The beginning of the fourteenth century was not easy for Castile . The death of Sancho IV in 1295 marked the beginning of an extremely turbulent period. The succession dispute of the infantes de la Cerda, supported by the Aragonese king Jaime II, reached its peak during the minority of Fernando IV (1295-1301), which added to the conflicts with the nobility plunged Castile into chaos and anarchy [1]. Once seated on the throne, and resolved the innumerable problems that afflicted the kingdom, the young Castilian monarch was finally able to concentrate his efforts on the fight against peninsular Islam, whose audacity at the moment worried not only the Castilian king. Indeed, the Nasrid sultan Muhammad III had taken advantage of the favorable situation to extend his dominions and gain control of both shores of the Strait of Gibraltar through the occupation of Ceuta in 1306, and other Moroccan places during the following year. Control of Ceuta, Algeciras, Gibraltar, Malaga and Almería gave the Nasrid a solid position of strength in the area of the strait that was not viewed favorably by any of its neighbors [2].
This aggressive attitude of Muhammad III led Ferdinand IV to approach Aragon. The Castilian-Aragonese alliance was signed on December 19, 1308 in the town of Alcalá de Henares. By virtue of this treaty the signatories divided up the Islamic domains of the Peninsula , corresponding to Aragon a sixth part of the Nasrid territory, which provoked the vehement protests of a part of the Castilian nobility, since theoretically all the remaining Muslim territory corresponded to Castile. The monarchs also promised not to make peace separately with the enemy and to each contribute a fleet of 10 galleys and 5 Aragon logs, while the Castilians would contribute 3 logs. Finally, a series of marriage ties between both families were sealed to strengthen the agreement [3]. Hostilities against the Muslims were to begin on June 24, 1309, Saint John's Day. The Castilians would attack the bay of Algeciras and the Aragonese the city of Almería. This Christian pincer attack would force the Grenadians to fight on two fronts and divide their forces [4].
After the signing of the Treaty of Alcalá de Henares, both kingdoms began to prepare all the necessary aspects to carry out the crusade. Ferdinand IV summoned Cortes, which met during February and March in Madrid, to request the financial resources with which to launch the expedition against the Nasrids. The high level of the king's requests caused the discomfort, once again, of some important rich Castilian men, who considered it more sensible to simply cut down the Vega de Granada and obtain a quick and easy booty.
Internationally, both Ferdinand IV and James II sent ambassadors to Pope Clement V, at the court of Avignon, to give their joint venture against the Muslims the crusade character , since in addition to the spiritual benefits, the economic contribution that the crusade declaration provided was also very necessary [5]. On the other hand, and to diplomatically isolate Granada, Jaime II, with the Castilian acquiescence, entered into a relationship with the Benimerines. Committing himself to the North Africans to assist them in the recovery of Ceuta, in exchange for them delivering a substantial part of the loot once the square was taken, the Aragonese monarch sent a squadron that blocked the square by sea, while the Benimerines did the same by Earth. The Muslim sultan, Abu Rebia Sulayman, once he conquered Ceuta in the month of July, forgot his agreement with the Aragonese and went back to an understanding with his fellow Nasrids. The new alliance between Fez and Granada It was sealed through a marriage between Abu Rebia and the sister of the new Nasrid sultan, Nasr, who gave her husband the squares of Ronda and Algeciras as her dowry. The blocks that would face each other during the second half of 1309 were thus configured. The peninsular Christian coalition of Aragon and Castile against the Nasrids and Benimerines [6].
The Castilian Crusade
Once the Courts of Madrid concluded, Fernando IV traveled to Toledo to finalize the preparations for the crusade. He also issued orders to his nobles to come to the border with him. Despite the fact that some important members of the Castilian aristocracy had been against the king's plans, they responded to his call. The contingent assembled by Fernando IV for the crusade ranged between 12,000 and 15,000 men, between pawns and knights . Undoubtedly a very large number for the time, and it was possible to gather only thanks to the competition of the cream of the Castilian nobility for the crusade, in addition to the council contingents of Salamanca, Segovia, Seville and other places. The Portuguese monarch Dionís I also collaborated with the company by sending 700 knights [7].
Despite the fact that Ferdinand IV and Jaime II set the start of hostilities for Saint John's Day, some Castilian leaders launched military operations autonomously against Nasrid territory before the fixed date. These military initiatives, together with the meeting of the Aragonese fleet between Valencia and Barcelona, put the Nasrids on alert [8], despite the good words that Jaime II addressed to Muhammad III, assuring him that the objective of his fleet was Sardinia.
From Toledo Fernando IV moved to Córdoba, and from there to Seville, where he triumphantly entered at the beginning of July. In the city of Seville the final provisions were made for the siege of Algeciras. The provisions would be transported by boat to Algeciras while the army moved to the plaza by land. On July 27, a part of the contingent already had the square within their sight. On July 30, the king himself, along with most of the nobles, arrived at the town . Once the siege of Algeciras began, and as a means of weakening the resistance of the besieged, already afflicted by famine, the Castilian monarch sent a large contingent to surround Gibraltar. The forces deployed to Gibraltar were made up of some members of the nobility most loyal to the king, such as Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán and Juan Núñez de Lara, as well as the Archbishop of Seville together with the council militia of the city of Seville [9].
The siege and conquest of Gibraltar was a short undertaking , barely a month long, in which the military performance of Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán and the Sevillian hosts stood out. The operation was carried out in the form of a clamp. While the people of Seville advanced by land crossing the isthmus and establishing their control over the Mount of Victory, which gave them a superior position over the Plaza de Gibraltar and its suburbs, the rest of the forces crossed the bay, transported by the ships, and established the siege in front of the Earth Gate. The city was completely surrounded thanks to the action of the Aragonese ships that closed the bay, preventing any type of reinforcement or supply from the sea. The Seville contingents, located on the heights, were able to break the resistance of the besieged thanks to the use of two engennos throwing large stones at the population. Finally, on September 12, due to the heavy pressure to which it was subjected, Gibraltar surrendered to Fernando IV, who had moved from the siege of Algeciras. The capitulation agreement guaranteed the lives of the 1,125 inhabitants of Gibraltar, who were allowed to evacuate the city and go to live on the other side of the strait [10].
Once Gibraltar had been taken, and the orders given for its walls to be repaired and shipyards to be built, Ferdinand IV returned to the siege of Algeciras, whose development did not herald a victorious outcome as in the case of Gibraltar. Barely a week after the conquest of Gibraltar Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán died in a skirmish in Gaucín . His death was the first of many calamities that the Castilians would suffer during the following months, and that would prevent the long-awaited conquest of Algeciras. As soon as autumn began, a rainstorm began that would not let up for three months in a row, making the situation of the besiegers painful. As if this were not enough, two of the main magnates of the host, the infante Juan and don Juan Manuel, along with Fernán Ruiz de Saldaña and 500 knights, left the siege and returned to Castile due to their confrontation with the monarch [11] . Despite all these adversities and misfortunes, Ferdinand IV, determined to win or die, refuses to lift the siege or to reach an agreement with the Nasrids [12]. However, despite his determined obstinacy and the reinforcement of 400 knights brought by the archbishop of Santiago [13], the impossible prospects of victory forced the young king to accept an agreement with the new sultan, Nasr, who in exchange for the Castilian retreat undertook to pay outcasts again, some 11,000 gold doubles per year, and to declare themselves a vassal of Castile , in addition to returning the castles of Quesada and Bedmar. Thus concluded the Castilian crusade. The taking of Gibraltar, a position of great geostrategic value, but isolated by land from Castilian territory, did not compensate in any way for the expenses and efforts that the Crusader company caused in impoverished Castile at the beginning of the 14th century [14].
The Aragonese Crusade
In parallel to the Castilian efforts in the western part of the Kingdom of Granada, the Aragonese, commanded by Jaime II, carried out a hard campaign in the eastern part , before the walls of Almería . The Aragonese hosts, like the Castilian ones, began the crusade with some delay [15]. On their way to Almería they had to put to flight a Granadan contingent that was besieging the castle of San Pedro, near Murcia. The different Aragonese contingents were arriving in front of the walls of Almería in a staggered manner. First the fleet and the contingents transported by it on August 10, on the 12th some land hosts, and on the 15th all the troops, whose number amounted to 13,000 men, were already before the city [16]. Almería was blockaded by land and sea .
The first Aragonese attack that started the crusade was not long in coming. As soon as the camp was established, on August 14 the Aragonese hosts launched the first of the frontal assaults against Almería. The Nasrid forces were well informed of the Christian movements and just ten days after the siege was established they already raised a great pitched battle against the Christians, the only one of the entire campaign, in which the hosts of Jaime II were unappealable winners. , obtaining a free pass to continue the encirclement [17]. The Aragonese resumed their pressure on the square, and barely a day after the pitched meeting they were already beginning to build mines and ramparts to attack the square. Despite the harsh attacks to which Almería was subjected, the city resisted. By mid-September the tables were beginning to turn; a large Nasrid detachment was quartered in the nearby town of Marchena, complicating the permanence of the Aragonese over Almería through a continuous series of attacks led by the North African leader Uthman ibn Abi l-Ula , which despite being repelled, placed the Christians in an uncomfortable position. The Aragonese were forced to dig a moat and fortify their camp. At the end of September, on the 23rd and 27th, two new general assaults ended with the same result as the previous attempts. The Aragonese crusade began to falter, at the same time as the finances necessary to sustain the siege [18], the king having to pawn his own possessions to stay on Almería. Throughout the autumn the attacks continued, and despite the large number of siege machines used by the Aragonese, they were unable to take the city. At the end of December Jaime II understood the impossibility of achieving victory and he began negotiations with the Granadans [19].
The end of the crusade
At the end of January 1310 Jaime II and Fernando IV abandoned the sieges of Almería and Algeciras respectively . Both monarchs had to end the campaign in the midst of serious financial difficulties and a huge loss of popularity as. The causes that explain the failure are several:
- In the first place, the Aragonese hope of forming a tripartite front against Granada vanished events just started. The Benimerines, once Ceuta had been recovered with extreme ease, reached an agreement with Nasr by which the Nasrids would recover their traditional North African alliance in exchange for the delivery of the Algeciras and Ronda squares. In this way, the Granadans were able to devote themselves to the defense of their eastern flank, preventing Jaime II from taking over Almería, while the Benimerines, theoretical allies of the Christians, fought them in the western area of the Nasrid kingdom, successfully defending Algeciras.
- Both Aragon and Castilla started the campaign later than agreed , with the season well advanced, which caused an exceptionally wet autumn to befall them, making the living conditions of the combatants very difficult.
- The financial difficulties of both monarchs, as well as the aforementioned adverse weather conditions, led to a notable shortage of supplies, with all the consequences that this entails for the hosts and for military operations.
- The desertions of don Juan Manuel and the infante don Juan together with their retinues, they greatly reduced the morale of both crusading contingents [20].
- Finally, it is necessary to highlight the strategic mistake made in planning the campaign . A large number of Castilian aristocrats opposed Ferdinand IV's plan to directly encircle Algeciras. They considered it much more feasible and profitable to carry out a looting campaign through the Vega de Granada. Similarly, Jaime II launched directly against Almería instead of carrying out a campaign of destruction and pillage. In medieval warfare, as contemporaries of the facts knew, to take a fortified city, it was necessary to carry out a series of previous campaigns of destruction and looting throughout its region for years , since a frontal attack against a city that has not previously been subjected to such punishment is doomed to almost certainly fail due to the superiority of defensive means over offensive ones. The work of attrition [21] against a population like Almería could last decades, as evidenced by the cases of the conquests of the other great Andalusian cities during the reign of Fernando III [22]. The fortunate conquest of Gibraltar, a smaller population, was the result of a secondary operation within the general plan of the campaign.
Bibliography
- BAYDAL SALA, Vicent, “Tans grans messions. The financing of the crusade of Jaime II of Aragon against Almería in 1309”, Medievalism , 19 (2009), p. 57-154.
- BENAVIDES, Antonio, Memoirs of Ferdinand IV of Castile . 2 vols. José Rodríguez, Madrid, 1869.
- Chronicle of Ferdinand IV , Library of Spanish Authors, 66:173-392.
- GARCÍA FERNÁNDEZ, Manuel, “Gibraltar, conquest and repopulation (1309-1310)”, Medievalism , 19 (2009), p. 155-169.
- GARCÍA FITZ, Francisco, Castilla y León facing Islam. Expansion strategies and military tactics. 11th-13th centuries . University of Seville, Seville, 119-121.
- GIMÉNEZ SOLER, Andrés, The siege of Almería in 1309 , Typography of the Provincial House of Charity, Barcelona, 1904.
- GONZÁLEZ MÍNGUEZ, César, “Ferdinand IV of Castile and the war against the Moors:the conquest of Gibraltar (1309)”, Medievalism , 19 (2009), p. 171-197.
- MARUGÁN VALLVÉ, Carmen María, “The army of the Crown of Aragon in the expedition against Almería in 1309”, Medievalism , 19 (2009), p. 199-142.
- MARUGÁN VALLVÉ, Carmen María, “The siege of Almería in 1309:the development of the military campaign” in Almería entre cultures:(13th-16th centuries) , p. 171-188. Institute of Almerian Studies, Almería, 1990.
- MASIÁ DE ROS, Ángeles, Castilian-Aragonese relationship from Jaime II to Pedro el Ceremonioso . 2 vols. CSIC, Barcelona, 1994.
- O'CALLAGHAN, Joseph F., The Gibraltar Crusade. Castile and the Battle for the Strait , University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2011.
- SEGURA GONZÁLEZ, Wenceslao, “Tarifa and the siege of Algeciras in 1309”, Al Qantir. Monographs and Documents on the History of Tarifa , 1 (2003), p. 1-45.
Notes
[1] Chronicle of Ferdinand IV , p. 93-97, 100-103.
[2] O´CALLAGHAN, The Gibraltar Crusade …, pp.
[3] The ultimate objective of the Christian coalition was nothing more and nothing less than the total expulsion of Islam from peninsular soil "in order to get the disbelievers of the Catholic faith out of Spain who are in disgrace to God and are in great harm and danger to the entire Xristiandat”. BENAVIDES, Memoirs of Fernando IV…, pp. 621-622.
[4] “Well, it is true that, the king of Castiella, enclosing his part and us from ours, the Moors cannot enpeççar or burden you or us , what they could if we farmed nearby and you didn't and farms”, MASIÀ DE ROS, Castilian-Aragonese relationship …, p. 234-235.
[5] GONZÁLEZ MÍNGUEZ, “Fernando IV de Castilla…”, pp. 180-181.
[6] O´CALLAGHAN, The Gibraltar Crusade …, p. 127-128.
[7] GONZÁLEZ MÍNGUEZ, “Fernando IV de Castilla…”, pp. 184-185.
[8] GARCÍA FERNÁNDEZ, “Gibraltar, conquers and…”, p. 158.
[9] Chronicle of Ferdinand IV , p. 162-163.
[10] Chronicle of Ferdinand IV , p. 163.
[11] GIMÉNEZ SOLER, The site of Almería …, p. 61-63.
[12] Chronicle of Ferdinand IV , p. 164. “Before I wanted to die there rather than get up from where I was dishonored.”
[13] O´CALLAGHAN, The Gibraltar Crusade …, p. 132.
[14] A detailed and documented sequence of events can be found in SEGURA GONZÁLEZ, “Tarifa…”, pp. 20-37.
[15] Although the agreed date was June 24, the Aragonese army did not leave Valencia until July 18. MARUGÁN VALLVÉ, “The site of Almeria…”, p. 173.
[16] 3,900 horsemen and 9,000 infantry. MARUGÁN VALLVÉ, “The army…”, p. 240.
[17] BAYDAL SALA, “The financing…”, pp. 89-90.
[18] ID p. 93.
[19] O´CALLAGHAN, The Gibraltar Crusade …pp. 131-132.
[20] The defection of these two important nobles resonated strongly not only in Castile, but in much of Europe. The infante don Juan came to be described as a "demon" by the pontiff himself. “He is so evil that if it were up to him he would destroy everything and for money he would sell God, you and all of Christendom.” Quoted by JIMÉNEZ SOLER, The site of Almería , p. 68-70.
[21] Military theorists have coined the term “indirect approach strategy” for this form of warfare.
[22] GARCÍA FITZ, Castilla y León facing Islam …, pp.119-121.