We often study Dutch history from the seventeenth century from Dutch sources. Recently an untranslated book by a senior Portuguese soldier about the war with the Dutch in Brazil was published. This offers an interesting, different view.
In the newspapers from 1638, the Dutch read how Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679) had lost the siege of the Portuguese-Brazilian city of Salvador de Bahia. However, it was not the fault of this nobleman, the new governor-general of Dutch Brazil. He had just saved his army by retreating. The blame for this loss lay with traitors and the presence of too few men for a good encirclement, which allowed the Portuguese to continue to supply themselves.
Newspaper reports of this kind were not intended as objective reporting, nor was the book of jubilation that appeared in 1648 about Johan Maurits' reign in Dutch Brazil (1638-1644). That is why it is also interesting to read a different view of the battle. Francisco de Brito Freire (1625-1692) described in his book 'História da Guerra Brasilica ’ (1675) the story about the Dutch and their overseas administrators from a Portuguese point of view. This Portuguese admiral forced the Dutch to surrender in 1654.
His book was recently published as 'Bahia, Recief and other inconveniences. The end of the Dutch era in Brazil. Benjamin N. Teensma has translated, abridged and edited it. He is a Netherlands-Brazil expert. The original is quite extensive and Teensma mainly edited the chapters in which De Brito Freire described the Hollanders and their actions. Furthermore, the last part of the original book has been lost, leaving us with only the historiography from the Dutch conquest of Salvador da Bahia in 1624 to Nassau's failed siege of that same city in 1638.
Don't mince words
The book is almost a military report, full of sieges and battles and naval battles and with many tactical details. That's not surprising with an admiral as an author. Sometimes that is a bit long-winded, but also for those who do not necessarily like military history, the book remains interesting. De Brito Freire, for example, paints a picture of the landscape, including dwarves, giants and cannibalistic peoples, and through his descriptions we get a picture of the manners and customs of the seventeenth century. The admiral does not spare haughty and self-centered commanders, both Dutch and Portuguese, who, through their incompetence, endangered the lives of their subordinates.
Johan Maurits also falls under this. According to Teensma, De Brito Freire wrote his historiography as a counterpart to the book 'Nederlandsch Brazil under the rule of Johan Maurits, Count of Nassau 1637-1644'. Caspar Barlaeus had written this jubilant book, commissioned by Johan Maurits himself, in 1647. De Brito Freiro would have been very displeased with the content and wanted to expose the pride of Johan Maurits and the greed of the WIC.
With money everything is possible
Teensma starts the book with a chronology and a clear introduction, providing enough context. Also for the reader who does not know much about the subject and the era. Historiography begins in 1624, when the Dutch begin to attack Brazilian territories. After Piet Hein got hold of the Spanish silver fleet in 1627, there was suddenly enough money to take the Brazilian plans out of the fridge again. De Brito Freiro aptly writes:“For example, unhappy America had to contribute to its own disaster from its own resources, because it was unanimously decided to take up that project again.”
After fierce fighting, the Dutch managed to occupy a sizeable enclave in the northeast of Brazil between 1630 and 1654, with Pernambuco as the core area and Recief as the capital. The surrounding areas are still in Portuguese hands. The Brito Freiro introduces the reader to the guerrilla tactics of small groups of indigenous peoples fighting for the Portuguese and Brazilian-born Portuguese. They know the area and drive the Dutch to madness.
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“The Portuguese formed twelve groups of twelve peasants who would become very famous. They were men who, sometimes alone and sometimes in a group, could carry out quick, silent and inexorable robberies. As country children they knew the Brazilian nature. Because the whole area is covered by old-growth forest, it became clear after a few days how effective their way of waging war was in liquidating the Dutch. We gave them the honorary name capitães de emboscadas or ambush captains.”
A few chapters later:“Thanks to these raids we controlled the countryside to such an extent that the Dutch no longer dared to show themselves even with reinforced convoys. They could not possibly cover such a vast and rugged area in which their enemies could roam everywhere and at the same time ravage the plantations and the population in several places with violence and arson.”
The Dutch were generally stronger at sea. And cunning. “The proven expertise of those cunning folk who always try to position themselves in such a way as to inflict much damage and suffer little.” The Dutch are winning in 1634, despite strong resistance from the undermanned Portuguese. “Due to the lack of aid and support from Brazil and Spain, it is not surprising that the city was lost, but that this had not happened much earlier.”
Egocentric officers
Not only lack of support, but also the disagreement between the Portuguese officers played into the hands of the Dutch. De Brito Freire clearly shows what he thinks of this between the lines. “Many senior officers disagreed with the decision to divide our troops between the domestic headquarters and the fortress of Nazaré on the Augustine cape, because these divisions made it impossible to deploy a powerful main force.”
“But just as the better opinions are not always the most accepted, this one too was set aside. A possible reason for this rejection was fear of loss of reputation, because the Dutch had already come so close. Moreover, the inland fortress was founded by our general (Matias de Alburquerque) himself and had been maintained for so long at the expense of many victims that for him the sentiment outweighed the harsh reality.”
De Alburquerque is succeeded at the end of 1635 by the nobleman Don Luis de Rojas y Borja, with whom De Brito Freire is not very satisfied. “As an army commander, the inexperienced Don Luis proved to carry his way with pride rather than wit, as he followed all the impulses of his whims and whims.” On January 8, 1636, his troops are cut to pieces:“The theatrical end of a blow-jawed general.”
Saving Angel Johan Maurits
In order to put things in order, the WIC appointed the German count Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen in 1637 as governor-general of Dutch Brazil. The WIC thus passed the experienced General Christoffel Artichevski. De Brito Freiro about the appointment:“He was a cousin of Maurits, Prince of Orange and stadtholder of the Republic of the United Netherlands. Because of his distinguished descent, he was invited to be governor-general of Dutch Brazil. Because of his high birth he would be obeyed by the Dutch and respected by the Portuguese.”
At the end of Teensma's adaptation, Johan Maurits arrives in Brazil. He wants to look good in his first military operation in 1638. “He gathered his men from all the garrisons so that he could raise an army of 6,000, including five hundred Indians and blacks from the forest villages and from the plantations.” According to the Portuguese admiral, Johan Maurits still managed to lose the battle of Salavador de Bahia with this superior force because he had set out without his experienced generals.
“Those gentlemen were dissatisfied with Nassau's conduct:Nassau had treated them less tactfully out of envy at their reputation. Jealous as he was, he wanted to perform great deeds himself and prevent its fame from shining on them… He had pushed through the decision to start this campaign against the will of many. Now he experienced their frowning mistrust as frightening.”
“Finally, after we had wounded or killed most of their infantry, the Dutch withdrew, for greater terrain knowledge and physical skill had enabled our troops to continually improve their positions. Moreover, there is a wide gap between hijacking other people's property and defending one's own property." The insights into the methods and character of Johan Maurits contrast sharply with the descriptions in Dutch sources from that time. The book is therefore a nice addition.