Patel's historic letter to Nehru
New Delhi,
7 November 1950
My dear Jawaharlal,
Since my return from Ahmedabad and the committee meeting held on the same day, which I got to know only 15 minutes before its start and I regret that I could not even read the related documents for that reason, I have been worried about Tibet. Yes, I thought I should share my thoughts with you.
I have read all the correspondence between my foreign ministry and our ambassador in Peking and the Chinese government through them, I have tried to read this correspondence in a friendly manner to my ambassador and the Chinese government, but I am sorry to say It has been that after this study none of them came true to my eyes. The Chinese government has deceived us by preaching intentions for peace. I think he had made his place in the mind of our ambassador by pretending to solve the problem of Tibet peacefully after seeing the opportunity. Undoubtedly, while this correspondence is going on, the Chinese must have prepared all plans to attack Tibet. It seems that the Chinese will finally betray us. The sad part is that Tibetans believed in us. They relied on us for their guidance, we were unable to save them from the Chinese diplomatic web or Chinese malice. Looking at the recent circumstances, it seems that we will not be able to save the Dalai Lama. Our ambassador has had to go through a lot of trouble in finding an explanation and explanation for the policies and actions taken by the Chinese. As mentioned in a telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when our envoy to the Chinese government objected to one or two issues from our side, he found laxity and frivolous apologies on their part.
Can any sane person believe that China may have some kind of threat from Anglo-American secret plans in Tibet? So, if the Chinese believe this to be true, then it is obvious that they will not have the slightest faith in us and will consider us as puppets of Anglo-American politics or their plans. If they think of us this way after you have direct contact with them, then no matter how close we consider them to be their friends, they certainly do not consider us their friends. We have to especially keep in mind his communist attitude of 'whoever is not with him is against him'. For the past several months, we alone outside the Russian camp have been fighting for China's admission to the UNO and seeking assurances from the Americans on the Formosa issue. We have made every effort to assuage the sentiments of the Chinese, allay their fears and support their legitimate demands in our negotiations with the US, UK and UNO. Despite all this, China does not agree with our distaste, it continues to look at us with suspicion and from the outside, a suspicious mentality is clearly visible in which perhaps a little hostility is also mixed. I don't think we can do anything more than this to make China believe in our good intentions, our friendship and goodwill. Our ambassador in Peking, who has the ability to convey this friendly attitude of ours to them, may have also failed in this task. The last telegram he sent is an outright uncivilized act, not only because the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet negates our rebellion, but also indicates that our attitude is influenced by foreign pressure. It doesn't seem like the language of a friend but that of an enemy.
With this in the background we now have to think about the new situation that will arise before us, with the extinction of Tibet as we know it and the expansion of China to the door of our home. Never in history have we had to worry about our northeastern border; The Himalayan Mountains, located in the northern direction, have always been considered impenetrable; Our friend never gave us any trouble. The Chinese are divided. Because of their own internal problems, they never harassed us on our borders. In 1914 we entered into a treaty with Tibet which was not approved by China. We felt that Tibet's self-government was sufficient for recognition of this independent treaty. But we probably should have got China's approval signed on that as well. Perhaps for China, dominion means something else. Therefore, we must assume that very soon the Chinese will also outdo the agreements between Tibet and us. By which all the marginal and economic agreements with Tibet, on which we have been working for the last half century, will fall into a pot of boiling oil. China is no longer divided. He has become united and powerful.
Along the Himalayas in the north and northeast, as well as across the border, we have a population that is not ethnically different from the Tibetans and Mongols. The undefined borders and the homogeneity of the population on our side with the Tibetans and the Chinese could create a crisis between China and us in the times to come.
Ancient and bitter history teaches us that communism is not a shield from imperialism and that communists are as good or bad as imperialists or anyone else. China is not only interested in this part of the Himalaya Mountains but also in important parts of Assam.
The Chinese have their eyes on Burma; Burma's trouble is that it does not even have the Mac Mohan Line around which it can build a settlement. The acquisition policy of the Chinese and the imperialism of the communists is different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has that cloak of ideology that makes it tenfold more dangerous. Ethnic, national and historical claims are hidden behind the spread of ideology. Therefore, the threat from the north and north-east is both communist as well as imperialist. Where the West and North-Western directions were already challenging our security, now a new threat has arisen for us from the North and North-East directions. Therefore, for the first time in centuries, India must unite itself to guard its borders in two different directions at the same time. Till now we have been preparing our security plans keeping in mind Pakistan which is weaker than us. Now we have to make preparations keeping in mind the communist China settled in the north and north-east direction, a communist China with definite goals and objectives and in whose mind there is no feeling of friendship towards us.
We should also consider the political circumstances of this potentially troublesome border. The tribal areas of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and Assam are settled in our north and north-eastern borders. All these areas are very weak in terms of transmission. They do not have continuous defensive lines.
It is very easy to infiltrate from here. Very few corridors have police protection. Even in all those posts, our soldiers are not stationed. Under no circumstances can we call our contact with these regions close. The people living here do not have any special loyalty towards India. The Mongol influence can also be clearly seen in Darjeeling and Kalingpong regions. In the last three years, we have not been able to take any particularly commendable step towards the Nagas or any other hill tribal caste of Assam. European missionaries and other guests must have been in contact with these castes, but their influence was not at all favorable to India. Some time back there was some political excitement in Sikkim. There may still be a smoldering sense of dissatisfaction there.
Bhutan is a bit quieter than the rest, but its closeness with the Tibetan people can be harmful. In Nepal, there is an oligarchic rule based on coercion; It is a clash between the fierce citizens there and the enlightened ideas of modern times. In such a situation, making people feel threatened or making them defensive is a very difficult task and this
Enlightened perseverance, strength and clear policies are the only way to make trouble easy. I am sure that the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, will never fail to exploit these weak links, partly in support of their ideologies and partly in support of their goals. In my view, in such a situation, we can neither be humble nor can we waver. We should not only clearly articulate our goals but also identify the ways to reach them. The slightest mistake we make in the choice of goals or any laxity in the decisions we take to implement them, will make us weak and make the clearly visible threats before us even bigger.
Along with these external threats, we now have to face internal problems as well. I have already directed (HVR) Iyengar to send a copy of the Intelligence Department's review report on these matters to the Ministry of External Affairs. Till now, the Communist Party of India was finding it a little difficult to get in touch with the Communists in foreign countries or to get supplies of arms or papers etc. from them. They had to use the difficult Burmese or Pakistani borders to the east or resort to long beaches for this purpose. Now they will have an easy way to reach the Chinese communists, through which they will be able to easily reach other foreign communists as well. Infiltration by spies, fifth column writers and communists will become a common and easy thing. Instead of dealing with the communists located somewhere in Telangana and Warangal, perhaps we should
They will also have to deal with communist challenges along the northern and northeastern frontiers; they can safely depend on communist armaments in China for their ammunition supplies. Thus, all these circumstances have brought us such difficulties on which we have to take a decision immediately so that, as I said earlier, we can set the objectives of our policies and find the way to achieve them. It is also clear that we must take such a comprehensive step which includes not only our defensive policy and preparedness position but also the problem of internal security which we must tackle without wasting a moment. We also have to deal with the administrative and political problems in the vulnerable areas of the border which I have mentioned earlier.
Of course, it will not be possible for me to give a detailed description of all these problems, but still I am going to talk about some such problems below, which in my opinion should be solved very soon and around which we need to solve our administrative problems. And a plan should be made to implement military policies by preparing them.
a) Intelligence and military assessment of threats from Indian borders and Chinese challenges to internal security.
b) Oversight of the status of our troops and their necessary redeployment, especially with regard to the security of areas and routes that are likely to be disputed in the future.
c) Evaluate the strength of our security forces and reconsider the army's reduction plan keeping these challenges in mind.
d) Perpetual thinking on our defensive needs. It seems to me that if we do not pay special attention to guns, ammunition and armored supplies, then our defensive position will continue to weaken and we will not be able to fight the threats of dual challenges coming from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
e) As far as China's entry into the UNO is concerned, given the blunt response we have received from China and their attitude towards Tibet, I do not think we should support their claims any longer. Given China's active involvement in the Korean War, the UNO would probably have an indirect threat of excommunication. We should also set our stand on this problem.
f) The political and administrative steps to be taken by us to strengthen our northern and north-eastern borders. This will include the entire border i.e. tribal areas of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and Assam.
g) Measures for internal security of border areas and adjoining areas such as UP, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
h) Development of road, rail, air and wireless communication for these areas and for military posts deployed in the armies.
i) Security and intelligence of border posts.
j) The future of our mission in Lhasa and the trade posts of Yangtse and Yatung and our defense teams working in Tibet to protect these routes.
k) Our policy regarding the McMahon Line.
ये कुछ सवाल मेरे मन में उमड़कर मुझे परेशान करते हैं। हो सकता है कि इन मसलों पर सोचविचार हमें चीन, रूस, अमेरिका, ब्रिटेन तथा बर्मा के साथ हमारे संबंधों के व्यापक प्रश्नों की ओर ले जाए। वैसे तो ये सब सवाल आम ही हैं लेकिन इनमें से कुछ एक प्रश्न बहुत महत्वपूर्ण भी हो सकते हैं। जैसे कि हो सकता है हमें इस बात पर विचार करना पड़े कि क्या हमें बर्मा से हमारे संबंध घनिष्ठ करके उन्हें चीन से निपटने के लिए दृढ़ता मुहैया करवानी चाहिए। मुझे लगता है कि हम पर दबाव डालने से पहले चीन, बर्मा पर दबाव डालने की कोशिश करेगा। चीन के साथ लगती सीमाएं पूरी तरह अपरिभाषित हैं, जिससे चीन, सीमा पर ठोस दावे कर सकता है। मौजूदा स्थिति में बर्मा चीन के लिए एक सरल मुश्किल पैदा करके हमारा ध्यान अपनी ओर आकर्षित कर सकता है।
मेरा सुझाव है कि हमें जल्दी मिलकर इन समस्याओं पर व्यापक सोच विचार कर लेना चाहिए और तुरंत उठाए जाने वाले आवश्यक कदमों पर भी निर्णय ले लेना चाहिए और इसके साथ ही अन्य समस्याओं पर भी फुर्तीली नजर दौड़ाते हुए उनसे निपटने के लिए आवश्यक कदमों पर फैसला ले लेना चाहिए।