On June 24, 1940 , just two weeks after the start of the war on the Italian side, it was sunk by the corvette H.M.S. Falmouth and the destroyer H.M.S. Kimberley , the Royal Submarine “Luigi Galvani”.
The history of the Royal Navy during the Second World War is characterized, more particularly by the other Armed Forces, by what we can define as the paradoxes of the “ fascist war ". The Navy, in fact, as of 10 June 1940 was, among the main weapons of the Italian war system, the one considered to be the most modern and capable of supporting the war effort.
The great naval magazine made in the Gulf of Naples to celebrate Hitler's visit in May 1938 ( that of "A special day", so to speak ) showcased the state of form of the Italian fleet. The Reich propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbles, was able to write in his diary:
On paper, the Regia Marina could boast 6 battleships, of which two of the modern type of 35,000 tons, 7 cruisers of 10,000 tons, 14 light cruisers between 5,000 and 8,000 tons., 12 flotilla-conducting destroyers, 28 modern destroyers, 19 old model destroyers, 69 torpedo boats, 117 submarines of various tonnage. In terms of numbers, this displacement had nothing to envy to the main rivals present in the " Mare Nostrum “, France and Great Britain.
The Italian deficit revolved around two main cornerstones. The first was that the fleet, by type of unit and training, was poorly prepared for the war it then had to face. The structure that it had received especially during the two-year period 1934-1936 had set it up mainly for a daytime battle, using guns, between battleships. The other was the lack of aircraft carriers, as well as a serious agreement with the Air Force. Mussolini had rejected the idea of setting up aircraft carriers for the fleet, already considering the Italian peninsula a natural aircraft carrier for a possible war effort. The deficiency in this field, combined with the lack of a technical-scientific apparatus suitable for night clashes, was fatal from the very first clashes with the British fleet.
The Royal Navy, in June 1940, was still far from having prepared any type of enemy radar locator, as had Germany and England, despite having been studying since 1936 at the Istituto Militare delle Trasmissioni laboratories a radio telemeter that had to exploit the echoes of the electromagnetic waves reflected from a hull to the surface of the sea. The first suspicions that such an apparatus existed and that it was installed on the units of the Mediterranean Fleet the British Royal Navy had them in the tragic clash of Matapan (March 1941), a defeat that cost the Navy very dear precisely due to the inability to maneuver in the darkness.
The Duce, however, had a charter that he thought would greatly favor the Italian maritime war, that of submarines. The numbers were clear, in June 1940 Italy was the nation that boasted the highest number of submarine combat vehicles, vital for conducting the so-called "convoys war" as a predator.
However, the increasing effectiveness of the aerial weapon, which forced one to dive rapidly, and the strong anti-submarine defense, of the convoys and of the liners, highlighted the structural difficulties of the Italian boats . These in fact had been developed according to the principles of submarine warfare developed during the First World War, with the expectation of often operating in emergence, favoring surface nautical capabilities. For the attack, this was expected to almost always take place underwater during the day, when visibility was better, applying the ambush technique, in a defined passage or area where to wait for enemy ships to pass through. Paradoxically, Italy found itself disadvantaged by this situation, as it held a particularly large fleet but technically overtaken by the development of the war. Despite this, the substantial ability of our sailors and officers on board must be recognized, who managed to carry out particularly delicate missions and keep the most powerful fleet of the Old World in check for about three years.
The two Axis underwater fleets, Italian and German, collaborated by operating side by side in the Atlantic and Mediterranean scenarios. Allied losses due to submarine attacks were 2828 merchant ships for 14,687,231 tons of which 85% in the Atlantic, the main place of collision and merchant sinking. In the Atlantic, the Italians operated through the Bordeaux submarine base, called Betasom, where only 32 submarines suitable to operate in the Atlantic were deployed during the three-year war. The Mediterranean scenario was poorer in Allied merchant prey, but above all more patrolled and controlled from the bases of Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria.
Italian East Africa was in a strategic position with respect to naval traffic between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean:you could attack enemy traffic and protect your own right into the ocean. But the decision to go to war with Great Britain in 1940 made the Suez Canal impassable, isolating the colony without the possibility of aid from the motherland. The enemy had no problem bringing in other ships, while the forces present could not receive fresh supplies.
The naval forces that could have moved between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea were limited, with a colonial ship, 7 technologically inefficient fighters, a few M.A.S. ( the Torpedo Armed Motorboat which played a primary role in the war in the Adriatic during 1915-1918 ), and 8 submarines, which theoretically constituted the most modern and formidable weapon. However, the Italian submarines had difficulty maneuvering in such clear and warm waters, as well as problems regarding the refrigeration system which exploited a particularly dangerous gas and which endangered the very lives of the crews. Despite a request from the Viceroy, Duke Amedeo d’Aosta, the General Staff did not want to increase their forces, so as not to steal them from the main Mediterranean theater. Supermarina, code name of the supreme command of the Royal Navy, still asked that the "imperial" fleet try to take on an offensive and insidious role towards the enemy.
The tragic story of the submarine " Luigi Galvani fits into this context "And of her heroic crew.
The" Galvani "was one of the newest" Brin class submarines. ", All launched in 1938/1939, which had been developed specifically for oceanic combat.
Under the command of the corvette captain Renato Spano, the submarine left on 10 June from the port of Massawa to the area of operations. Galvani's mission was supposed to last approximately 28 days, with the aim of endangering oil traffic from the Persian Gulf. The boat arrived in the assigned area on 23 June, but the capture of the submarine "Galilei" a few days earlier had provided the British with the operational plans of the Italian fleet in the Indian Ocean.
On the evening of 23 June, unaware of the situation, the "Galvani" entered the gulf, discovering that the usual oil tanker traffic was completely absent. Immediately the submarine was spotted by the Falmouth corvette. As the boat proceeded slowly to dive, her stern was hit by a bullet. At this point, with the resistant hull compromised, the 2nd torpedo leader Pietro Venuti evacuated the aft torpedo-launching chamber and closed the watertight door. By sacrificing himself he saved the submarine, allowing it to be submerged. Immediately thereafter, the Falmouth drew closer to the submarine and unloaded a series of depth bombs that caused enormous damage.
Aware that the boat was lost, and that part of the crew could still be saved, Commander Spano ordered the emergence, an operation that was completed with great difficulty, due to the severity of the damage suffered. Of the fifty-seven crewmen, 31 were rescued by the British, while the remaining 26, including three officers, disappeared aboard the Galvani.
Among these was the ensign Piero Gemignani , born in Rivarolo (Ge) on 9 August 1918. After attending the Naval Academy of Livorno he was able to be assigned to the prestigious submarine specialty, probably fascinated by the idea of using a new and powerful technical vehicle. The risk that life aboard such boats attracted for the heroic and exceptional flavor it gave. However, audacity had to turn into accuracy, dedication, spirit of body, as life on board these boats was particularly difficult and required perfect organization. The g.m. Gemignani, during the first bombing of the "Galvani" had managed to survive and to assist the c.c. Spano, but once he re-emerged, worried about the need to destroy the ciphers on board, he decided to go back on board.
He disappeared along with the submarine at 02.17 on June 24, 1940. The Silver Medal for Military Valor was awarded in memory of him on December 9, 1950.
Commemorative bust of Ensign Piero Gemignani.