Deterrents are worth remembering. We knew that strategic surprise was not possible:the enemy was waiting for our attack. On the other hand, we could look for tactical surprise. It seemed to us that it was possible to deceive the adversary as to the power, the date and the direction of effort of our offensive. Our plans were made accordingly and they turned out to be sound.
First we had to conceal our concentrations. The staff worked out the detailed initial deployment of D-Day (units, tanks, guns, etc.) and made sure to carry it out as soon as possible, so that there were no more significant changes to be made afterwards.; thus the aerial photographs that the enemy would take, in the two or three weeks before D-Day, would not reveal any modification of our device. Reserved transport units and mock trucks were used for this, which were then gradually replaced by the vehicles of the attack formations as they were put in place. These substitutions were made at night, under strict control; narrow trenches, intended for the attacking infantry, were dug and immediately camouflaged during the night.
Second, we had to lead the enemy into believing that the attack would come from the southern sector. I must say that this hardly smiled on the 13th corps, but it nobly submitted to the general interest. Among other devices, vast false deposits, a false pipeline and false water reservoirs were built in the south; and it was arranged that the work would be seen by the enemy as ending a week or two after the actual D-Day. Finally, on the very night of the attack, the radio traffic of the C.P. of an armored division was designed to give the impression that a large movement of armored forces was taking place in the southern sector.
We had planned, for the night of October 23, a simulated landing behind the enemy positions. At 4 p.m. a convoy would leave Alexandria heading west; after dark most of the ships would return to port except for a few fast units which would simulate a landing, bombarding and strafing the coast and playing searchlights. This approximately
three hours after zero hour, in an effort to secure enemy reserves.
Logistically there was a lot to do. As long as we had been on the defensive, almost all our depots were deployed in the rear; before going on the offensive we had to push the whole system as far forward as possible. Transferring and hiding the deposits was no easy task. All preparations were made with a view, on the one hand, to constructing a railway to the west as soon as possible, and on the other hand, to make the best use of the ports which would be conquered. Finally, particular attention was paid to the organization of troubleshooting and repairs to our tanks and other combat equipment.
Montgomery's modification of the plan, with regard to the mission of the 10th Armored Corps, nearly opened a crisis between the army commander and General Lumsden. The latter had behaved valiantly at the head of an armored division during the dark days. He was above all a cavalryman and he naturally thought of a mobile battle, dreaming of the day when his armored units, equipped with modern tanks, would charge through a gap opened by the infantry to sow panic on the rear of the enemy. Also he received very badly the new directives of the commander of the army.
Shortly after, he called his subordinates to his P.C. to explain his plan and his views on the operation. Montgomery being absent at the time, I decided to attend this meeting myself. It quickly became apparent to me that the new concept of the use of our armored vehicles had not been fully accepted by the commander of the 10th corps. When the meeting was over, I had an interview with him where I insisted on General Montgomery's desire to conduct the operation as he had said. But I found that Lumsden was less than satisfied and that it was back to the bad habit of discussing orders. On Montgomery's return I informed him fully of what had happened and he immediately made it clear to the commander of the 10th Corps what he would have to do. Lumsden, as a disciplined soldier, stopped objecting and changed his own orders.
At the end of the third week of October, we had the feeling that all these vast preparations were coming to an end. The pace of work at headquarters was slowing, a sign that everything was now in place.
Terless, Montgomery had made sure everything was ready. He had quite correctly estimated that the units would perform at their best if they knew the whole plan of operation. Each therefore knew the role assigned to it in the overall manoeuvre.
On October 19 and 20, he addressed all senior officers of the three army corps up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. It was a tour de force. These speeches were among the best he had ever delivered. He was pointing out the opponent's weaknesses and expressing his confidence, saying he expected a duel to the death that would last several "maybe ten" days. He gave details of our own forces, of our huge stores of ammunition. He repeated, with force, that it was necessary to preserve the initiative and that everyone - everyone! - must have been driven by an ardent desire to “kill Germans”; “Even the chaplains - one each weekday, two on Sundays! ". A huge burst of laughter greeted his words. He ended by saying his certainty of victory.
The soldiers themselves were held incommunicado on October 21 and 22, no further permission being granted. And on the 23rd the whole 80th Army was animated by tremendous enthusiasm. All were certain of success.
On the morning of the 22nd, Montgomery held a press conference. He outlined his plan and intentions and said his firm belief in success. Many war correspondents were shocked by this fantastic confidence. How could one show such assurance? Some were no doubt thinking of minefields and powerful enemy defences, which would pose such serious problems that the army commander's optimism was surprising.
In the afternoon of the 23rd we went by car to our forward CP, which had been installed near the coast not far from the CPs of the 30th and 10th corps.
We were connected to our main PC and to the PCs of the various corps by buried cables, and our vehicles were also buried around the PC itself, instead of being left in the vicinity of the main road which was not to lack attract enemy air attacks. This front PC worked very well. I never left him; all my people could have me on the phone or be called in under an hour for a meeting.
The evening of the 23rd was wonderful. The final set-ups were carried out by a beautiful moonlight with clockwork precision. As zero hour approached, we drove to a hill from where we could see the battle ignite. A few of our planes flew over enemy positions to drown out the sound of 10th Corps tanks, marching in dense columns toward the moonlit but darkened front. From time to time, a short burst of machine gun fire, a salvo of artillery, disturbed the night, as usual. A look at our watches:9:30 p.m. Ten minutes to go. I couldn't stand still.