A century ago, the leader of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) claimed power in the House of Representatives. This attempt at revolution by Pieter Jelles Troelstra, however, failed within a week and has gone down in the history books as 'Troelstra's mistake'. But Troelstra was by no means the only one who believed that a revolution could succeed.
Pieter Jelles Troelstra strove for a socialist welfare state, but he disapproved of violent coups such as the one in Russia in 1917. He wanted to peacefully seize power to ensure social equality, worker participation and nationalization of the economy. In the autumn of 1918 he considered the Netherlands ripe for such a revolution.
He first deduced this from the social unrest in his own country. Because of the First World War, little food could be imported and the population of the big cities went hungry. Bread trucks were repeatedly looted, after which the troops had to restore order. In October, riots also broke out in the De Harskamp barracks in Gelderland:mobilized soldiers set fire to their barracks out of hunger and boredom.
Troelstra was not only impressed by the internal disturbances, but also looked with interest at the revolutionary wind blowing through Europe (see box below). He closely followed the progress of foreign revolutionaries and expected the Netherlands to follow their example. He was especially inspired by the seizure of power by his German kindred spirits, whom he had always regarded as a shining example. He admired the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), because it peacefully founded the Weimar Republic.
That is why Troelstra proclaimed his revolution on November 11, 1918, shortly after the resigned German Kaiser Wilhelm II had fled to the Netherlands. At a meeting of the SDAP and several trade unions in Rotterdam, he announced:"The working class in the Netherlands is now seizing political power." A day later, he repeated this message in the House of Representatives.
No popular uprising
Troelstra's attempt failed miserably. He faced a lot of opposition within his own party to begin with. Most members of the SDAP summit were more moderate than their leader. They rejected the revolution, now that their years-long struggle for universal suffrage had finally been successful with the constitutional amendment of 1917. These directors therefore did not take up Troelstra's appeal. On the contrary, they asked the local party branches to wait quietly until they could discuss at the SDAP congress on 16 and 17 November how they should respond to the call of their party leader.
Troelstra's speeches did not provoke popular revolt either. There were no large-scale demonstrations and strikes. He could not count on the support of the army and the police, which is necessary for a revolution to have a chance of success. Unions of conscripts and police officers publicly swore allegiance to legal authority.
This also applied to countless other counter-revolutionary organizations, ranging from Catholic unions to church boards. In proclamations they urged the workers to calm down and they organized mass demonstrations. For example, on November 18, tens of thousands of Dutch people expressed their support for Queen Wilhelmina on the Malieveld in The Hague. The SDAP leader quickly backtracked. On the second day of party congress, less than a week after he proclaimed the revolution, he had to admit that he had misjudged the balance of power.
Panic mood
The events of November 1918 have gone down in the history books as 'Troelstra's mistake'. After all, this half-hearted revolution attempt, a storm in a teacup, was nothing compared to the foreign coups. The SDAP leader announced his intentions candidly in parliament, after which he politely asked the government to relinquish power. Since no one was waiting for that, his revolution was limited to a small incident.
The image exists that the international chaos passed by the Netherlands and that in 1918 it was a stable island in a sea of waves of revolution. However, many Dutch people thought very differently at the time. They felt that they were living in a turbulent era and that the threat of revolution was very real. Troelstra was not the only one who was wrong. His opponents also seriously considered a popular uprising.
Already in early November there were rumors that strikes and riots were imminent. Notables reacted nervously. Mayor Alfred Zimmerman of Rotterdam even considered transferring power to the local SDAP department. Other politicians, clergy and confessional trade union leaders did their best to thwart the socialist takeover. To this end, they set up special associations, such as the Bond of Government Loyalty. Countless organizations urged workers to keep the peace.
The government did not dare to rely on the self-control of the population. Immediately after Troelstra's parliamentary speech, the ministers mobilized the army and the police. These troops protected government buildings, stations and utilities. They received support from reservists and other armed volunteers. For a short time, the streets in the big cities were dominated by machine guns, sandbags and barbed wire. There was a nervous atmosphere for a week.
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The mood of panic subsided after November 17, when it became clear that the proletariat had not taken up arms. Nevertheless, the Dutch remained alert for a new revolution attempt for several years. The cabinet took precautionary measures for months. The troops remained on standby until 1920, to prevent the communist uprisings in Germany from spreading to the Netherlands. In order to keep a close eye on domestic troublemakers, the Central Intelligence Agency (CI) was established in 1919.
The government only breathed a sigh of relief in 1920, when the introduction of the Anti-Revolution Act had to nip new coups in the bud. Until then, the ministers continued to insist on the need for vigilance. Conservative MPs, journalists and counter-revolutionary organizations also warned that the danger of revolution had not yet passed. In this way they promoted fear among large parts of the population. Many felt the need to do something personally against 'the red danger'. Tens of thousands of armed civilians assisted the army and the police in maintaining authority, even after November 1918. The Special Voluntary Landstorm (BVL) and the vigilantes literally took action against disturbances of the peace.
The warnings caught on, because everyone could recognize their own doomsday scenario in them. The concept of "revolution" was so general that a broad counter-revolutionary front emerged. Politicians often argued that coups threatened parliamentary democracy. Minister of Justice Theo Heemskerk emphasized in 1920 that revolution 'in its essence was ... anti-democratic'. Liberal parties added that the socialist state did not allow freedom.
They cited Russian terror as evidence. On the contrary, Catholics and Protestants insisted on the danger of immorality, since revolutionaries would have no respect for religion or marital morality. The biggest specter was disorder. A revolution would lead to bloodshed. The Catholic Committee of Action in Haarlem warned 'that this attack on freedom and security cannot take place without violence'. Even a failed revolution attempt would disrupt order. That explains why the fear of socialism persisted, even after Troelstra's revolution attempt had failed.
Stories from Russia
The Netherlands was not the only country that was under the spell of 'the red danger' between 1918 and 1920. The fear of revolution reigned throughout the Western world. Strikes or demonstrations were regarded as a contagious disease that threatened one's own state and governments took corresponding strict measures. The Spanish police and employers cracked down on strikes. In Italy, Benito Mussolini's fascist goons took on that task. France, Great Britain and Canada also struggled with social tensions. Strikes and mutinies among hungry, war-weary soldiers terrified the establishment. Politicians and conservative journalists feared that the repeated riots were harbingers of a mass popular uprising.
The fear of revolution was most widespread in the United States. Labor disputes and terrorist attacks by anarchists caused panic. The tabloid press and patriotic organizations convinced the public that revolutionaries were threatening to set foot in America too. The authorities held a sort of witch hunt against workers and immigrants whom they suspected of having socialist sympathies. This Red Scare ended only in 1920, because the danger turned out to be not too bad. Around the same time, fear of revolution also subsided in the rest of the western world.
This foreign unrest fueled concerns about the spread of revolutionary socialism in the Netherlands, especially since Russian refugees spread horrific stories about the new regime in their homeland. The newspapers played an important role in this. Dutch journalists copied the Russian horror stories and often wrote about the German disturbances, since they took place just over the border.
This reinforced the impression that the threat of revolution was coming very close. Daily and weekly newspapers were full of ominous articles, as journalists called even small-scale incidents revolutionary. They reminded their readers daily that they lived in "rough times of war and revolution, hunger and selfishness." As a result, the fear grew that the Netherlands could become the next victim of socialism. Both Troelstra and his opponents were convinced of this.
Here we see an important parallel with today. Even today, the Western world lives in fear of extremism and terrorism, despite the statistically small chance of an attack. Future historians will be amazed at this. They must then realize that the internet and social media confront citizens with the disturbing idea that the world is on fire. The image is powerful, but just like a century ago, when Troelstra's assessment turned out to be incorrect, we can conclude that there is no reason to panic.