Leaving aside the so-called “Gali case”, but without taking away all the importance it deserves, as well as the open subsidiary debates – on whether the entry into Spain of Brahim Gali, president of the SADR (Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic) was legal or illegal. , infected by Covid-19, for his treatment at the San Pedro de Logroño hospital, on whether or not the executive could deny said entry, on who ordered the police not to ask for his passport, on why he entered with a false name (or "different"), about the reason why Morocco was not informed of the visit, about the need or not to establish an investigation commission for this purpose in Congress, about who is the X that directed the process, about the consideration of censoring/silence any information related to the "case", and more items that will arise, surely, as a reason for political struggle in the matter - it is necessary to consider those previous aspects, little exposed, or related, which are the substratum of the current tensions in relations between Spain and Morocco. Tensions that come from afar, but currently have to do with the new open armed conflict between the SADR and Morocco in Western Sahara , demanding the former, the liberation of the occupied territories, and the latter, the sovereignty of those.
Thus, under this consideration, it was not only Gali's presence in Spain for humanitarian reasons that strained the aforementioned relations, but also the fact that Gali, leader of the SADR and head of the ELS (Saharawi Liberation Army), always an "enemy" of Morocco, went to Spain at a time when the Saharawi people were already at open war with Morocco (on November 13, 2020, about seven months before the aforementioned visit , on April 22, 2021).
Issue of the visit that Rabat, without making any reference to the aforementioned conflict, responded by highlighting that the Spanish decision, taken behind the back of its partner and neighbor, if there is no response satisfactory and convincing, it would be considered a threat to the relations maintained between the two countries that would not fail to be answered.
It is like, worth the crude comparison, if, for example, England and France were at war and Spain welcomed the English president for whatever reason; logically the diplomatic and political tension between Spain and France, and even more so if there were any previous divergence, would jump instantly.
A current armed conflict, about which little is known due to its limited or non-existent presence in the media, both national and international, and which seems to be being practically silenced by some sectors interested
The Saharawis, tired of Moroccan and international passivity regarding their independence, closed, on October 21, 2020, the "illegal" Guerguerat crossing opened in the Moroccan wall , passed connection with Mauritania and other African countries (which was already closed before, in 2017), seeking the suffocation of Moroccan economic interests (currently already touched by the drought in the agricultural sector and the effort to stop the pandemic) and, at the same time, those of other Europeans, including the Spanish, so that it would serve as a wake-up call to the international community and, at the same time, of pressure to the UN for the fulfillment of its duties towards the Saharawi people.
Matter that was previously communicated to the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) with the indication that the passage would not be opened until a solution was reached for the occupied Saharawi territories and the holding of a self-determination referendum as a solution to the conflict
Action that, with the Moroccan response of police/military intervention in the area and the opening in the wall (“of shame” or “of humiliation” to the Sahrawis) of a new gap or several, tensed the situation, even reaching the Saharawi side to threaten to return to war; Saharawi threat to which Morocco responded, accusing the Polisario Front of violating UN resolutions and endangering the ceasefire in Western Sahara, while ordering its forces to intervene in Guerguerat confronting Saharawi demonstrators, which which provoked, in turn, the response of the FSA in his defense; confrontation in which, aside from contradictory information, there was only, it seems, a certain exchange of fire, without causing casualties in the Moroccan army or in the Saharawi, which defended and evacuated the demonstrators.
Tension that caused the Polisario Front, in a public demonstration (later communicated to the UN Secretary General), to affirm that the flagrant aggression of the Moroccan armed intervention would be answered firmly and it would mean the end of the ceasefire, opening the door to the outbreak of a new total war in the region; a war that would be long if Morocco did not admit a self-determination referendum. War that was not recognized as such by Morocco on the grounds that the military aggression denounced by the Saharawis had not taken place.
Fictitious war or silent war?
After this declaration, the Polisario Front assured that the war had already begun (November 13, 2020) with actions of harassment, artillery bombardment and combat on the northern, central and southern fronts of the wall; war that, apparently, mobilized "hundreds of young people" in front of the Defense headquarters in Tindouf to enlist in the Saharawi Army.
At that time, despite the above, there was analysts and observers who, with more questions than certainties, wondered, has the war really started in Western Sahara?
There was talk then of “questions and certainties” because some analysts still did not know if the current conflict deserved the name of war or not; and this because, at least for the time being, even though the Sahrawi side spoke (without presenting reliable evidence) of a declaration of war , of military actions and of daily parts of the war in which the attacked objectives, the Moroccan casualties, their desertions were indicated..., Morocco, described the Saharawi attacks as mere harassment and provocations, not recognizing the breach of the 1991 ceasefire, and with it the situation of armed conflict.
From then on, a battle for the story was raised between both hostile wills, confronting two different versions of the events, each defending their own interests; versions that, in the absence of international observers, were exposed with half-truths and even lies.
Thus, the Moroccan side, without speaking of war, despised the FSA considering it within the category of a simple militia and even terrorists and not a regular army, while not doing case, it silenced and belittled the Saharawi actions without giving them any active response and without acknowledging possible casualties; Quite the opposite on the part of the Saharawi, who spread their war reports daily, seeking that their war activity positively influence the international community in the face of the definitive resolution of the dispute with Morocco.
Thus, regarding the war, declared and carried out through military actions only by the Saharawi side, there were the following two possibilities:
- Idle war as such between the parties due to lack of response from the Moroccan side, which does not want to fall into the strategic trap posed by the Saharawis by denying its non-existence, despite possible casualties (unverifiable and contrasted due to the lack of independent international observers), silencing/denying at the same time the Saharawi attacks; Moroccan inaction that seems to be trying to promote Saharawi military and political fatigue and even more so if it does not have international support, thus demonstrating that it is the Saharawis who have fallen, by recognizing and waging war, in the strategic error that they posed for Morocco . "War" without a Moroccan response, in which the Saharawi propaganda is very active seeking to make known its demands, its current military and political activity in the international arena, also seeking to raise and maintain the morale of its combatants and attack Moroccan morale by discrediting any of their activities. Warlike inactivity due to lack of Moroccan response that is also causing the diplomacy of the contenders, of the countries of the region and of African and European organizations to have a growing activity in defense of their own interests.
- Active war on both sides that Morocco, for the time being, denies that he is getting rid of and speaks of “noise” by the PF to draw international attention to reach a new peace agreement/ceasefire, but that, possibly, it does not reach the Saharawi expectation of the referendum. This war, active therefore by the two contenders, is considered by the Saharawis as a second part of the first and that will be provoked, sooner or later, by the constant Saharawi military action; war then that, with large-scale military actions, could, according to their version, be extended to other participating actors; case in which, growing in more or less controllable violence and with no signs of stopping, it would notably influence the security and stability of the Maghreb and, therefore, of the Sahel, as well as, derived from those, on economic/commercial activities, not only Spanish, and on the regional cooperation necessary for the prosperity of the countries integrated in such regions. Insecurity that would be accentuated with the possibility that a focus of jihadist terrorists could be created in the region and, even, that some jihadist group led and made up of some Saharawis, independent of the Polisario Front, could join, in some way, the conflict against Morocco acting, not only in the war zone (the one occupied by Morocco) but also inside the Maghreb country.
War that, with the indifferent silence and Moroccan non-intervention, which is still going on today, already in October 2021, has become for the Polisario Front an information battle without significant images, to which Rabat does not respond directly (only the statement of the then head of the Moroccan Government, Saadedin el Ourmani, that "the Saharawi victories are imaginary" has been collected; Moroccan silence that in turn is maintained by the UN and most of the international press.
Information battle in which the Saharawis participate with the dissemination of the already mentioned war reports broadcast daily by their own networks, including the Saharawi News Agency (SPS ) , always under the same basic model:after indicating the number and date of the report, the number of attacks carried out through artillery action (of all calibers), mortars and rockets, the places of the wall or localities in the occupied zone where the Moroccan units that were attacked, an indication, highlighting their capacity for destruction, of the multiple casualties of personnel and material of the Moroccan forces, their state of low morale and desertions, and in any case highlighting the silence and lack of response from Morocco, in addition to the lack of news coverage on the conflagration, both Moroccan and Western countries, thus favoring the Moroccan strategy of silence.
Information that the Saharawis try to contrast through their own videos of the area from which they carry out their bombardments (artillerymen and with rockets), interviews with some of their commanders, unofficial sources in the occupied territories, from Algerian journalists (logically in their favour) from the RTA (Channel 3) or from some, according to their indications, unverified Moroccan filtration, coming from relatives of soldiers killed or wounded eluding government threats ( it is strange that they do not occur in greater numbers given the situation of persecution of many journalists critical of the Government).
Analysis of the conflict, whatever it may be, that some analysts, in order to realize its dimensions, have sought to complement with data on the forces in presence and their strategies, both warlike and as informative and diplomatic. Thus, with respect to these forces, they try to provide data related to quantity, means, weapons..., making a comparison between them according to the open data that is obtained; comparison from which it is inferred that it is favorable, with manifest superiority, to Morocco.
And, on the other hand, facing the Saharawi forces, taking into account that every conflict requires a war economy, and considering that of the PF/SADR, given the precarious situation of the Tindouf camps, without military industry , given the daily expense of artillery ammunition and rockets that presuppose their actions (in addition to spending on fuel and other items necessary in the conflict), as well as enough anti-aircraft material to, as the Polisario Front claims, stop possible air action Moroccan without aviation, and, likewise, that of the possible acquisition on its part of technological war material (possibly drones), the following question arises in the face of its persistent war activity:how are they going to solve the logistical problem that it entails over time the need for ammunition in the face of so much daily artillery bombardment, fuel, spare parts, food and necessary sanitary materials (also dedicated to attending to their Covid-19 casualties) for the continuity of the war if they do not have external support? a question that can only be answered by pointing out pro-Saharawi foreign support, not yet fully revealed (on September 30, the Saharawi announced that its Army, within the framework of the common defense agreement with Algeria, will receive high-tech weapons) .
Data accompanying the opposing strategies, which must be contrasted with the reality of the development of the conflict:
- On the one hand, the Moroccan that renounces (for the moment) all initiative and military action, establishing a defense of resistance leaning on the wall with the possibility of going on the offensive , in his case, over the liberated Saharawi territories taking advantage of the new weapons acquired and the air superiority he has to accompany his armored vehicles; a strategy that does not contemplate acting on the Tindouf camps in Algeria ("sanctuary", Saharawi strategic reserve) or on possible bases in Mauritania as unfeasible and unacceptable.
- And, on the other hand, the Saharawi forces, which although, since the 1970s they specialized in guerrilla warfare with the advice of the world revolutionary left, in the face of the Moroccan wall they rethought the way of waging war, given that they did not there was territorial occupation, preparing for a limited conventional war following a low-intensity warfare strategy , trying to force the Moroccan enemy through constant artillery harassment, day and night, to lose patience and make some mistake that would allow the current situation to be reversed. Thus, if the situation does not change, the Saharawis have the initiative and sufficient freedom of action to carry out their war activity of harassment; a strategy that could change towards the targeted guerrilla if the Moroccan forces initiate the classic confrontation outside the wall.
In short, given that the non-indifference or non-impartiality of the neighbors is considered strategic suicide, fully affecting coexistence and regional peace, it will be necessary to be pending the evolution of the conflict and its results. Coexistence and regional peace since, for the moment, they seem assured in the face of Morocco's non-intervention in the "Saharawi war".
Strategies that could be affected by the possibility of action, based on elements infiltrated from both sides behind enemy lines, and even by the intervention of Al units Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or other terrorist groups , which would give rise to jihadist intervention in the conflict; intervention, in this case, not linked to the Polisario Front, as the Moroccan authorities insistently intend with the aim, according to the Saharawis, of tarnishing their image in the international context through the dissemination of such an idea in their press and in other related internationals.
The diplomatic battle for Western Sahara
A war without, for the moment, Moroccan military intervention, which has had, as a precedent, and currently has, a diplomatic war carried out continuously until today by both parties seeking , in both cases, those countries and organizations of all kinds that recognize their respective positions.
Thus, Morocco in thirty years has managed to stop its thesis, refusing self-determination, to be debated in the international arena , thanks to its alliances:privileged partner of Spain, France (a country that has not finished reconciling with Algeria due to the war and the colonial period), the USA, the United Kingdom, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf countries and dozens of African countries (forty-one of these withdrew recognition of the SADR as a state), with Latin American countries, as well as trade agreements established since 2000 (extended in 2016 with the visit of King Mohamed VI to the Kremlin), with Russia (country, a friend of Algeria, which has criticized Donald Trump's decision regarding Morocco's sovereignty over the Sahara) and, likewise, with China (country that will deliver anti-Covid vaccines).
In this way, the objective that the Sahara be internationally recognized as Moroccan territory (“existential question”) has been achieved due to the aforementioned privileged relations, together with its cooperation with Israel since the 1960s and the recent agreement established with the US under the presidency of Donald Trump; In this regard, facing the West, without being an important country in economic resources, the strategic position of Morocco in the Strait of Gibraltar (control and surveillance), the ease of passage through its airspace in the event of war and being a key country in the control of migratory flows to Europe from Africa. The price to pay for their help:the Sahara.
Agreements that have provided Morocco, despite the current Saharawi armed pressure ("their" war) a feeling of euphoria and geopolitical and geostrategic power as it had not achieved before, reason for its belligerent and diplomatic forcefulness with all those countries that demonstrate against his sovereignist thesis (now endorsed by the US) on Western Sahara; and more, by managing to increase its diplomatic presence in Latin America, making some countries that previously recognized the SADR stop doing so and others support its thesis of the project of autonomy for the Sahara against the referendum (in addition, in the last five years the Latin American embassies in Rabat have grown from five to twelve).
In this context of "diplomatic battle" between Rabat and the SADR, the search by the Saharawi for recognition of their existence has been constant (at present they recognize the SADR more than 80 countries, which do not include Spain or the EU ) both from cultural, academic, social friendship, diplomatic levels (with the opening of delegations and friendship associations) all over the world, although with lower level results than those achieved by Morocco, as well as from the development of international collection campaigns of signatures (especially in Spain), the last one during the war activity on January 26, 2021, with a manifesto under the slogan "The Sahara is not for sale", in which they denounce all exploitation of its resources and attacks on its Rights. Likewise, currently, it has sought for the international press to break the Moroccan silence regarding its expansionist policy and the war, and for the international community to react to the wave of violent repression that the Saharawis of the occupied territories are suffering from the Moroccan side as form of retaliation for the armed conflict. Diplomatic actions that are currently being intensified with a tour of diplomatic meetings with European political forces (including the Spanish), together with the explanatory presence of the situation in all kinds of forums by Saharawi leaders.
Specifically, in this journey, the Polisario Front continues to seek, in all possible ways, in addition to its armed harassment, a way for Morocco to lose patience and openly intervene in the conflict or that the international community urge Rabat to respond as soon as possible to its permanent request endorsed by the UN for a referendum. With such purpose, he has denounced:
- Before the UN, the failure to designate a special envoy to the area to resolve the SADR-Morocco dispute; vacant position since 2019, which if filled would allow the UN to take charge of the search for a solution to the dispute. A complaint that seems to have had an effect given that, at the end of August 2021, the Russian Alexander Ivanko, with previous experience in the matter as chief of staff of MINURSO since 2009, has been appointed.
- Before the international community, the continued Moroccan repression exerted by the "occupation authorities" on the Saharawi activists of the occupied territories (and on related non-Saharawis), facts that, in specific cases, are being investigated by the international organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) and that have not been recognized by the Moroccan authorities. Action on these activists to which must be added that, generally the expulsion from the country, applied to some foreign activists "annoying" to Rabat; case, for example, among others, of Helena Maleno, a Spanish activist specializing in migration and founder of the organization Caminando Fronteras, who has denounced Morocco for its "violent" deportation to Spain after two decades of living in the country (expulsions that follow currently taking place together with the rejection of the entry into the country of supporters of the Saharawi cause).
- Likewise, she has denounced the silence, lies and lack of information about the war by Morocco (and a large part of the international community), which has activated the development of the Saharawi media for the purpose to respond adequately to the media war. An example is the birth on March 24, 2021 of the Saharawi Voice Twitter as "the window (one more) of Western Sahara to the world breaking the media blockade" to which they are subjected after the ceasefire was broken. Thus, according to the Saharawis, with this “ambitious communication project [they intend] to offer rigorous and in-depth information to help the communication battle that is also being waged for the freedom of Western Sahara.
- He has also denounced the sale of weapons to Morocco in the midst of the war (also accusing Spain).
- As well as the continued exploitation of the resources of said territories by various international companies (among them some Spanish) with the Moroccan approval (companies that are warned of the danger they run by being located in territory at war; last warning in early October). In this area, two recent rulings by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), preventing EU fishermen from fishing with Moroccan permits in Saharan waters and preventing agricultural exports from the Sahara from being excluded from EU preferential tariffs, endorse the Saharawi position regarding the indicated exploitation.
At the same time, they have suggested a change in strategy (which they do not specify) “with new special military background operations and military quality” with the acquisition of new weapons technologies; they warn the Moroccan regime that “the worst and hardest of the war is yet to come”. Threatening at the same time with a possible extension of the conflict to the North African region with the alleged armed intervention of some North African countries (unconfirmed matter).
Likewise, they urge the Spanish Government through Spanish society, declared a friend of the Saharawi people, to take their side by ceasing to pay attention to the "blackmail" of Rabat; and diplomatically pressure countries of the AU, EU... to reject Trump's declaration regarding Moroccan sovereignty over the Saharan territory of the SADR and declare illegal the consulates established in the occupied territories, given that the new president of the USA, Joe Biden, has not yet rejected such a declaration, nor does it seem that he will do so given the recent (early May) position of the administration Biden, with no plans to reverse Trump's declaration, recognizing Western Sahara as Moroccan.
An indication of this seems to be the announcement of the annual maneuvers “Africa Lion” (African Lion), usually organized between the US and Morocco in this country, which would take place in 2021, between June 7 and 18, for the first time, according to Morocco, in the occupied territories (an aspect widely publicized by the Moroccan press) reaching the towns of Mahbes (a town near the wall that was already bombed by the Saharawi), Tantan and Agadir. Maneuvers that, in this case, due to the supposed place of action and the presence of forces from the US and other countries, would mean non-armed intervention by the Saharawi Army in the area to avoid an international conflict. It must be taken into account that the logo of such maneuvers, prepared by Rabat, presents a map that encompasses the Saharawi territory. However, the Saharawi forces have not ceased to act, according to their war reports, on Mahbes, with the presumed objective of prohibiting or limiting the aforementioned maneuvers. Maneuvers that in the end, according to the AFRICOM Central Command spokesman, were held north of the border between Morocco and the occupied Saharawi territories (50 km west of Tindouf) without reaching the aforementioned occupied territories. Spain, for its part, in the midst of a diplomatic crisis with Morocco, declined the US invitation to participate in such military exercises.
In this situation, the Sahrawi response to the "moroccanization" of the Sahara by the US was quick to request internationally that said country respect what was established by the UN, declaring that such recognition is a flagrant violation of International Law, while denouncing the installation of a US Consulate in Dakhla as an error and mobilizing in the international arena all those, including former American politicians of a certain level, who are in favor of the self-determination of the Sahara, waiting for the new president Joe Biden to modify the decisions adopted by Donald Trump.
Conflict in which Spain , despite the continuous indications that it has a historical and legal responsibility in Western Sahara, including by the UN that recognizes said country as "administrating power", has sided with the AU, EU, UN and MINURSO, appealing to the contenders to show a sense of responsibility and restraint, in order to seek a political and peaceful solution to the current conflict, as well as to the contentious base through the development of a self-determination referendum.
Demonstrations that the Saharawi side is indifferent to as they do not expect anything from Spain (despite having long ago been their 53rd province) in the consideration that it is subject to blackmail Moroccan; blackmail that, logically, the current Moroccan ambassador to Spain, Karima Benyoich, denies, pointing out that such an accusation is not realistic since Morocco is not an opportunistic country , que no es fácil detener a las mafias, que Marruecos tiene también una presión migratoria muy alta, y que es un país de acogida con unas políticas de migración y asilo que han regularizado a miles de personas. No obstante, a pesar de tal manifestación, hay que contar, por parte marroquí, con las acciones de influencia bajo presión ejercida por las migraciones masivas de ilegales sobre Canarias y sobre las ciudades autónomas de Ceuta y Melilla (negadas como españolas por Marruecos) buscando provocar una crisis político social como forma de desviar la atención sobre el conflicto con los saharauis.
Añadir a lo expuesto el retraso de la Reunión de Alto Nivel (RAN) España-Marruecos que estaba prevista para el 17 de diciembre de 2020, bajo el pretexto de la pandemia ocultando así su verdadera razón:la oposición marroquí “ultrasensible” a las consideraciones españolas, en boca de la, en aquel momento, ministra de Asuntos Exteriores, Arancha González Laya, respecto al conflicto saharaui apoyando las resoluciones de la ONU y las del entonces viceministro, Pablo Iglesias, a favor de los saharauis, así como, haber acogido, en pleno conflicto al líder del FP, por razones estrictamente humanitarias (hecho silenciado por los saharauis y por España); líder que, además, tiene causa abierta en la Audiencia Nacional por torturas y desapariciones de disidentes en los campos de refugiados entre 1976 y 1987 (acusaciones vertidas en su día por la Asociación Saharaui de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos y por la Asociación Canaria de Víctimas del Terrorismo) y por la que fue convocado a declarar.
Situación de conflicto en la que España no ha aportado soluciones diplomáticas originales, pero que empuja a tomar cuenta del problema tras cuarenta y tres años de inacción; así, tras la investidura de Biden, la ministra de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, en funciones en aquel momento, Arancha González Laya , sin pedir a los EEUU el cambio de postura sobre la decisión de la administración de Donad Trump afirmando la soberanía de Marruecos sobre el Sáhara, pidió se retomara el proceso del Sáhara y que la ONU nombrara ya un enviado especial para dicho territorio en situación de vacante desde hace 18 meses. Postura que ha sido respondida, indirectamente, por Marruecos, con la sugerencia de que sus relaciones con España dependen de que el Gobierno español “emule a EEUU” respaldando con claridad su propuesta de solución para el Sáhara:una autonomía limitada bajo la soberanía de Marruecos
No obstante, la situación expuesta ha cambiado un tanto ante la reciente (finales de enero de 2021) indicación de la entonces ministra de Asuntos Exteriores, admitiendo por primera vez la existencia de un enfrentamiento bélico entre los ejércitos saharaui y marroquí, al tiempo que, preocupada por el conflicto, dice apoyar los esfuerzos de la ONU para solucionar el fin del mismo (afirmaciones recogidas con satisfacción por el portal ESaharoui).
Así pues, España, considerando de momento que la administración Biden no dará marcha atrás de forma completa respecto a los planteado por Trump , sigue, como vemos manteniendo su tradicional política de neutralidad positiva, dando la impresión, en ocasiones, de que está a favor de Marruecos (y por lo tanto en divergencia con los saharauis) y en otras en su contra, dependiendo de la presión que ejerza Marruecos, que mantiene contra viento y marea su postura de anexión de la excolonia española, postura que no parece que vaya a cambiar.
En el lado marroquí de la balanza, el debate sobre Ceuta y Melilla, el control de la inmigración de irregulares desde su país, el apoyo para la prevención de ataques terroristas y la Reunión de Alto Nivel (RAN), y para equilibrar, la espera de que España cambie de posición y apoye la tesis soberanista marroquí sobre el Sáhara reconocida en su día por el expresidente de los EEUU, Donald Trump.
Así, no extraña que, tanto Marruecos como la RASD, pidan a España claridad en cuanto a su posicionamiento en la actual situación. Y más, en su momento, parte marroquí al saber que el líder del Frente Polisario, Brahim Gali, en pleno conflicto, ingresó enfermo de Covid en un hospital español.
Actitudes todas que, en su conjunto, al menos de momento, parecen quitar hierro al conflicto armado abierto, llegando a pensar que los planteamientos saharauis, expuestos como objetivos a alcanzar con el mismo, no sean tan viables como el Frente Polisario presupone en sus canales de comunicación; tanto que, en diferentes medios se ha llegado a hablar de “fracaso saharaui” o de “la última batalla perdida del Frente Polisario” .
No obstante, así las cosas, fuera de las realidades e hipótesis planteadas, habrá que esperar a que la evolución de los acontecimientos nos presente la valoración exacta de los resultados que alcanzan cada una de las partes en conflicto.