Ancient history

Iwo Jima:Mount Suribachi, symbol of mastery of the island

The rough volcanic mountain, 170 meters high, steeply sloping to the sea side, was not of vital importance for the defense of Iwo Jima. However, it offered beautiful observation and firing sites for the artillery:on the other hand. because of its imposing appearance. Mount Suribachi symbolized, for whoever had control of it, the mastery of the island. Anticipating that he would quickly be isolated. Kuribayashi had assigned to his defense only 1,860 men; but several hundred blockhouses, concrete shelters and camouflaged cannons had been installed at its base, as well as an inextricable maze of corridors and caves on its slopes.

Like always. each position had to be taken one by one using various weapons:mortars. tanks, rockets, flamethrowers and dynamite. The Marines reached the caves and had to fight there with knives. Some defenders, out of ammunition. were reduced to rolling stones down the slopes. but their resistance never ceased.
On the morning of the 23rd the Marines came close to the summit.

40 men, under the orders of Lieutenant Harold Schrier, carried off a flag American to mark their victory. At 10:20 a.m. they reached the summit amid cheers, while fighting continued nearby; then, at noon, the Marines hoisted a second, larger one. Associated Press reporter Joe Rosenthal photographed the erection of this second pavilion:a photo that would become one of the most famous of World War II.

If we were still far from the end of the fights, the hardest part, however, was done. In anticipation of bitter clashes, the Americans had engaged, that day, the 3rd Marine Division in the center of the front line, flanked by the 4th on the right and the 5th on the left, while General Schmidt had landed and led under his single command the largest group of Marines ever assembled. There were only a few square meters left to conquer, but it was obvious that every meter would be paid dearly.

Kuribayashi had systematically transformed the plateau region into a vast fortress. He had an abundance of rockets, artillery and mortars, including a 320 gun firing 350-kilo shells; many blockhouses and concrete shelters had been installed on the island, as well as powerfully fortified underground shelters:one of them could shelter 2,000 men and had 12 exits; on the other hand, the defenders were well trained and had high morale.

Luckily, this type of operation was exactly what the Marines had been prepared for. In the war of the Pacific, from one atoll to another, they had to fight a form of combat very different from that used in Western Europe or North Africa; and that, against a fanatical enemy, resolved not to surrender. On this type of battlefield, there is no space for maneuvers, no circling, but an all-out assault.

Of course, all modern weapons were, during these fights, implemented to support the assault forces. Japanese positions were bombarded by warships, from destroyers with their 127 guns to battleships with their 407; they were pounded by mortars, dive bombers, artillery and tanks; they were burned with a flamethrower. But the Marines knew, as they advanced to the next ridge or down a ravine, that taking every position would result in a close combat.

The battle they fought for airfield No. 2, in the center of the island, is characteristic of this form of combat. There, the Japanese had built hundreds of concrete redoubts which, for two days, defied the concentrated fire of the Americans. On February 24, the 2 battalions of the 21st Marine Regiment rushed to attack the enemy positions, charging with bayonets and grenades, the terrain not being suitable for tanks. The Japanese didn't just open fire from their entrenched positions, they came out en masse, bayonets fixed.

Repulsed by this violent counter-attack, the Marines reformed and charged in turn. The next day, at nightfall, they had taken the airfield and moved quickly towards the village of Moto-yama with, for only prospect, a battle as hard as that of the day before:on their right stood the formidable rating 382. The battles for its conquest were so bloody that the Marines, with black humor, baptized this area the "chopper".

Similar engagements took place on the following days. The Americans first attempted to seize the highest and most central part of the enemy's line of defence:each time, in fact, that the 4th and 5th divisions pushed forward their respective flanks, they were driven out. by the overwhelming response of the Japanese. The problem for them in this central area was the difficulty of deploying tanks and artillery, or of directing naval support fire with precision. The main task fell to the Marines, clearing the area.

However, after ten days of fighting, the 3rd Division's fire support had been substantially increased; the leading battalions, having spotted a weak point in the Japanese front, rushed into it. In the evening, the village of Moto-yama, which was no more than a heap of rubble, was invested. The Marines could consider taking Airfield No. 3.
But their momentum was broken on the fortified second main line of Kuribayashi, and they had many areas left to clear. Hill 382 was fiercely defended by the Japanese for two days and Hill 362 to the west also proved difficult to capture. The conquest of Iwo Jima did not last ten days, as Schmidt had predicted, but much longer. The exhausted Marines saw their ranks thin; some units fell to 30% of their initial strength.

On Sunday, March 5, the three divisions regrouped and rested as best they could despite the danger of Japanese bombardment and infiltration. That day, the Marines had the satisfaction of seeing a struggling B-29 returning from a raid on Tokyo. to land in disaster on the aerodrome n" 1. Their fight had not been useless.

For the Japanese, the situation was serious. Kuribayashi had lost most of his tanks and guns; more than two-thirds of its officers had been killed. His men were reduced to desperate measures such as attaching explosives to their backs and throwing themselves under American tanks. The advance of the Marines gradually dismantled the enemy communications system. Left to their own initiative, the Japanese officers still launched counter-attacks, but in a disjointed way. Moving behavior, certainly, in the tradition of the Samurai, but which exposed their forces, already very thin, to the American firepower.

On the night of March 8-9, an assault by naval units was easily repelled by the 4th Marine Division; the Japanese lost over 800 men. The constant pressure exerted on the defenders was beginning to bear fruit:their actions were increasingly isolated and incoherent.
On the afternoon of March 9, a patrol from the 3rd Division of Marines reached the northeast coast of Iwo Jima:the enemy line had been cut in two. But despite the unbroken American advance, there was no sign of Japanese surrender. The only indication of their plight is the increasing number of "banzai" charges.
Kuribayashi's reports, however, indicate that the situation is deteriorating.

March 10:"American bombardment so violent that I cannot say or write anything about it here."
March 11:"The surviving forces of the northern districts (Armies of Land and Sea) to 1,500 men. March 14:“Attack in the morning from the northern district. Much harder than the previous ones. Around noon, an enemy section, with about ten tanks, broke through our left wing and came within 200 meters of the divisional headquarters. March 15:“Very critical situation. Current strength in the Northern District, about 900 men”.