In 1254 the great emperor John III Vatatzis died, leaving the Empire of Nicaea powerful. John had succeeded not only in fending off the attacks of the Latins against him, but also in liberating many lands in Thrace and Macedonia.
At the same time, he had faced the Turkish and Bulgarian danger. His son and successor, however, had to face the need to face again the expansiveness of the Bulgarians. Ioannis Vatatzis had defeated the Bulgarians and imposed his terms on them, sealing the deal with the marriage of his son Theodoros to the daughter of the Bulgarian tsar John Asan, Helen. After the death of Ioannis Asan, the Bulgarian throne was occupied by his son Michael Asan, brother of Empress Helen.
He did not disturb the Empire until the moment John Vatatzis died. Then he considered the moment suitable to recover all the lands that the Bulgarian kingdom had lost from John Vatatzis. The Bulgarian king estimated that his successor, Theodore II, would need some time to establish himself on his throne.
He also took advantage of the fact that at that time there were no serious imperial forces in Macedonia and Thrace, with the exception of the few garrisons in the various cities. Finally, he counted on the factor of surprise, since the relations between the two states, at that time, were satisfactory and there were kinship ties between the two royal houses, so the Byzantines did not expect a Bulgarian attack.
The Bulgarian king, however, did not attack immediately. He waited for the winter to come, so that it would not be easy to supply the various garrisons with food – in the winter the army could not be fed from the food – but also so that an immediate Byzantine reaction would not be possible. At least that's what he thought.
Bulgarian invasion
Michael Asan gathered his forces north of the river Ebro, which formed the border between the two states, in December 1254 and invaded the imperial territories in early January 1255. The Bulgarians moved, literally, at lightning speed, despite the bad weather conditions and quickly overwhelmed many cities, villages and settlements, almost without resistance.
Most of the Imperial garrisons surrendered the cities they held with the agreement to be let go freely, knowing that without food they could not hold out for long. After all, several cities and villages were also inhabited by Bulgarians and the Byzantine garrisons could not fight both an external and an internal enemy.
Stenimachos - today's Asanovgrad, a Greek city in Eastern Romilia - the fortresses of Peristitza, Krytzimos (today's Chrysim, 20 km southwest of Philippopolis) and Tzepaina (in the northwestern Rhodopes) and the entire area up to Lake Achrid fell into the hands of Michael Asan. , with the exception of the small town of Mniakos, the only one that remained under Byzantine control. The Bulgarians captured other smaller towns and fortresses such as Ustra, Perperakion and Kryvo, reaching as far as the outskirts of Adrianople.
After these successes, Michael Asan began the effort to consolidate Bulgarian sovereignty in the territories he occupied. He placed strong garrisons in the cities and fortresses and supplied them with weapons and food - which he had collected - so that he would be able to face the Byzantine counter-attack - which he calculated for the spring of 1255. But he calculated without his courage and tenacity Theodorou.
The opposing forces
Although there are no clear accounts of the composition, number, type and quality of the opposing forces, we will attempt to outline the opposing armies, based on historical sources. The Army of the Empire of Nicaea was the continuation of the Byzantine Army under Comnenus. It had many mercenary units – even Latin ones, who were mainly heavily armed knights, organized into a separate corps, the so-called “Latinicon”. The number of Latino mercenaries, however, gradually seems to have decreased.
In the campaign against the Bulgarians, the action of Latin mercenary knights is not mentioned in the sources. On the contrary, the action of light mercenary horse archers, who made up the so-called "Scythian" body and who were either Turks, or Christianized Turks (Turkopoulos), or Magyars, (also called Vardariotes, because they lived in the Axios valley) must be taken for granted , as in the battle of Pelagonia – just three years after the end of the Bulgarian War (1259) – they were an important part of the Byzantine Army.
Naturally the body of the Imperial Army was made up of the bodies of the native cavalry. Of these sections, others were "royal". , i.e. fed directly by the state and others were formed by holders of welfare, i.e. territorial areas granted to them by the emperor in exchange for granting military service. The royal divisions were generally better armed and trained, forming the so-called Cavalry divisions, in contrast to the other cavalry divisions, those of the Soldiers.
The infantry, though ordinarily only a small percentage of the army, in this campaign were rather numerous, owing to the nature of the campaign itself, since the infantry alone were able to operate effectively in the difficult terrain of the upper Rhodopes, where and most of the operations took place, but also to contribute to the siege operations. The infantry were divided into three main types, the crossbowmen, the archers, and the skirmishers.
Kontarati carried a large shield, usually teardrop-shaped, at that time, a long spear (kontarion), swords and armor, chain, scale or leather. Archers carried a compound bow, helmet, sword and small shield. They usually fought in dense formations, attacking en masse. But they were able to fight in a loose order as well. The small ones were armed with bows, javelins and slings.
Spearmen usually also carried a small shield. They fought exclusively in sparse formations. In this campaign, the Byzantine engineer was particularly effective, constructing a number of siege machines. The Byzantine Army of the period was now organized into Alaia, battalion-level units, usually with an average strength of 500 men.
The Bulgarian Army was disorganized, with the exception of some units directly controlled by the royal house. Feudal in essence, it was made up of sections offered to the king by the various local lords of the kingdom, who were his vassals. Under the command of strong leaders, such as Ioannis Assan, who could overcome internal centrifugal tendencies, this army was highly combative.
His cavalry, which also constituted his elite, was divided into heavy and light. The heavy cavalry fought like Western knights, with dashing charges, although they lacked their equipment and armor. Thanks to its impetuosity, it excelled in striking power compared to the native Byzantine cavalry, which preferred the orderly advance. The Bulgarian light cavalry consisted of horse archers, Bulgarians, Cumans and Turks, just like the Byzantine.
As for the infantry, the Bulgarians relied mainly on armed subjects who were recruited for each campaign and usually came from the bulgarianized Slavic element of the population, with the exception of some heavy infantry units that were directly subordinate to the king. The foot soldiers carried a variety of weapons, from spears and bows, to agricultural implements. The best foot soldiers were equipped like the Byzantine crossbowmen.
Numerically, finally, the two opposing armies must not have been far apart, numbering no more than 20,000 warriors each. In the spring campaign of 1256, however, Theodore seems to have fielded a much stronger force, whose presence alone frightened the Bulgarians and forced them to capitulate.
Winter frenzy
When Theodore II was informed of the treacherous Bulgarian attack, he immediately convened a council of war. In this council opinions were divided. Most of the generals, angered by the Bulgarian ruse, proposed an immediate counter-attack, despite the brutal winter. A contrary view was held by the emperor's uncles Manuel and Michael, who insisted that neither the season permitted the campaign, nor the army fit to undertake such a task, at this time of the year. They pointed out to the emperor how bad any failure would do to his reputation.
But Theodoros had already made up his mind After the end of the council he ordered all the available military units to be assembled and started from Nicaea. At the same time, he had given orders to gather at every station on the march, from Nicaea to Adrianople, every available soldier. Thus the Imperial Army was strengthened along the way, and the further north it marched, the more men it gathered.
Before the end of January 1255, Theodore was in Adrianople and soon even crossed the Ebro from the bridge that existed near that city, after remaining, for the rest of his army, just one day in the great Thracian city.
The Bulgarian king had sent scouts to the area to watch for the eventual arrival of the Byzantine Army. One of them saw the Byzantine phalanxes coming out of Adrianople and hurried to inform his king. It was Michael Asan's turn to be surprised, as he did not expect this reaction from Theodoros, due to the winter. The Bulgarians, however, gathered as many forces as they had available, north of Adrianople and camped there, placing light cavalry guards around their camp.
In the meantime, Theodoros was informed by residents of the area about the existence of the Bulgarian gathering and hurried there. The emperor's goal was to crush the Bulgarian Army in a line-by-line battle, in order to force Asan to surrender what he had captured, without the Byzantine Army having to go through a difficult winter campaign.
Unfortunately for Theodoros, his plan did not succeed. The emperor had sent his vanguard towards the Bulgarian camp, himself following with the main body of the army. The Byzantine vanguard spotted the Bulgarian vanguards and attacked them. Victory crowned the Byzantine arms and those Bulgarians who survived surrendered as prisoners, together with their leader. Few escaped, but these were enough to rush to the Bulgarian camp and give the message of doom to their chief general, whose name is not known.
He immediately broke up his camp and fled, with all available forces, into the night. The Bulgarians left the camp in a state of panic. Many did not even saddle their horses. Galloping in the dark winter night, without even being able to clearly see where they were going, many entered a forest and while galloping, they fell on the branches of the trees and were seriously injured.
Theodorus had also marched, with his whole army, in the night, but with the help of native guides, and avoided similar accidents. The Byzantines arrived at the abandoned Bulgarian camp at dawn and found it empty. Theodore then called a new council of war, after which he decided to pursue the Bulgarians into Eastern Rumilia, despite the snow and cold.
The Byzantine Army reached Vero (present-day Stara Zagora in Bulgaria), which it liberated without difficulty, since the Bulgarian garrison had fled. There he found food and supplies for his army. Theodore, based at Vero, intended to continue his movement towards the Rhodopes. But the weather suddenly worsened and it began to snow relentlessly. Theodore waited for six days for the bad weather to stop, but the weather showed no signs of improvement. So he decided to return to Adrianople, temporarily, taking the inhabitants of Vero with him, to protect them from a new Bulgarian attack.
Arriving in Adrianople, Theodore sent his elite forces to the Rhodopes, with the mission of recapturing all the forts in the area that had fallen into the hands of the Bulgarians. This mission was executed with speed. With the help of their siege engines, the Byzantines took down all the fortresses that resisted, although most were simply abandoned by their garrisons at the mere sight of the stone-throwing siege engines of the Byzantines.
At the same time as these were happening, the emperor, with the rest of the army, marched against the cities that had been taken by the Bulgarians. In a short time, thanks to the heavy stone-throwing machines, which operated with the use of a counterweight (trembouche), he forced the Bulgarian garrisons in Peristitsa, Stenimakhos and Krytzimos, the fortress cities that guarded the southern Rhodope, to surrender. /strong>
Against Tzepaina, however, the emperor failed. And this is because the fort in question was built in an inaccessible location and due to the snow and ice, the Byzantine Army's artillery machines could not be placed in a firing position. However, the emperor did not give up his plans and called the generals Alexios Stratigopoulos and Konstantinos Tornikis, who were in Serres, to hurry to meet him in Tzepaina. But the latter were surprised by a Bulgarian detachment and were forced to return to Serres, without, however, their forces having suffered serious losses.
The Battle of the Key
An even more serious threat to Theodoros was the Bulgarian counter-distraction operation, in the area of Tzoumaia, against the small fortified town of Meleniko. Significant Bulgarian forces marched against the city, under General Dragan (Dragotas according to G. Akropolitis – probably of Serbian origin).
The small Byzantine garrison was headed by Ioannis Nestogos and Ioannis Angelos. The Bulgarians repeatedly attacked the small town, but were repulsed with heavy casualties, from the arrows and stones thrown at them by the soldiers and townspeople who reinforced the defensive effort of the garrison. However, the besieged began to worry about the lack of water. Nevertheless, they endured.
Emperor Theodore, when he was informed of the Bulgarian attack on Meleniko, decided to act immediately. He assembled his army and, leaving the transports behind, marched, in the heart of winter, in 12 days, to Serres. The horsemen had loaded their horses with supplies and food for the whole army. After resting his army for a day at Serres, the emperor marched towards the strait of Rupel (Byzantine Rupelius). The Bulgarians, of course, had blocked the narrow passage with a wall and had stationed there a numerous foot guard, which was also supported by a few horsemen.
The emperor, when he reached the strait, which in its narrowest part was about three meters wide – also due to the bed of the river Strymons – understood that a frontal attack would only cause unnecessary damage to his forces and nothing else. That is why he decided to follow the example of Vasilios II Bulgaroktonos and his general, Nikephoros Uranos, during the famous battle of Cleidis, in 1014. The difference was that the battle of the Key was fought in July, while now it was February and the snow was close to a meter thick!
Theodoros was not one to be easily disappointed, however. He immediately realized that he had to overrun the Bulgarian position, and the most suitable men for this task were his skirmishers, his light-armed footmen, viz. Thus, while he himself with the cavalry and heavy infantry marched in front of the Bulgarian fortifications and began to harass the Bulgarians with archery and small attacks, the light infantry, as scouts of the time, climbed the wooded slopes of Mount Agistrou, there where the Rupel fort would later be built.
When the light infantry reached the appropriate positions the signal was given and the Byzantine Army charged against the Bulgarians. The latter, seeing before them, the Byzantines, prepared to face them, rather pleased by the "foolishness" of their opponents to attack them head on. Ξαφνικά όμως βέλη και ακόντια άρχισαν αν τους πλήττουν στο αριστερό τους πλευρό.
Έντρομοι τότε, διαπίστωσαν ότι είχαν υπερκερασθεί και τράπηκαν μαζικά σε φυγή. Οι ιππείς τους πρόλαβαν να διαφύγουν. Το πεζικό τους όμως εξουδετερώθηκε, στο σύνολό του. Οι Βούλγαροι ιππείς που διέφυγαν ενώθηκαν με σώμα του Βουλγαρικού Στρατού, το οποίο διοικούσε ο Δραγωτάς, ο οποίος στάλθηκε εκεί για να σταματήσει τη βυζαντινή προέλαση και το οποίο στάθμευε βορειότερα, μεταδίδοντας και σε αυτό τον πανικό.
Οι Βούλγαροι τράπηκαν σε φυγή και μέσα στην ασέληνη νύκτα πολλοί σκοτώθηκαν πέφτοντας σε κρημνούς ή ποδοπατημένοι από τους πανικόβλητους συμπολεμιστές τους. Έτσι πέθανε και ο Δραγωτάς, ο οποίος έπεσε από το άλογό του και ποδοπατήθηκε από τα άλογα των συμπολεμιστών του. Πέθανε, με φριχτούς πόνους, τρεις μέρες αργότερα.
Μετά τη νίκη του ο Θεόδωρος κινήθηκε προς το Μελένικο αναγκάζοντας τους Βούλγαρους πολιορκητές να τραπούν, με τη σειράς τους, σε φυγή. Κατόπιν αυτού ο αυτοκράτορας επέστρεψε αρχικά στη Θεσσαλονίκη και κατόπιν κινήθηκε προς τα Βοδενά (την σημερινή Έδεσσα). Εκεί όμως ο Θεόδωρος αρρώστησε και παρέμεινε, υποχρεωτικά, για μερικές ημέρες. Όταν ανάρρωσε κινήθηκε προς την πόλη Πρίλαπο, την οποία κατέστησε βάση επιχειρήσεων στη δυτική Μακεδονία. Όταν έφτασαν και οι πολιορκητικές του μηχανές, ο αυτοκράτορας βάδισε με τον στρατό του προς το Βελεσό (σημερινό Βέλες του κρατιδίου των Σκοπίων, πρώην Τίτο Βέλες).
Ο Θεόδωρος έφτασε ενώπιον της πόλης και ετοιμάστηκε να την πολιορκήσει. Ωστόσο η βουλγαρική φρουρά, στη θέα των πολιορκητικών του μηχανών παρέλυσε και παραδόθηκε με συνθήκη. Περίπου 500 Βούλγαροι αφέθηκαν να φύγουν ελεύθεροι. Στη συνέχεια ο αυτοκράτορας στράφηκε ανατολικά και έφτασε στην Στρώμνιτσα (αρχαία ελληνική πόλη Αστραίον) των σημερινών Σκοπίων και από εκεί βάδισε προς το Μελένικο και επέστρεψε στις Σέρρες.
Με τον τρόπο αυτό ο Θεόδωρος απελευθέρωσε όλα σχεδόν τα εδάφη που είχαν κυριεύσει οι Βούλγαροι, με εξαίρεση την Τζέπαινα και το μικρό φρούριο Πάτμο, στη Ροδόπη – το τελευταίο κυριεύτηκε τελικά από τον στρατηγό Αλέξιο Φιλανθρωπινό.
Τα στοιχεία της φύσης νικούν τον Θεόδωρο
Από τις Σέρρες ο Θεόδωρος πληροφορήθηκε ότι οι Μογγόλοι έκαναν επιδρομές στη Μικρά Ασία, κατανικώντας τους Σελτζούκους Τούρκους. Φοβούμενος για την ασφάλεια των ανατολικών του συνόρων ο αυτοκράτορας στράφηκε ανατολικά. Στο μεταξύ είχε έρθει το καλοκαίρι. Ο Θεόδωρος τελικά στρατοπέδευσε αρχικά στο Διδυμότειχο και κατόπιν στην Αδριανούπολη, περιμένοντας τις εξελίξεις.
Ο μογγολικός κίνδυνος τον κράτησε καρφωμένο στην Αδριανούπολη όλο το καλοκαίρι. Τελικά στις αρχές του φθινοπώρου του 1255, πληροφορήθηκε ότι οι Μογγόλοι είχαν αποχωρήσει και αποφάσισε να βαδίσει προς την Τζέπαινα με σκοπό να ανακαταλάβει το τελευταίο βουλγαροκρατούμενο οχυρό, νότια του Έβρου.
Η Τζέπαινα ήταν κτισμένη στις βορειοδυτικές απολήξεις της Ροδόπης, κοντά στις πηγές του ποταμού Έβρου, εκεί που η Ροδόπη συναντά την οροσειρά του Αίμου, νοτιοανατολικά της Σόφιας. Το έδαφος είναι ορεινό, τραχύ, δύσκολο για ανθρώπους και άλογα. Το σημείο όμως είναι στρατηγικής σημασίας, καθώς το οχυρό ήλεγχε τις διαβάσεις από Βορρά προς Νότο και αντίστροφα.
Αν και είχε σχεδόν τελειώσει το φθινόπωρο και ερχόταν ξανά ο χειμώνας, ο αυτοκράτορας κίνησε με τον στρατό του προς την Τζέπαινα. Ο Γεώργιος Ακροπολίτης αναφέρει ότι ο Θεόδωρος είχε ενισχύσει τον στρατό του με πολλούς πεζούς τοξότες – γεγονός λογικό, εφόσον αναλάμβανε πολιορκητική επιχείρηση – και κορυνοφόρους, χωρίς να διευκρινίζει αν ήταν πεζοί ή ιππείς. Γιατί οι Βυζαντινοί ιππείς έφεραν, ως δευτερεύων όπλο και κορύνη, τον λεγόμενο κεφαλοθραύστη. Βυζαντινοί πεζοί όμως οπλισμένοι, αποκλειστικά ή κύρια, όπως προδιαθέτει η ονομασία τους, με το όπλο αυτό, δεν υπήρξαν ποτέ.
Ο Βυζαντινός Στρατός, αφού διάνυσε τέσσερις σταθμούς πορείας έφτασε σε μια ακατοίκητη περιοχή που ονομαζόταν Μικρολιβάδα. Εκεί όμως ο καιρός επιδεινώθηκε. Την ίδια νύκτα ξέσπασε φοβερή καταιγίδα και όταν ξημέρωσε ολόκληρο το υψίπεδο ήταν καλυμμένο από χιόνι.
Ενώπιον αυτών των συνθηκών ο Θεόδωρος κάλεσε τους στρατηγούς του για να ακούσει τη γνώμη τους. Οι περισσότεροι πρότειναν ως ενδεδειγμένη λύση την υποχώρηση στην Ανδριανούπολη. Αντίθετα ο αυτοκράτορας αποφάσισε να βαδίσει ο στρατός προς τη Στενήμαχο, όπου θα έβρισκαν τα αναγκαία και θα μπορούσαν να προστατευτούν από τις άσχημες καιρικές συνθήκες, χωρίς να δώσουν στους εχθρούς την ηθική, έστω, ικανοποίηση ότι υποχωρούσαν.
Έτσι και έγινε. Ο στρατός αφίχθη στη Στενήμαχο, όπου ανεφοδιάστηκε και αναπαύτηκε και αμέσως μετά κίνησε για την Τζέπαινα. Ο Θεόδωρος έστειλε ένα αλάγιο, με επικεφαλής τον Κωνσταντίνο Μαργαρίτη, να αναγνωρίσει το έδαφος. Ο Μαργαρίτης, επιστρέφοντας, ανέφερε ότι το έδαφος ήταν βατό και μπορούσε με ευκολία ο στρατός να το διασχίσει. Μόνο έτσι δεν ήταν όμως. Το ίδιο βράδυ, το χιόνι πάγωσε και την επομένη που ο στρατός κίνησε ξανά υπέφερε τα πάνδεινα για να ανέβει στις βουνοπλαγιές που βρίσκονταν απέναντι από το οχυρό.
Ήταν εμφανές, ότι υπό αυτές τις συνθήκες, δεν μπορούσε να νοηθεί καν η οποιαδήποτε προσβολή του οχυρού. Έτσι ο αυτοκράτορας αποφάσισε να επιστρέψει στην Αδριανούπολη. Από εκεί πήγε στο Διδυμότειχο, όπου άφησε φρουρά με επικεφαλής τους Μανουήλ Λάσκαρη και Κωνσταντίνο Μαργαρίτη και πέρασε στη Λάμψακο για να διαχειμάσει εκεί με τον στρατό του. Στους δε Λάσκαρη και Μαργαρίτη έδωσε σαφείς εντολές να μη εμπλακούν σε μάχη με τον εχθρό, παρά μόνο αν οι αντίπαλοι ήταν λίγοι αριθμητικά.
Η εαρινή κεραυνοβόλος εκστρατεία
Όταν έφτασε η άνοιξη του 1256 ο αυτοκράτορας έδωσε εντολή να συγκεντρωθούν όσοι στην υπηρεσία του ήταν ικανοί να φέρουν όπλα, στρατολογώντας ακόμα και τους κυνηγούς του, συγκέντρωσε μια επιβλητική στρατιά, την ισχυρότερη που είχε παρατάξει η Αυτοκρατορία από τη εποχή των Κομνηνών. Κατόπιν πέρασε ξανά στην Ευρώπη και βάδισε προς το Διδυμότειχο με σκοπό να ενωθεί με τις δυνάμεις των Λάσκαρη και Μαργαρίτη.
Στο μεταξύ όμως ο Βούλγαρος τσάρος είχε αποστείλει στη Μακεδονία και Θράκη 4.000 ελαφρούς ιππείς του, με σκοπό τη λεηλασία. Ο Λάσκαρης και ο Μαργαρίτης, παρακούοντας της αυτοκρατορικές εντολές τους επιτέθηκαν, αλλά ηττήθηκαν κατά κράτος. Ο Λάσκαρης γλίτωσε μόνο χάρη στην ταχύτητα του αλόγου του. Ο Μαργαρίτης αιχμαλωτίσθηκε και πολλοί στρατιώτες σκοτώθηκαν, άδικα.
Ο Θεόδωρος έμαθε τι είχε συμβεί και βάδισε με τη μέγιστη δυνατή ταχύτητα – καλύπτοντας απόσταση 70 χλμ. σε μια μόλις ημέρα – κατά των αντιπάλων, διασκορπίζοντάς τους. Οι ηττημένοι Βούλγαροι, τρομοκρατημένοι, ανέφεραν στον τσάρο τους ότι ο Βυζαντινός Στρατός ήταν τεράστιος σε αριθμό και δεν ήταν δυνατόν αν τον νικήσει.
Ο Μιχαήλ Ασάν τρομοκρατήθηκε. Άλλωστε και στη χειμερινή εκστρατεία του Θεοδώρου δεν είχε αντιδράσει, ως όφειλε, προφανώς υπολογίζοντας ότι αδυνατούσε να αντιμετωπίσει τον Βυζαντινό Στρατό.
Αντιμετωπίζοντας και εσωτερικά έριδες – οι οποίες άλλωστε οδήγησαν, λίγο αργότερα στη δολοφονία του – ο Μιχαήλ ζήτησε τη συνδρομή του πενθερού του, του Ρώσου πρίγκιπα Ροστισλάφ (ο Ούρος των Βυζαντινών) για να επιτύχει την σύναψη συνθήκης ειρήνης με τους Έλληνες. Παράλληλα έστειλε πρέσβεις στον αυτοκράτορα Θεόδωρο, ενημερώνοντάς τον για τις προθέσεις του.
Ο Ρώσος πρίγκιπας πράγματι δέχτηκε τον ρόλο του μεσολαβητή και πήγε να συναντήσει τον Θεόδωρο. Ο Θεόδωρος δεν επέβαλε βαρείς όρους τους ηττημένους Βουλγάρους, επιδιώκοντας τη διατήρηση της ειρήνης στην περιοχή της Βαλκανικής, καθώς είχε να ανησυχεί και για τα ανατολικά του σύνορα. Έτσι ορίστηκε ότι σύνορο των δύο κρατών θα ήταν και πάλι ο ποταμός Έβρος, στη Ρωμυλία. Επίσης η Τζέπαινα θα περνούσε πάλι στο έλεγχο των Βυζαντινών.
Ο Βούλγαρος τσάρος δέχτηκε, με ανακούφιση τους όρους και η συμφωνία υπεγράφη το καλοκαίρι του 1256.