Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and the kneeling in Warsaw

From 1969, as Federal Chancellor, Willy Brandt campaigned for understanding with Eastern Europe and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for this. By kneeling in Warsaw on December 7, 1970, he asked for forgiveness on behalf of the Germans for the crimes of the Nazi regime.

by Kathrin Weber

The GDR is not a democratically legitimized state and cannot represent Germany to the outside world - anyone who recognizes the country nonetheless must, in the worst case, expect diplomatic relations to be severed. This principle of the so-called Hallstein Doctrine has determined German foreign policy since 1955. As a reaction to this, the principle of the Ulbricht doctrine applies to the GDR and its allies:no negotiations without prior recognition. A deadlocked situation that increasingly restricts Bonn's foreign policy room for maneuver and makes a German-German rapprochement impossible.

On the way to reconciliation with Eastern Europe

As early as 1963, Willy Brandt and his close political companion Egon Bahr drafted a concept for a policy of détente under the motto "change through rapprochement". During the 1969 federal election campaign, the SPD's top candidate, Brandt, and the FDP's party leader, Walter Scheel, stressed that Germany needed a new government simply because of foreign policy.

When Willy Brandt becomes Chancellor, he makes understanding with the East one of his most important political goals. "The German people need peace in the full sense of the word, also with the peoples of the Soviet Union and all the peoples of Eastern Europe. We are prepared to make an honest attempt at understanding so that the consequences of the disaster can be overcome, which a criminal clique has spread across Europe brought," he stated in his government statement on October 28, 1969.

The reconciliation with the states of Eastern Europe should also be the basis for a rapprochement between the two parts of Germany, whose relationship should be released from the "current tension". Brandt speaks for the first time of the existence of two German states.

Tough negotiations in Moscow

The key to an understanding lies in Moscow. Once there is a treaty with the Soviet Union, it is easier to come to an agreement with Warsaw and East Berlin. "The German-Russian talks over their heads, feared by many neighboring European countries, were unavoidable because only Moscow was able to make decisions and was willing to talk," said Egon Bahr, then State Secretary in the Chancellery, looking back. In December 1969 he traveled to the Soviet capital for the first talks about renouncing violence. The negotiations are tough. The biggest problem is the border question. Although Bonn is ready to recognize the post-war borders, the chance of reunification should remain.

The solution finally came with the so-called letter on German unity, which Brandt gave to the Soviet government on August 12, 1970, the day the Moscow Treaty was signed in the Kremlin. It states "that this treaty does not conflict with the political goals of the Federal Republic of Germany to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regain their unity in free self-determination". In addition, the preamble to the treaty refers to the UN Charter, which also emphasizes the right to self-determination.

The next hurdle is the Berlin Agreement

The ratification of the Moscow treaty ties the Brandt/Scheel government to the conclusion of an agreement between the four victorious powers on Berlin, which is intended in particular to guarantee free access from the Federal Republic to West Berlin and strengthen the city's ties to the West. Because, according to Brandt, "if we want detente, then Berlin must not remain a point of the Cold War." In September 1971, the USA, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France signed the four-power agreement on Berlin. Another step is done.

Big gesture:Willy Brandt kneeling in Warsaw

Parallel to the talks with Moscow, Bonn began dialogue with Poland in February 1970. Central points are a renunciation of violence, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and the resettlement of Germans.

On December 7, Brandt signs the Warsaw Pact in the Polish capital. On the same day he visits the memorial for the uprising in the former Warsaw ghetto. Instead of just laying a wreath, he kneels in front of the monument. "Then he, who does not need it, kneels there for all those who need it but do not kneel there - because they do not dare or cannot or do not dare. Then he admits a debt to which he himself does not have to bear and asks for forgiveness, which he himself does not need. Then he kneels there for Germany," says reporter Hermann Schreiber, describing the scene in a report in "Spiegel". The picture went around the world and made the chancellor an internationally recognized peace politician. Nevertheless, the response in Germany to Brandt's grand gesture is divided. According to a snap poll in December 1970, only 41 percent of those questioned thought that kneeling was appropriate, while 48 percent thought it was excessive.

There has been speculation for years as to whether the kneeling was planned. In his memoirs, Brandt clearly denies this:"I hadn't planned anything, but left Wilanow Castle, where I was housed, with the feeling that I had to express the special nature of the commemoration at the ghetto monument. On the abyss of German history and below the burden of the murdered millions I did what people do when language fails."

Brandt receives the Nobel Peace Prize

With his policy of détente and high moral standards, Brandt gains trust and high recognition abroad. The US magazine "Time" named him "Man of the Year 1970". On December 10, 1971, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. "Chancellor Brandt, as head of the West German government and on behalf of the German people, stretched out his hand for reconciliation between old enemy countries," the statement said. The treaties of Moscow and Warsaw as well as the commitment to the rights of the West Berlin population are mentioned as special merits. Brandt accepts the award with emotion and in his acceptance speech he emphasizes how much it means to him "after the indelible horrors of the past to see the name of my country and the desire for peace reconciled".

Strong internal political resistance

While abroad supported Brandt's course, at home he met with some fierce resistance. A majority of Union politicians reject the Eastern treaties. They accuse the government of "selling out German interests" and see the freedom of the Federal Republic in danger. When the news of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize broke during a Bundestag session, only some of the MPs stood up and applauded. The majority of the opposition sits in silence. There are even suspicions in the press that some votes of the Nobel Prize Committee have been bought.

The long road to ratification of the treaties

Because of the Union's resistance to the Eastern treaties, ratification in the Bundestag becomes a deadlock. After several MPs from the SPD and FDP defected to the CDU, the government only had a narrow majority of four votes at the end of January 1972 - only a few days before the start of the first reading. When another FDP member of parliament left his party on April 23 and another announced that he would not vote for the Eastern treaties, Brandt no longer had a majority.

The CDU uses the situation and tries to overthrow Brandt with a constructive vote of no confidence. The vote took place on April 27, 1972 - Brandt versus Rainer Barzel. The opposition is confident of victory, but in the end it is two votes short of a majority. Brandt remains in office.

But the struggle over the Eastern treaties is not yet over. In order to get it through parliament as quickly as possible and to persuade the opposition to at least abstain from voting, the government agrees to a joint resolution with the opposition in which, among other things, the right of Germans to self-determination is again emphasized. According to Brandt, the text "goes to the limits of what I can still be responsible for", but paves the way for a successful, albeit extremely close vote. On May 17, the treaties with the East pass the Bundestag with 248 yes votes each.

Basic treaty regulates the relationship with the GDR

In November, the Federal Republic and the GDR sign the basic treaty, which, in addition to a renunciation of violence, provides for the establishment of "permanent representations" and confirms the intention of both countries to regulate practical and humanitarian questions by treaty. Brandt has thus achieved the goals of his détente policy.

An overwhelming election victory

Because of the stalemate in the Bundestag, the government and opposition agree on new elections in late summer, which are scheduled for November 19. In the election campaign, the SPD fully relies on the chancellor as the driving force, buttons and stickers with the slogan "Vote Willy" are distributed, numerous celebrities such as Günter Grass, Heinrich Böll, Inge Meysel and Sebastian Haffner support the chancellor in a social-democratic voters' initiative. With 45.8 percent, the SPD - with a turnout of more than 91 percent - achieved its best result to date and is thus the strongest parliamentary group in the Bundestag for the first time - a late triumph for Brandt and a clear vote for his Ostpolitik. "The fight for the contracts decided the election," he later wrote in his memoirs.