Historical story

Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine's biggest mistake after 1991?

1991. The Soviet Union collapses. Belarus and Kazakhstan are willing to hand over their post-Soviet nuclear arsenal to Russia. But not Ukraine, which is concerned about its security. He tries to negotiate and expects a guarantee.

The collapse of the Soviet Union created a significant problem in the context of the post-Soviet nuclear arsenal, which was also outside the borders of the USSR's successor, i.e. the Russian Federation. A significant part of it, it is estimated that even more than the then Great Britain, France and China combined, remained on the territory of Ukraine. The question is whether the state had the possibility of using this arsenal at all.

According to some opinions, Ukraine had only the so-called negative control, i.e. it could only prevent the warheads from firing. On May 23, 1992, under the Lisbon Protocol to START-I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan assumed the obligations arising from this treaty, and the last three states were to become non-nuclear parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Belarus joined in 1993, Kazakhstan in 1994).

US President Bill Clinton (left), Russian President Boris Yeltsin (center) and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk after the signing of a trilateral agreement in Moscow preceding the Budapest Memorandum; January 14, 1994 (photo:William J. Clinton Presidential Library, public domain)

Ukraine lingered, fearing for its security and respect for sovereignty, as the process of delimiting the border with Russia was protracted. The status of Crimea was also problematic. So she wanted to use the abandoned nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip or a deterrent. At the same time, she expected security guarantees from the United States, but such guarantees that the state offered to its closest allies. However, the United States was not willing to provide Ukraine with legally binding guarantees. Pursuant to the trilateral arrangements (including the Tripartite Statement of January 14, 1994), it was decided that Russia would provide Ukraine with fuel sets used in nuclear power plants, and the US - at least USD 150 million in financial and technical aid for the disarmament of nuclear weapons.

The security guarantees were to be released when Ukraine acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was not the variant Ukraine expected, but it was under increasing international pressure. On November 16, the Verkhovna Rada finally agreed that the country would become a non-nuclear party to the treaty, on condition, however, that it obtained a written confirmation of the security guarantee.

These guarantees were confirmed at the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Budapest on December 5, 1994. It was also then that the Budapest Memorandum was signed.

Contents of the Budapest Memorandum

Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States

Memorandum on security guarantees in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Budapest, December 5, 1994

Entry into force:December 5, 1994, upon signature.

Original text languages:English, Russian and Ukrainian

Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations:Ukraine, October 2, 2014

Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state,

Given Ukraine's commitment to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified time frame,

Noting the changes in the world security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which created the conditions for a deep reduction of nuclear forces,

They confirm the following:

1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in line with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine.

2.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat of use of force or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that no armaments will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense. or in other cases consistent with the United Nations Charter.

3.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from using economic coercion, the purpose of which would be to make Ukraine subject to the exercise of its inherent rights with her sovereignty and thus guarantee herself any advantage.

4.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate action by the United Nations Security Council to support Ukraine as a non-nuclear State party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should Ukraine become a victim of the Act aggression or the addressee of threats of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons.

5.The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, except where an attack is made against themselves, their territories or dependencies, their armed forces, or their allies by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear state.

6. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will consult each other should any situation arise which creates doubt with respect to these obligations.

The memorandum comes into force upon signing.

Signed in four copies of equal validity in Ukrainian, English and Russian.

For Ukraine:Leonid D. Kuchma

For the Russian Federation:Boris N. Yeltsin

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:John Major

For the United States of America:William J. Clinton

Bibliography

  1. Kleczkowska, Budapest Memorandum - international agreement or non-binding agreement? , "The Authority of Judgment", No. 20/2021.
  2. Jędrowiak, British analyzes in the area of ​​international relations - 2015 review , "Strategic Review", No. 9/2016.
  3. Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Budapest, 5 December 1994 , "Treaty Series. Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations ”, Volume 3007/2014.
  4. Rydel, The annexation of Crimea by Russia in the light of international law , "Historia @ Teoria", No. 1/2018.