The heroism of the participants of the uprising is beyond doubt. However, the very decision about an armed uprising has not yet been settled. Should the responsibility still be held on General Tadeusz "Bor" Komorowski? Or maybe it was the intrigues of a completely different man - and it was politics, not the military?
After the tragic death of General Władysław Sikorski on July 4, 1943, the functions of the Polish Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief were separated. The former was the peasant activist Stanisław Mikołajczyk, and the latter was the distinguished Piłsudski General Kazimierz Sosnkowski.
The gentlemen did not like each other, to say the least. Most importantly, they had completely different visions as to whether anti-German states should break out in the face of the Red Army entering Poland.
The uprising will transform into a mass slaughter of the Polish population
As we read, in the memoirs of Witold Babinski, published for the first time in Poland, entitled "Historical Contributions to the Period 1939-1945" Gen. Sosnkowski - of whom Babiński was an aide-de-camp - made the matter clear, for example in December 1943 writing to the prime minister that:
an armed uprising in Poland in cooperation with the Soviet armies must be preceded by establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviets and the Polish government insists on the integrity of the eastern borders of the Republic of Poland.
After the death of General Władysław Sikorski, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski (source:public domain) was appointed Commander-in-Chief.
The general also emphasized that in order for the uprising to have any chance of success, the Home Army must first be rearmed, and the moment of commencement of the fighting must be carefully selected, because otherwise:blood shed will by no means fulfill the Polish goals of the war .
Such dilemmas were alien to Stanisław Mikołajczyk, for whom the vision of the outbreak of the uprising was a bargaining chip, used to exert - in his opinion - effective pressure on Stalin.
As Witold Babinski states in his book, in October 1943, during a conversation with British Foreign Minister Antony Eden:
Mikołajczyk drew attention to the threat of facts committed by Russia and threatened that in defense against lawlessness, an uprising against the Soviets could break out in Poland ("first against Germany, later against the Soviets ”) and in that case our government would go from London to Poland.
Minister Eden took a deep interest in the issue of an armed uprising and hinted that he would use it as an argument for talks at the Moscow conference.
Stanisław Mikołajczyk was appointed prime minister (seated first from the left). He wanted to use the possible uprising as a bargaining chip in talks with Stalin (source:public domain).
So, as we can see, the Prime Minister posed : the issue of the uprising as an element in the Polish-Russian game . It was almost a Polish ultimatum.
Isn't it worth calling it an uprising?
The following months were marked by a lively discussion between the Commander-in-Chief and the Prime Minister about what circumstances must be met for the uprising to take place. And what can really be called an uprising, and what can be called a wide-ranging diversionary action.
Sosnkowski was well aware that without Stalin's clear declaration of help for a possible uprising, from the very beginning it was doomed to failure and drowning in blood.
He also emphasized at every step that there was no need to count on significant support from the Anglo-Saxons. He consistently insisted that arms could only be seized in the event of the collapse of the Germans and their military decay .
Meanwhile, Mikołajczyk, guided by short-term political calculations, did almost everything to provoke an uprising. He completely ignored the military aspects and the inevitable casualties. Ultimately, at the beginning of July 1944, the prime minister sent a telegram to the country to which - as Babiński writes:
added longer arguments, not only disagreeing with the Commander-in-Chief, but contradicting his view. These arguments could not be understood by the country other than as an incentive for an uprising.
The prime minister, playing on the feelings of patriotic members of the underground, wrote, inter alia:
As far as the Home Army was concerned, we were saying that the time would come . [Today] we can be accused of a tacit agreement with Germany . In the East, the fight has flared up anyway, so isn't it worth announcing it with an uprising?
Just before going to Moscow for talks with Stalin, Mikołajczyk arbitrarily sent a telegram to occupied Poland, which actually decided that he took responsibility for the outbreak of the uprising (source:Bundesarchiv; license CC BY-SA 3.0).
I authorize you to declare an uprising
Later, he proposed to declare that the underground administration was up and running. He also stated that if the Soviets did not respect this, we would have an argument on an international basis . At the same time, Mikołajczyk pressed for an urgent answer, because each day decides about the success of the action . Finally, he asked eloquently:
Have you considered the issue of the uprising in the event of a collapse of the Germans, possibly a partial uprising, where before the Soviets would come to power:the Government Delegate and the AK Commander?
The above quotations present Mikołajczyk's activities in a troubling light. However, this is still nothing compared to what happened on July 26. Just before his departure for negotiations in Moscow the prime minister sent a telegram to the country without the knowledge of the president, government and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. which was :
At the meeting of the Polish Government, a resolution was passed unanimously authorizing you to announce the uprising at a time chosen by you. If possible - notify us in advance (quoted after:Witold Babinski, "Historical contributions to the period 1939-1945").
Had it not been for Mikołajczyk's decision, general Komorowski would never have had the opportunity to issue the order to start the Warsaw Uprising (source:public domain).
This one, arbitrary document was of key importance for the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising. Previously, the "Instruction for the Country" of October 27, 1943 was binding, under which the following principle was in force: assessment of possibilities […] belongs to a country; final decision and choice of moment - to the government.
Given the very skeptical attitude of the Commander-in-Chief, this rule made the outbreak of fighting a big question mark.
Mikołajczyk's cable completely changed the situation. Only on July 28, after the fact, its content was confirmed by a resolution of the council of ministers. In this way - as Witold Bobiński emphasizes - the prime minister took over the responsibility for the outbreak of the uprising, while transferring it formally to the country.
In that case, should it not be said that it is Mikołajczyk's hands that contain the blood of up to 200,000 victims of the Warsaw Uprising?
Source:
Witold Babiński, Historical contributions to the period 1939-1945 , Finna 2015.