam, a vision that they try to impose relying on the facilities provided by the fact that the Sahel is a predominantly Sunni Muslim region subject to a series of vulnerabilities political, economic, social... which, with its offer of a resolution, wins sympathetic wills.
That of local governments often in the hands of some rulers affected by corruption, more interested in its extension over time than in fully solving the existing problems in their country, in order to receive foreign support of all kinds that keep them in power.
That of civil society divided between those who support government ideas and those who, repressed, are in opposition (adding among these some related to the jihadists); without forgetting, where appropriate, the existing ethnic and/or religious differences.
That of the intervening foreign countries, which, apart from trying to protect their own interests in the region (fundamentally economic derived or not from the colonial period) try to impose, through a diplomacy based on their support, a democracy like yours without understanding in depth on many occasions the idiosyncrasies of each country (traditions, culture, religion...).
And outside of any imaginary consistent with some kind of ideology, there are obviously mercenaries or private military groups, bandits and mafias dedicated to organized crime in all its possible variants.

Among those mentioned, those jihadists and the hostile and violent of another bill, led the European/Western countries to develop a series of interventions , military (the majority led by France for historical reasons, the EU and the UN) and civilians who, trying to cover the political and institutional vacuum of some Sahelian governments, outsourced security seeking pacification and development in the region with the hope , always open, that the violence subsides, especially the jihadist, preventing it from reaching them.

Interventions that, in view of the current and dangerous jihadist growth in the region, may undergo certain important readjustments, affecting the strategies proposed to date, both by the regional communities such as the international ones applicable in the Sahel; At the moment the EU, the United Nations and France do not rule out any option:continue as before, readjust the current strategy or disengage from it (issues rethought now after the Taliban victory).

Options that take into account the causes that have pushed France to analyze the continuation or not of the current Operation Barkhane (name given to the small crescent-shaped dunes), including the following:

Frustration and exhaustion at the lack of progress on security.
The wear suffered by the French forces, given the low results, in deaths and injuries.
The lack of operability of the regional forces formed and instructed by the French, due to their fear and low morale or determination in the face of the jihadists.
Failure by some of the States of the region of the agreements established in terms of security and governance (subject to profound changes in their governments and to the adequate response to the demands of the citizens).
The instability of some States manifested through political and ethnic struggles, changes of government, coups...
The possibility that some countries in the region will come to negotiate with the jihadists.
The short-term interventions of the international community over the years in helping to stop instability in the Sahel.

Furthermore, it must be considered that military pressure has promoted, in response, the merger (the first strategy of jihadist unification in the Sahel, although certain interested relationships between opposing groups are maintained) of terrorist organizations such as Ansar Dine, AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), the Macina Liberation Front and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JIMN), giving Al Qaeda a pre-eminent position in the Sahel against the Islamic State and its groups Affiliates:Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO or MUJAO), Boko Haram, Ansarul Islam and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (EIGS).

A terrorism, internationalized from an initial localism, whose continuous growth on the African continent with the appearance of new groups and their expansion towards countries where until recently they were safe of jihadism (Congo, Mozambique...), and towards those of the coast (Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast) is an indicator that the military response is not working properly and that, therefore, something is wrong in the approaches of the operations developed to date, in addition to pointing out that the dangerous contagion of jihadist fanaticism does not seem to end (currently the problem already affects a third of the 55 African countries).

Causes to which we must also add the tiredness of the Sahelian populations in the face of the effects, which they consider counterproductive, of foreign military interventions , which they come to see as one more factor of insecurity due to unchecked terrorist violence, continued structural/social deterioration, repeated violation, according to their information, of human rights by some of the indigenous forces interveners and the establishment of security plans that do not reach all citizens equally (security that mainly protects cities and members of the government and institutions).

The Sahel, a European Afghanistan?

However, hastily withdrawing military forces from the region now could lead to regional chaos that would, given the size of the territory (the size of Western Europe) and its weak political context, make it easier for the jihadists to remain in the area and for the possible substitution of such forces by others from Russia and China.

Thus, in accordance with what has been said, relative to the current situation, the Sahel, from a global vision, sometimes very generalized and sometimes not correct in view of the quantity and complexity of the problems to be solved, to the various indigenous actors united in their geography, as well as foreign ones, and to the number of jihadist groups located there, some fighting among themselves, to the presence of other forms of violence..., the reality of victory Taliban achieved by an armed militia against a national army created with foreign support, abandoned to its fate, it seems difficult to export to the Sahel.

However, before that, before the announcement by the French president, Emmanuel Macron , last July, of the disappearance, reduction or remodeling of Operation Barkhane, led by French forces, a possible "Vietnamization" was thought of and, in continuity of thought, a "Talibanization" of the Sahel, considering the chaos that would occur in that region after the abandonment, in whole or in part, of the region by such forces.

Which will not be feasible considering that the announced military readjustment, which I do not abandon, seems to be clear about how it is to be carried out, correctly combining military security and police with civil projects , so that it is not affected:

Continuation of the fight against jihadist terrorism in the Sahel.
Dissemination of information/intelligence to the other military operations:UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the G5 Sahel forces and the Malian forces involved.
The logistical capacity offered to such forces.
The training and instruction of the same.
Operation Takuba (name given to the Tuareg sword), established in 2020 to continue the EU Training Mission (EUTM), accompanying Malian forces and others from the region in joint operations.
The various development and stabilization projects launched by the international community (many under the auspices of the Sahel Alliance).

Remodeled forces that, in any case, must be accepted by the countries that receive them to avoid adding, by their rejection, one more cause to the action of jihadism; forces that must not commit any operational error that affects unarmed civilians, thus violating human rights, which would be counterproductive for the relationship with the countries they support and favorable to jihadism.

Thus, in view of such an approach, not yet resolved and taking into account the foreseeable problem that would arise with the possible stagnation of the French/European forces in the Sahel (between them the Spanish ones), observing what happened in Afghanistan with the march of the American and allied forces, and despite the differences indicated, solutions are being sought from the EU to the Sahelian problems so as not to fall into the mistakes made in Afghanistan.

On this path, there is talk of, drawing lessons from the Afghan experience, creating a European army of its own to deal with crises with European repercussions, realizing now that «when we have to fight Against terrorism in Africa, it will not be NATO or the US that will do it» but it will be us (Macron spoke before of Europeanizing the military forces active in the Sahel); which, in any case, continues to abound in the militarist position, on the military front, without taking into account, at least according to what has been stated, the civil actions of the necessary structural front.

In any case, we will have to be careful since, as previously stated, although there is, between the Sahel and Afghanistan, some coincidence in terms of vulnerabilities and the type of struggle, it is not the same in terms of enemy, here multiple, terrorist and not only, in terms of its objectives, in terms of the number of countries involved, and in terms of foreign forces involved, which have nothing to do with the Americans in Afghanistan. Forces that, in this case, will not leave the region, although they will change the model of action.

Reasons why, as the French president and various analysts at his side point out, the «domino effect» alluded to at the beginning is unfeasible in the Sahel , although it is true that, as continuity in combat decreases, a certain fragility may appear if the necessary decisions are not made in the short term. So, as much as the Sahelian terrorists, like other assets outside the African continent, emboldened by the American defeat, want to follow the Taliban example and make propaganda about it, they are still fickle things that are somewhat difficult to bring to reality. Even so, we will have to be vigilant in the West and specifically in Europe in the face of the possibility of attacks by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State carried out under the euphoria of the Taliban victory.

In any case, at present, and given that the Sahel is one of the most unstable regions in the world with the possibility of such instability spreading, what has been learned from Afghanistan, that it is really valid, must be taken into account to prevent Sahelian jihadism from taking power in the countries that make up the region and attacking Europe from there.