However, Liggett did not underestimate his opponent. He did not envisage a frontal attack against the fortified position of the Bois de Bourgogne. Rather, he was thinking of seizing the heights of Barricourt and thus making the Bois de Bourgogne untenable. November 1 was chosen, in order to coordinate the attack with that which the French would launch on the left flank.
Planning to use gas, Liggett attacked only seven divisions of the 1", 3' and 5' Corps. The 5th Corps was commanded by Major-General Charles P. Summerall, an artillery specialist; it was equipped with 608 guns to prepare the ground, and all available tanks. While the troops waited, the positions in the Bois de Bourgogne were largely neutralized by a deluge of 41 tons of gas. Meanwhile, Summerall urged his men to effective:all ranks united for the imminent assault.
As soon as their infantry set off, in the cold and foggy dawn of November 1st, the Americans showed that they had learned the lesson of the preceding combats. They avoided the too easily located points on which the German gunners risked to concentrate their fires. The American artillery barrage was also better adjusted than during the last offensive, experience having shown that the Germans could be located practically anywhere, but especially not at the best sheltered places of their own front line.
It followed that the 5th and 3rd Corps, as they advanced towards their objectives, encountered only scattered resistance. Things were not so easy in the 1st Corps sector, where the Germans put up a firm resistance; but Liggett did not attach much importance to this.
The long-awaited breakthrough had indeed succeeded! The Americans after jostling four divisions continued to advance. The dark process of repeated attacks to gain a few yards of ground was coming to an end. The Germans opposed to the 1st Corps were forced to fall back and retreat so quickly that the Americans, who were however being transported in trucks, could not catch up with them.
In its forward march, the A.E.F. passed over the pitiful remains of a defeated army. Private Rush Young, of the 80th Division, wrote:"As we advanced, the roads and fields were strewn with German corpses, horses, quantities of guns, carts, cases of ammunition, helmets, pistols and bayonets. »
The Germans were in full disbandment and their pursuers left them no chance to reconstitute themselves, to form a new line of defence. Cleverly, Liggett had set no limits to the advance of his troops. The Allies applauded. Even Pétain, usually so reserved, paid compliments on receiving the report of the observers:"These officers report to me a quite remarkable improvement and the evident elimination of the difficulties which had marked the attack of September 26 :the road movements are done in good order, the orders are given in time and correctly to the units... Also the progression, already splendid can it be continued thanks to the excellent organization of the whole affair. »
In fact, Pétain was not quite right. A few units had advanced so fast that they had run out of supplies. But the thrill of victory calmed the grumbling.
On November 5, Pershing issued an order that was interpreted by some of his unit commanders as an invitation to compete in speed to reach the historic town of Sedan. The great victory almost turned into a farce, when units became entangled. Fortunately, the Germans were no longer able to take advantage of it. When the French demanded and were granted the honor of entering Sedan to avenge their defeat of 1870, Liggett became furious and called the action criminal.
From now on, nothing could stop the Americans who rushed to cross the Meuse. On November 10, Bullard's second army got involved in turn and only the armistice, which took effect the next day at 11 a.m., saved the Germans.
Thus ended, in a last great momentum, "the War to put an end to all wars". The Meuse-Argonne Offensive was the main American participation in the conflict, a participation that sparked some controversy.
We can obviously highlight the French and British successes; the success of the maritime blockade and the important victories from August to November 1918. We can also recall the figures of 5,600,000 French victims and 3,000,000 British to understand who bore the burden of the war.
We can, no doubt, insist on the fact that the victory could have been won without the United States, which lost only 350,000 men, a third of them in the battles of Meuse-Argonne. The fact remains that the French and the British were fighting with their backs to the wall before the American intervention.
American soldiers landed at the rate of 300,000 a month, beginning in July 1918; it broke the nerves of the German leaders, while giving the Allies the willpower they needed to resume the offensive. They could have counted on a mass of 100 American divisions to plan a campaign in 1919.
As for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive itself, the distinguished British military critic Sir Basil Liddell Hart dubbed it the "nightmare battle". It was hastily improvised, and lack of experience meant that the infantry had too much to do. The Americans may have learned on the job, but they learned, and they finally managed to break the front.