Germany does not produce oil. This is a truth that was and still is. In 1939 the country covered 70% of its needs from imports. With the start of World War II, Germany lost access to almost all international oil markets with the exception of that of the Soviet Union, which was opened with the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in August 1939.
Hitler though he was not particularly pleased and could not be since he felt dependent on Soviet oil bearing in mind that whenever the Kremlin decided the flow could be stopped. Oil played an important role in the German dictator's plans for an attack on the USSR, the plans of which began to be drawn up since 1940.
The Germans estimated that 70% of Soviet production came from the deposits of the Caucasus oil, which meant that, in addition to any advantages that the conquest of the region would entail for them, it would simultaneously deprive their opponents of the possibility of continuing the war. The Germans attacked with two Army Groups (A and B).
Panzer supply
The German summer offensive began on 28 June 1942 in the sector of Army Group (AG) B, whose forces advanced towards Voronezh and the Don River. The Don sector was defended, from west to east, by the 12th, 18th, 37th and 51st Soviet Armies. OS A entered the battle on 9 July. The attack was launched by General von Kleist's panzers attacking the right flank of the Soviet Southern Front.
On July 20 XXX Panzer Corps (SPa) with the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions (MPa) approached the Don River. A battle group of the 23rd MPa reached the north bank of the big river at the height of the city of Nikolaevska. This group, under Major Engineer Cheidlik it consisted of the reconnaissance brigade of the 23rd Army, an engineer company, a panzer grenadier company and two artillery companies. The German contingent took the Soviets completely by surprise and soon part of it crossed the eastern bank of the width, at that point, 150 m. river.
In this way one of the most important water barriers in Europe was lost to the Soviets without a fight. The Soviet 51st Army responsible for guarding the sector under Lt. Gen. Nikolai Trufanov, not only did not react, but did not even launch a counterattack against the few Germans . The Soviet commander was relieved of his duties after the fiasco, but the damage was already done. Besides, his replacement was done rather hastily and for a few critical days the 51st Army was headless.
The German engineer created a ferry and from the evening of July 22 German light vehicles began to cross to the opposite bank. However, the 23rd Army was not able to immediately take advantage of the success of Cheidlik as it faced a lack of fuel. Thus, the reinforcement of the bridgehead was assigned to a tactical unit of the 3rd Army which boldly moved 40 km deep into the enemy line, even capturing intact a bridge over the river Sal, at the height of the town of Orlofka, south of the Don.
On July 23, the Grosseutschland division also crossed the Don, in the region of Malinovskaya. The opposing 37th Soviet Army also did not do the slightest thing to hinder the Germans. It wasn't until July 25 that the Soviets attempted the first counterattacks against the German outposts, but it was already too late. The overworked Soviet armies on the right flank of the Soviet formation had no choice but to retreat, abandoning a significant part of their artillery as well.
Rostov and first Soviet counterattacks
The 51st Army deployed three rifle divisions opposite the German bridgehead on the Saal River, attempting, with the few tanks it had, to strike the right flank of the German 3rd Army. However, the T-60 light tanks at his disposal made no impression on the experienced German tankmen who easily repelled the Soviet counterattack. However, Soviet aircraft managed to destroy a bridge built by the German engineer over the river.
Despite their initial successes, the Germans had to capture Rostov and the Don bridges south of the city in order to succeed in their advance towards the Caucasus. The LVII Spa was fighting in burning Rostov. Its commander, General von Kirchner, realizing the importance of the bridges, ordered the 13th Army to rush if they were captured. At 16.00 on July 23rd, reconnaissance elements of the division had arrived on the north bank of the Don facing Soviet troops who, badly, were retreating almost disorderly.
Despite the destruction of two bridges – one accidentally by the Germans – the engineer of the 13th Army managed to establish a floating bridge on the night of 23-24 July 1942. Further north the infantry divisions of the 17th German Army were clearing the Rostov area.
In order for the Germans to be able to take advantage of their bridgehead on the Don south of Rostov they had to occupy an elevated road on an embankment, 6 km long ., on and parallel to which there were five bridges, road and railway, in the area of Bataysk, south of Rostov. Beside this system of bridges there were marshes that prevented passage.
The area was guarded by units of the Soviet 18th Army that had just retreated from Rostov and were therefore not in their best condition. The sector especially of the bridges was guarded by the 339th Rifle Division (MTF). The Soviets covered the causeway with machine guns and mortars. However, they had not taken care to undermine it, nor to mine it.
Although a head-on attempt to seize the embankment seemed doomed in advance, Lieutenant Grabert of the famous "Brandenburg" decided to attempt it. In the early morning of July 25, the young lieutenant's men bravely rushed out, relying on surprise. strong> The daring Germans managed to bring the second of the five bridges under their control at about 04.00 in the morning.
Although they were pinned down and their leader mortally wounded. the appearance of the Luftwaffe and the Stukas, destroyed the Soviet defense positions, finally opening the way for the tanks of the 13th Army. The attack on the rampart cost the detachment of the "Bradenburgians" 33 dead and missing and 54 injured. In return, however, the gate to the Caucasus was now open.