Another anniversary. Forty-seven years later. First the coup d'etat of President Makarios, on July 15, 1974 by the Greek-speaking members of the junta and its residents in Cyprus, EOKA II. And the course was prescribed. The Turkish invasion followed on July 20. The underground collusions between the key players in Washington, Athens and Ankara had set the scene well. Two reports of those days, have their own special significance.
BY KOSTAS VENIZELOS
SOURCE:APOPSEIS
The then Ambassador of Greece in Ankara, Dimitris Kosmadopoulos, was summoned at 5:45 am on July 20 to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and was informed by Gunes about the start of the Turkish amphibious operation. Kosmadopoulos immediately informed the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an encrypted emergency signal at 6:15.
"The Turkish Government informs the Greek Government that it has decided to make use of Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Guarantee Treaty. The action of this Turkish government is placed strictly within the framework of this contractual provision and aims to restore things to a state defined in the treaty. It is added that during a conversation with Mr. Sisko, we assured him that Turkish troops will never open fire as long as they do so by forces that are on the island.
It is reiterated that through this action the Turkish government does not intend to bring about an armed rupture with Greece and hopes that, as a result of this action, ground for understanding could be created more easily. The Turkish Government reiterates its views on the need for good relations between two NATO members, specifically Turkey and Greece".
The Greek ambassador expected the reaction of Athens, which did not come. The teletype remained silent. Every fifteen minutes the embassy in Ankara asked the ministry's typists in Athens if there was a message. Silence. At 8.00 in the morning the Greek ambassador asks his communications technician to ask what the Athens radio is broadcasting. The second program Cretika and Armed gymnastics:
“I kept this teletyped verse story. For two hours now, the Turkish invasion forces have been treading on Cyprus and nothing has been said to the Greek people. He was offered musical indulgence and gentle gymnastics (Travel of an ambassador to Ankara, 1974-1976).
At noon, the first message was sent from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the embassy:
"TO:Embassy of Ankara.
Di S.A. Mr. Kosmadopoulon.
Following a Turkish attack in Cyprus, you requested new passports and returned to Athens.
CYPRUS
Kosmadopoulos submits his resignation and departs via Syria.
The second case concerns the memoirs of Turkish General Betrettin Demirel
Turkish general Bedreddin Demirel, who was the commander of the 39th Infantry Division, kept a diary, which was subsequently published in Cumhuriyet, from 17.7.1989. Demirel, ignoring the political agreements, proceeded to record the military actions. He clearly recognizes the difficulties that existed. It is clear that if there had been no treachery, the degree of difficulty for the Turks would have been great in working out the plans to repel the invasion:Among other things, the Turkish general states in his diary:
"Finally the 15th of July came. On that day, EOKA II, led by Nikos Sampson, staged a coup in Cyprus. Regarding this episode, the 39th division was put on alert on the night of July 15/16. That night, in the memorial notebook I was writing for my son, I noted:Victory is ours. The lines ended with the same agony.
On the morning of July 16, the mobilization of the 39th Division began. The battle group of the 50th infantry regiment would land in Cyprus first. Between July 15-19 the streets of Mersina, Adani, Alexandroupoli, Osmaniye and Maras were full of our units. Day and night the units prepared and loaded supplies. On July 16, after noon, a secret meeting was held in the office of the commander in the Adana army corps staff. General Esref Akinci, the commander of the ground forces, presided.
It was secretly determined that the landing day would be July 20th. The landing plan that was planned for 11 years could now be realized. But it was considered definitive that the 39th Division would land in Cyprus. Basically the 39th Division was not considered ready in any sense to conduct offshore warfare. There were some shortages in terms of personnel, armaments and necessary means. Detachments, forced to remain in garrisons and camps, reduced the actual strength of the units. This situation created a significant gap in the 39th Division.
When it was finalized that the 39th Division would leave in groups for Mersina and Alata and then land in Cyprus, some people began to be seized with serious worries and fears. Some of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates were so overcome with fear that they could not understand the orders well.
There were staff who came to Mersina, without taking individual dependence very well. The cars were loaded with things useless for war. These were some things used for exercises. Most of what they didn't need got rid of. The vehicles were mainly loaded with water, fuel, munitions and food... The day of the landing was kept secret. Units could wait for months as in previous exercises as well as in 1967…. It was considered beneficial for commanders to give short morale-boosting speeches to camps on departure. I made such a speech to a crowd of officers in the Alata dasyllium.
….We knew the training of the enemy units compared to ours, and in terms of armament and equipment, they were weak. We heard from fighter officers who served in Cyprus that the old Russian T-34 tanks they had when they did exercises were left on the road. Some of our plans provided some facilities for raiding and co-operation in Morphou and Famagusta. As a result of the coup, E.F. was distributed throughout the island. Especially in the landing areas (by sea and air) they were abandoned by the Greek Cypriots.
Among the Greek Cypriot forces there were supporters and non-coup supporters. Our greatest concern was the failure of the first wave of our landing forces and the intervention of the enemy's air and naval forces. E.F. it did not have a strong air force and navy. But it could be reinforced by Greece. The Greek air and naval forces could have come to Cyprus beforehand. At the same time, our landing could be blocked by the Russian and American fleet.
None of this happened. We were partly right about these fears. The enemy was ineffective at sea and in the air. But due to the little resistance offered by the enemy on land and especially on the coastal strip, the Camkak brigade, with orders sent to the 2nd Army and subsequently to the 6th Army Corps, remained on the coastal strip.
The Camkak brigade, ordered to depart from Mersina, proceeded to Cape Karpasia and then turned towards the coast of Kyrenia. This move caused confusion among the Greek Cypriot forces. That is why the E.F., which was distributed throughout the island due to the coup, was unable to face the first wave of Turkish landing forces.
The news from Cyprus until the evening of July 20 was not good. The first waves of the Camkak Brigade landed ashore after 8.00 am without enemy fire. But the enemy after the third wave, began to concentrate artillery and mortar fire on the beach and thus the battle group of the 50th Infantry Regiment was forced to disembark without a plan.
The fact that on the beach only two boats could approach and the others had to wait offshore, as well as the unloading of the Ertugrul and Koycagis ships in the landing craft, were the problems affecting the landing. The commander of the Camkak Brigade, who was in Ertugrul, could not be connected with the disembarked units.
By noon all forces were ashore but it was not possible to maintain a security zone on the coast and advance in depth. There was no communication between the forces. The commands of the air and sea landing forces had no communication with each other.
The commander of the 6th Army Corps, General Ersin, who arrived on July 20 could not calculate where the designated beach spot was. From what we were informed after a connection was made, the orders sent to Cyprus by service mail by helicopter and concerning the organization, tasks and mode of action of the Camkak forces, were not submitted in time to the commander of the 6th Army Corps, Ersin.
....The commander of the 50th Regiment, Colonel Karaoglanoglou, was killed on the coastal strip, while the deputy commander of the Regiment, Aykon was seriously wounded and the worst, according to the Greek radio, the Turkish forces that were on the coastal strip suffered a heavy defeat.
We were able to prepare only 7 boats at the military port of Mersina until the noon of July 21st. Some of these boats had gone to Cyprus, unloaded and returned.
… July 22 was very important. The ships approached two by two and unloaded... The enemy's fire was sporadic but accurate...". The sequel, more or less known. The Turkish troops advanced conquering the Cypriot land. The betrayed Cypriot land.