Historical story

Could the tunnel save Poland from the 1939 war?

Throughout the interwar period, Germany did not want to recognize the territorial changes made after the end of World War I, calling the decisions of the Versailles Treaty the Versailles dictate. They also made no secret of the fact that their goal was to change borders and return to the pre-war situation. In their opinion, Poland was a seasonal country, incapable of independent existence.

As for the goals, the situation did not change after Adolf Hitler took power in Germany. He wanted to completely change the European order that developed after the First World War. In his concept, the Germans were to head east to look for a living space there. Interestingly, he mentioned Ukraine and Russia in this context, but until 1939 he did not mention Poland as a potential area of ​​aggression . Perhaps he wanted our country to be a satellite of Germany.

Normalization?

This thesis seemed to be confirmed by a rather unexpected agreement with Poland concluded in 1934. This was made possible after the declaration that he was ready to settle the problems of the past with anyone who expressed such a wish. The new leader of Germany thus showed the world his peaceful face. It should also be remembered that the authorities in both countries had to take into account the negative reactions of their societies. For Hitler, the problem was the government policy of the Weimar Republic and the traditional perception of Poland as part of Germany. But also for the government in Warsaw, changing its policy towards Germany was not an easy matter. As Józef Piłsudski emphatically emphasized in a conversation with the German MP Hans von Moltke:

(...) the thousand-year hatred of the Polish nation towards the Germans will cause great difficulties in implementing this policy. Therefore, this policy cannot be based on emotional grounds, but on purely rational premises.

The declaration of non-violence, signed on January 26, 1934, was not only a breakthrough in mutual relations, but also a certain shock for both nations. The following years were a new quality in mutual relations.

Hermann Göring while hunting in Białowieża

The correct relations were confirmed by frequent visits of fascist dignitaries to Poland. Herman Goering's hunts in Białowieża became a symbol of normality . Reassuringly, which was a peculiar phenomenon, was Hitler himself, who in a conversation with the Polish ambassador in Berlin argued that Germany did not want a war with Poland, because it did not have the areas necessary for this country. Instead, he suggested joint action against Russia. He also assured that the Polish corridor separating East Prussia from Germany was not a problem, as it could be solved by building a special railway line and a motorway connecting Germany with East Prussia. Such a suggestion was made as early as 1933, but the Germans suggested that the problem could be taken up in some 15 years.

"Poles do not know the concept of peace at any cost"

However, the problem of the corridor returned much faster. Hitler's successive gains in Europe, especially the occupation of Czechoslovakia, resulted in a completely new situation for Poland, which, it seems, did not notice the growing threat in time.

The first leaks about issues to resolve mutual relations appeared as early as the end of 1938. However, they were not delivered in the final form until the spring of 1939. Hitler directly demanded Poland's consent to the annexation of the Free City of Gdańsk to Germany, as well as Poland's consent to build an extraterritorial railway line and a motorway from Germany to East Prussia. He also assured that Germany had no other demands from Poland.

In response, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Beck declared that Poland could not be pushed away from the Baltic Sea, adding that although peace is a precious thing, Poles do not know the concept of "peace at any price" . The suggestion was obvious - Poland would not give up part of its territory without a fight. In confidential conversations, the minister suggested that it was not his will, and that a firm tone was necessary for the purposes of internal policy. This weakened the significance of the answer and could suggest that Poland is ready for possible negotiations. It is doubtful, however, whether Hitler was interested in such negotiations at this stage.

Józef Beck giving a speech in the Sejm on May 5, 1939

Surprising Alternatives

The outbreak of the conflict was only a matter of time. And here begins our story about looking for alternative solutions. On the one hand, the authorities in Warsaw sought allies, trying to revive relations with France. Talks with Great Britain were also held, which ended with British guarantees for Poland. Quite unexpectedly, however, the Polish authorities could count on favor from a completely unexpected side. This "ally" was… fascist Italy.

The announcement of the breaking of the Polish-German treaty was already received by the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini with concern, although, of course, Italy declared its solidarity with Germany. However, the conversation between the Polish ambassador in Rome and Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian minister of foreign affairs, looked a bit different. One could say that it expressed the Italians' sympathy for Poland and expressed their concern for the future of our country.

Meanwhile, the situation became more and more complicated. As he recalled in his memoirs, "Wieniawa is a pessimist, he is sure that war is inevitable." After the official part of the meeting, both gentlemen talked as honestly as friends. Ciano clearly stated that, in his opinion, "whatever happens, Poland will pay the costs of the conflict ". At the same time, he did not highly value Poland's Western allies, stressing that no French-British aid was possible, at least in the first phase of the war, and Poland would soon turn into a pile of rubble. Summing up the conversation with Wieniawa Ciano wrote:

Wieniawa admits that in many points I am right, but he believes in the eventual success ... I'm afraid that his illusions are unfortunately shared by a great, too great number of Poles.

Galeazzo Ciano and Józef Beck during a banquet at the Brühl Palace in Warsaw (1939).

During another conversation concerning the German demands, Ciano unexpectedly offered the Pole a solution. Sharing the view that German demands were just an excuse, he suggested a time game. He proposed that the Polish side agree that the Germans should dig a tunnel connecting the Reich with East Prussia. The tunnel would not violate Polish territorial integrity, while consenting to its creation would be an expression of goodwill and seeking a compromise. It was, of course, only a friendly gesture on the part of the Italian towards the esteemed Pole.

In the summer it might have seemed that the conflict had eased somewhat and that Gdańsk would not be the cause of the war. However, preparations for it continued on both sides. In this situation, Italy could not remain impartial and the Italian ambassador to London declared that if England was ready to fight for Poland, Italy would support the Germans.

The Italians, however, were concerned about the concentration of German troops at the end of July, which, in their opinion, was supposed to be a preparation for an attack on Gdańsk in mid-August. Meanwhile, Italy was not ready for war, financial reserves and stocks of raw materials for the economy were running out . Besides, they feared that the local conflict might turn into a global war. Hence the idea of ​​calling an international conference to resolve the conflict.

Efforts were also made to curb the German aspirations. During the meeting with Ribbentrop in Salzburg, Ciano, at the behest of Mussolini, insisted that Germany should not start a conflict with Poland, as it could turn into a global conflict that would be a catastrophe for the whole world.

The Italian minister was aware, however, that his German partner was not telling him the whole truth. So he did not really believe the German assurances. As he noted in his diary:

Ribbentrop slips away every time I ask him to define direct German intentions. There is no easy conscience. He lied too often about German intentions regarding Poland, so as not to feel uncomfortable now ... His will to start a conflict is ruthless. It rejects any solutions capable of satisfying Germany and, at the same time, repealing the armed conflict. I am sure that if the Germans were given more than they asked, they would attack anyway, because they are simply possessed by the demon of destruction.

Today, the supporters of the Polish-German alliance should listen to these words. It was written by a man who was well versed in the lobbies of German politics. Italy has declared that it will not act against Poland. Hungary has also announced restraint in the event of a conflict with Poland. . These events did not change German plans and in mid-August, after meeting Hitler, Ciano was sure that no arguments would stop the Germans from attacking Poland.

Ciano and Ribbentrop

In his opinion, Hitler was sure it would be a local conflict. He added, however, that a great war had to be waged while he and Mussolini were still young. Upon his return to Rome, Ciano made a note:

I return to Rome in disgust to the Germans, to their leaders and to the way they act. They cheated and lied to us. And now they are in the process of dragging us into a brawl that we did not want and that could compromise the regime and the country as a whole. Upon learning of the aggression against Poland, the Italian people will shake up with indignation and will take up arms against Germany.

Ciano also suggested to Mussolini that Italy should not join Germany against Poland. However, as he himself noted in his journal:

Mussolini's reactions are contradictory. At first I am right. Then he declares that his honor orders him to go with the Germans.

Despite this, Ciano also tried to rebel Mussolini against Germany in the following days, stressing that they had broken the pact, so Italy should not have qualms about leaving Germany. During the meeting with the Polish ambassador in Rome, Ciano argued that he knew from his ambassador in Warsaw that Poland wanted to fight to the last soldier, and the churches were full of people praying for rescue for the homeland. However, he concludes:

These people will be massacred tomorrow by Germanic iron, although they are completely innocent. I am wholeheartedly with them.

According to the minister, Mussolini was also convinced that war would break out, but also that France and Great Britain would declare war on Germany. "If they don't, I will send an ultimatum to the Bank of France demanding the gold back, which is what the French love the most." If you believe the memoirs, Ciano persuaded Mussolini to break the pact with Germany on August 21:

Hijack this pact, throw it in the face of Hitler, and all of Europe will recognize you as the natural leader of the anti-German cross procession.

However, he quickly changed his mind, opting for Germany. Interestingly, this did not mean hostility towards Poland and Poles. After the defeat in the defensive war in September 1939, thousands of Poles went to France to continue fighting there. And the Italian authorities turned a blind eye to it, pretending that they believed they were Polish tourists ... So the tunnel did not turn out to be a good idea for solving Polish-German problems, but the friendships from the pre-war period survived.