Despite a common idea, the French army was far from inferior to the German army in quality and quantity, except in the fields of aviation and anti-aircraft defense. However, the sky is not empty, as has often been said, even if the French fighters really capable of competing with their German counterparts are still too few within the units, such as the Dewoitine D520, with only thirty-six examples. . French artillery, unlike the First World War and the 1870-1871 war, has nothing to envy its German counterpart.
Despite a widespread myth, the panzers of the Wehrmacht are not invincible in themselves, quite the contrary. France has SOMUA S35 and B1/B1 bis which are among the most powerful tanks in Europe. Their armor resists all the German anti-tank guns of the time, as well as the guns of the Panzer II, III and Panzer IV and their armament surpasses that of the majority of panzers. While it is true that the majority of tanks in service are light armored, this is also the case in the German armored divisions, where the most powerful tank, the Panzer IV, the only one able to compete with the Somua S- 35 and French B1 bis, represents only about 10% of armored vehicles in service.
So why was France defeated so quickly in 1940?
At the tactical level, mainly due to the doctrine of the use of weapons, in particular armour. While the 2,592 German panzers are grouped together in ten very autonomous and coherent divisions, of about 250 armored vehicles supported by infantry, engineers and motorized artillery, more than two thirds of the four thousand two French tanks are divided into Groups of tank battalions of around a hundred vehicles from the various armies, without any operational autonomy or support. For the French General Staff of the time, the armor remains mainly, as in 1918, an element of accompaniment and support of the infantry.
The French tanks are therefore designed accordingly and, despite their superior armor and armament, suffer from many shortcomings compared to the Germans. The almost total absence of a radio communications system, moreover, the few available on heavy tanks very often break down, in comparison all German tanks have modern and reliable radios. A reduced autonomy always due to their design as infantry support, which combines with the weakness of the refueling system. We also note the predominance of single-seat turrets where the vehicle commander is overloaded. In a way, the worst meets the best. Nevertheless, we see clear, even resounding successes, as at Stonne, with more than 100 German tanks destroyed, including twelve by a single B1 bis tank, or even Hannut and Montcornet. But the French tanks however have few opportunities to show their superiority, and cannot influence the course of events, because the war led by the Germans goes faster than them.
If the combined use of aviation and armor partly explains the French defeat, it is insufficient on its own. Developed and put into practice on the tactical level by the Germans during the campaign in Poland in 1939, its effectiveness against the French army was still questionable within the German command before the start of operations. Even if it receives an unfavorable response there, due to the ideological conservatism of the general staff, it is also known in France and could be applied by some of its theoreticians, such as Colonel Charles de Gaulle. France then had seven armored divisions:the 1st, 2nd and 3rd light mechanical divisions and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th armored divisions. Admittedly, the last two were formed a little hastily after the start of the conflict, but most are more powerful than their German counterparts, even if they are a little less well organized.
This idea of an irresistible German tactic, the blitzkrieg, seems to have been put forward after the defeat, to minimize the responsibility of the French military leaders, in the French debacle, their errors on the strategic level having been numerous and serious; From the Riom trial, the Vichy authorities who had to judge the "culprits" of the great debacle of the spring of 1940 went so far as to put forward the figures (to say the least fanciful) of 7,500 tanks and more than 5,000 planes deployed. line by the Wehrmacht. A very ridiculous arithmetic manipulation to hide a much simpler and much more prosaic reality. Historians, especially Anglo-Saxons, such as Kenneth Macksey or John Keegan are now taking a fresh look at this historical episode, and are increasingly questioning German superiority. German historians do the same like Karl-Heinz Frieser who, when he reports on the transfer a few months before 1940 of the motorized means of very many German divisions to the only divisions responsible for applying Hitler's plan, uses this metaphor:he German army looked like a lance with a point of tempered steel, whose wooden handle seemed all the more rotten the longer it was [...] Yet this steel point dealt a mortal blow to the Allies .
One can wonder about the possibility that France had to continue the fight.
It should be noted that the German forces suffered daily losses greater than those observed in Operation Barbarossa and that they were in a perilous situation logistically during the Armistice.
A report by Guderian transmitted to the OKH in early October 1940 indicates that the German forces engaged in France needed a 4 to 6 week halt before resuming the advance towards the south.
* Fuel condition:15% of requirements.
* Ammo status:17% of requirements.
* State of transport by trucks:25% to 30% of the number required.
Under these conditions, several historians believe that the German advance could have been slowed down long enough for the French forces to withdraw into North Africa.