Far from being an archaic element, destined to Disappearing due to presumed obsolescence, the pike was, at the beginning of the 16th century, a weapon that had caused a considerable tactical transformation in just a few decades. In the Burgundian Wars (1474-1477), the great squadrons of Swiss pikemen they showed not only that the pike was extremely useful as a defense against heavy cavalry – something that was not alien to the generals of the time – but also as an offensive weapon against any other type of unit.[1] The Swiss pikemen, well armored, and thanks to a superior discipline, overwhelmed in this conflict the Burgundian infantry equipped with shorter polearms, swords, bows and crossbows, without the more numerous Burgundian artillery being able to stop them, because the Swiss, far from being defensive, they put the pike to offensive use.
The Swiss model and the clash of spades in the Italian Wars
The pitched battles of the Italian Wars (1494-1559) that the Swiss infantry carried out, those of Novara (1513), Marignano (1515), and Bicocca (1522), were characterized by their indisputable offensive role, which in all cases was launched in compact columns against an entrenched and provided enemy. abundant artillery. The first battle culminated in an unexpected victory for the Helvetians, which led Niccolò Machiavelli to emphasize, in his Speeches on the first decade of Titus Livy , in “the example of the Swiss, who in Novara, in 1513, without artillery and without cavalry, went in search of the French army, provided with artillery, to their entrenchment, and broke through without the slightest impediment”.[2] ] As in the Burgundian Wars, the cannon quickly fell silent before the swift advance of the pike squadrons. In this regard, the words of the French Marshal Robert III de La Marck, Lord of Fleuranges, are revealing:"the custom of the Swiss is such that, straight to where the artillery of their enemies is, they go to look for it."[3] There was, moreover, a very useful tactic against cannon fire that the Venetian ambassador Vincenzo Quirini describes in his Relazioni di Germania (1507):
In Marignano , the Swiss were close to breaking the Gallic front despite the fact that, on this occasion, the French army was much better organized and had both a band of lansquenettes, who were placed in protection of the artillery, as in Novara, as with a body of gunmen and crossbowmen commanded by what was then the most skilled infantry general of the time, Pedro Navarro. Jean Barrillon, secretary to Chancellor Antoine Duprat, made clear both the courage of the knechte Swiss as the firmness of the German lansquenets:“The artillery then began to fire. The Swiss, with their pikes crossed, vigorously attacked the Lansquenets and other infantry troops, who received them bravely, and a fierce battle began.”[5] The Lord of Fleuranges, who participated in the fight, was less complimentary of Francis I's Tudesca infantry, since the Helvetians, even under heavy artillery fire, "came to fight hand-to-hand against one of the aforementioned bands of Lansquenets, who they lasted very little, because the Swiss destroyed them immediately.”[6]
What prevented the breakout of the French army were the relentless charges of the French heavy cavalry, forcing the Swiss to stand still while the artillery pummeled them at will. Despite everything, the Helvetian pikemen continued to advance whenever possible to the enemy guns, commanded by the Grand Master of the Artillery, Galiot de Genouillac. François de Rochechourat, a witness to the battle, wrote:"I have never seen such great attacks launched by one side or the other, nor such rebukes."[7] The battle lasted for two days, at the end of which the Swiss, lacking cavalry and artillery, were finally put to flight. Fleuranges explains that only on the second day did the Lansquenets manage to avoid the clash of pikes with the Swiss thanks to a heavy artillery and arquebus fire on an exhausted enemy:“they [the Swiss] did not arrive at the point, except for a band that threw themselves on the lansquenetes and the artillery, but when they lowered their pikes, they withdrew in order without daring to attack them”.[8]
To gauge the degree of dejection of the Swiss after hours and hours of punishment from a distance, we must compare the outcome of Marignano with that of Bicocca . In this battle, in accordance with their usual tactics, the Swiss pikemen advanced in two compact columns against an entrenched enemy with artillery. The battle is famous for the catastrophe they suffered in a few minutes at the hands of the Spanish arquebusiers. However, the heavy fire of individual weapons was not enough to prevent, like the artillery fire and cavalry charges on the second day of Marignano, a clash of pikes from taking place. The soldier Martín García Cereceda recounts that the Swiss, riddled with bullets by the Spanish, turned against Georg von Frundsberg's squadron of imperial lansquenetes and engaged in a melee where there was no lack of a duel to the death between the German and Albert von Stein , one of the Swiss captains:
What he broke – that is, he put in disarray – to the Swiss squadron was the attack that a good number of Spanish infantrymen undertook on their own against one of their flanks. In other words, arquebuses and other smaller caliber portable firearms, such as shotguns and slingshots, proved, both at Marignano and Bicocca, that they could slow down a cadre of pikes, but not destroy it. This also applies to Pavia, a battle in which the arquebus was revealed, once again, as an ideal weapon to stop – not destroy – the infantry armed with pikes. In this regard, Juan de Oznaya, lance page of the Marquis del Vasto, mentions that:
This butchery, however, has a trick, since, in the words of Fleuranges, who commanded the Swiss, his men "had no arquebus, because the thing had been so suddenly that they had not had occasion to take them with them.”[11] In any case, this was the only infantry squad destroyed with arquebus fire in the entire battle, since the squads of Lansquenettes from the Black Band, those of the Swiss from the upper cantons, and those of Frantopines –Gascon and Béarnaise infantry –, they had to be attacked hand-to-hand by the imperial infantry, and they did not run away until they were outflanked, as García Cereceda mentions:
All this without taking into account that, following Oznaya, the Swiss of Montmorency and the Frantopines, remained more or less cohesive and began to withdraw towards the Ticino River, where they broke ranks to escape by swimming, "many voices of Spaniards who went after them, promising them a good war, assuring their lives, were not enough."[13]
The aforementioned battles, far from implying a detriment to the pike, sealed the value of the infantry provided with this weapon as long as they acted in good coordination with the rest, especially with the arquebus, whose most important tactical function was none other than to weaken the enemy squad before the pikes attacked it. Here it is necessary to point out that, although the Spaniards were undoubtedly the ones who used the arquebus with greater skill and in greater quantities, this does not mean that the knechte Swiss and German lansquenets did not quickly integrate the firearm into their tactical schemes. In their Relations of Germania (1507), fifteen years before Bicocca, the Venetian Quirini mentions that the Lansquenets already used sustained fire skillfully:
Quirini himself describes at this point, and this is important, how the clash of pikes was reached:“[…] when said shotguns fire so far forward that they can reach the enemy without that this offends their own, and all that is left is for the infantrymen of the squad to approach the enemy, when they are within shotgun range, the captain orders with the beat of the drum that everyone, with great shouting, attacks without disorder until the shock.”[15] Here, then, is the way in which the Lansquenets, and by extension their Helvetian adversaries, reached hand-to-hand combat.
Dopplesoldners and rodeleros
The overwhelming tactical superiority of the Swiss infantry spread its military model rapidly, leading to the formation of similar units in other states. The imperial lanskenets , organized by Maximilian I, are the most notorious example. The Swabian War (1499), between the Holy Roman Empire and the Swiss Confederation, was the scene of the first battles between such antagonistic formations. In all of them the Swiss triumphed despite the fact that the tactical model of the two sides was traced –in fact, if we follow the French nobleman Martin du Bellay in his description of the battle of Marignano, we observe that even in the clothing the knechte Helvetian and Imperial Lansquenets was indistinguishable[16]–. What tipped the scales so overwhelmingly in favor of the Confederates was, in Charles Oman's opinion, their seniority, discipline, and esprit de corps , then much higher than those of their opponents.[17]
In reality, the new tactical paradigm was already installed firmly in Western Europe, with the exception of the British Isles, by the end of the fifteenth century. In all cases we see an increasing diversification of weapons within the squad. If we look at the plates of the Kriegsbuch by Philipp Mönch (1496) that reflect armies deployed in combat formation, we observe that, in the same body, men with pikes, halberds, crossbows and arquebuses are mixed. The marksmen are located on the flanks, the pikemen in the front rows and the halberdiers in the rear. In a French engraving of the battle of Fornovo (1495) , we observe in the Swiss mercenaries a similar disposition, with the difference that we do not find halberds in the formation. If we follow Paolo Giovio's account of this feat of arms, we see that the Swiss certainly did not carry halberds in this battle, although both sides – Charles VIII of France, his local allies, and the Italian coalition led by Venice – they had developed tactics to break the spade squares in the face of the inevitable clash between the infantry formations. The Swiss employed zweihänders –swords or uprights, in Castilian–, swords whose blade measured from 1.4 m to 2 m. The Venetians, Milanese and Mantuans used halberds and one-handed swords which they wielded with shields. When the time came for the crash, Giovio explains:
At the end of the fifteenth century, the knechte Swiss and their imperial adversaries used mounts and packsaddles to break the first rows of a square of spades and pave the way for the men behind. Georg von Frundsberg's example at the Battle of La Motta (1513) is descriptive of the role these tough fighters had. A chronicle contemporary to the events mentions that he “standing in the first row, he brandished his sword and fought like a woodcutter felling an oak tree in the forest.”[19] Giovio affirms that these soldiers used to “go many times with a pestilential honor to clearly take death with their hands to reach, in a new age [that is, being young] main offices in war with some feat of remarkable courage. […] And allow them, for the privilege of their courage, to carry a flag and be captains of infantry, and all the time of their lives they carry double pay.”[20] Hence, the soldiers located in the first rows of the squad were called doppelsöldner .
Still, we must be cautious about studs, since there are not many written references to their use on the battlefield. Fleuranges mentions that, in Novara , a battle in which he personally fought, the Swiss who broke through the squadron of German lansquenettes were armed not with studs, but with halberds.[21] In the thumbnails of the Chronicon Helvetiae by Christoph Silberysen (1576) combatants appear equipped with both halberds and zweihänders at the head of the formations in the clash of spades. However, this work dates from between fifty and eighty years after the events represented, so there is doubt as to whether they are truly reliable. In any case, we can safely say that the uprights were not ornamental or fencing weapons, since Giovio mentions, in addition to the example of Fornovo, that the defenders of Florence used them in 1529 against the besieging imperial army. Thus, in an attack they undertook on an enemy barracks, the Florentine commander ordered "that no one carry pikes, since, walking and fighting with them in a narrow place, they would be an impediment, and he believed that halberds, and swords Two-handed were better at killing enemies.”[22]
In the second half of the century, the Florentine Domenico Moro would recommend the use of uprights and halberds in his treatise Il Soldato (1570), in conjunction with the pikes, for hand-to-hand combat against enemy squads:"in the melé they can act, with much more comfort than with pikes, some soldiers armed with swords and bucklers, and some with greatswords, which in the said melee, if somewhere [the squadron] were broken, they would make an honorable resistance by entering among the enemies.”[23] We find ourselves here before a defensive use of the upright . In this sense, it is interesting to analyze a Swiss engraving from 1548 that reflects the victory of several Catholic cantons over the Protestant forces of Zurich, under the command of Huldrych Zwingli. In this work, the Protestants appear already disintegrated and in retreat, but we observe that three of them launch themselves at the Catholic squad brandishing zweihänders . Most likely, this weapon had the defensive function described by More, especially considering that the Trewer Rath und Bedencken. Eines Alten wol versuchten und Erfahrenen Kriegsmans (“True advice and reflections of an old, tried and experienced warrior”), possibly written by Georg von Frundsberg around 1522, places the lansquenets armed with studs in the center of the squad, around the flags, and the same is dictated by the later ones. imperial ordinances, such as those of Maximilian II of 1570, according to which, of the 400 men in a company, 50 must be equipped with zweihänders and halberds for the defense of the flags.[24]
What is certain is that the zweihänder he could cut off the tips of pikes. Although there are not many references about it, we do find testimonies that attest to it. Among the most interesting is a letter that a French soldier wrote in January 1558 during the siege of Calais, then a possession of England. The defenders made an exit from one of their bastions on the barracks occupied by the lansquenetes. However, "the tudescos, surnamed their king, played Roland one after another, and with their two-handed broadswords they made a felling of those pikes that wanted to advance out."[25]
The ideal weapon to use offensively against a spade cadre, however, was the halberd Both the knechte Swiss like the German Lansquenets used this short-handled weapon, much more manageable than the pike, to sweep the first rows of the enemy formation. The French soldier Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie, Lord of Fourquevaux, perfectly defines the function of this weapon in his Instructions sur le faict de la Guerre (1548), where he introduces the rodeleros into the equation:
The Italian fencing master Giacomo di Grassi, in his treatise Ragione di sicuramente l’Arme, si da offesa come da difesa (1570), identifies the partesana , similar to the halberd but with a long, pointed blade with two fins at its base, instead of the halberd's ax-and-spear combination, as best for breaking a square of spades:"has more force to cut spades because of its strength and weight, and the second because it is unadorned and lacks other accessories, which could obstruct the side hit. Therefore, the partesan must be used […] to enter between the pikes and cut them into pieces.”[27] The Englishman John Smythe, in his treatise Certain Discourses Military (1590) also recommends "Italian-style halberds, with long points, short edges, and elongated shafts."[28]
The halberd and the partan were destined to lose all tactical function at the end of the century to be relegated to symbols, respectively, of sergeants and corporals. As late as 1582, however, we find references to its tactical use – along with that of zweihänders –, to attack a squad. Francisco Verdugo, in his Commentary on the Frisian War , recounts that, during one of the battles he engaged in front of Lochem against the forces of the Dutch rebels, "knowing no advantage, I took out from the infantry squad a few rows of halberds, pikes and broadswords, ordering the others to stand firm, and because the rest of the enemy army was walking, I sent Captain Decheman [the Frisian Reint Dekama] to charge with the people I had left him on the mountain and hit across, as I also did with the one I had taken from the squadron”.[29] ] A curious graphic testimony from 1581, The Image of Irelande, with a Discoverie of Woodkarne (“The Image of Ireland, with a find of the kern of the woods"), shows a few rows of halberdiers between the English formations of pikemen and arquebusiers.
Regarding the rodeleros , as we have read in Giovio's account of the battle of Fornovo, already then the anti-French coalition made use of soldiers equipped with halberds and swords and bucklers who, slipping under their own and enemy's pikes, attacked the front lines of the Swiss squadron. The masters of this tactic were the Spanish, who had a large number of lightly equipped soldiers when they landed in Italy in 1495 under the command of the Great Captain. That same year, in Seminara, the Hispanic rodeleros were overwhelmed by the Swiss pikemen of the army of Carlos VIII, which made clear the weakness of the infantrymen armed with shields if they did not fight framed in a unit with a nucleus of pikes, in which case they could be incredibly effective. Diego de Salazar, who served under Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, wrote a treatise, De Re Militari (1536), in the form of a dialogue between him and Pedro Manrique de Lara, another Spanish general, in which he explains that "pikes are good against horses, and when they come against infantrymen, they are useful against those that they bring before the battle tightens […]; more after the battle is united or revolted, and they are not useful, shields and swords follow, which can serve in any narrowness”.[30]
During the Great Captain's second expedition to Italy, at the Battle of Barletta (1503), the Spanish infantry managed to disband a squadron of lansquenetes in the service of France thanks to the audacity of their rodeleros, despite the fact that, as usual, it was the Helvetians who led the offensive and disordered the first rows of the Spanish squad . Captain Salazar describes the combat:
In the Battle of Ravenna (1512) A similar scenario occurred. The French were the victors on this occasion, but they could not claim a decisive victory because the Spanish infantry destroyed a squadron of lansquenettes in the service of Louis XII and withdrew in order from the battlefield, saving the Spanish position in Italy. Francesco Guicciardini, impressed, wrote in his Storia d’Italia that “the Spanish infantry, helpless of the horses, fought with incredible courage; and although in the first encounter with the tudesco infantry he had lost in part the firm ordinance of the pikes, later reaching them at the distance of the swords, and many of the Spaniards covered with shields, getting with daggers between the legs of the tudescos, had already reached almost half of the squadron with great slaughter.”[32] A more extensive anonymous account explains the ruse used by the Spanish rodeleros to slip under the pikes of the lansquenetes:
This is not the only case where Fighters on one side raised enemy pikes, then ducked under and directly attacked the helpless men holding them. Fleuranges describes a similar case at the battle of Scherwiller (1525), during the German Peasants' War:“When it came to hand-to-hand combat, the Lutherans were ill-disposed and not all were people of war; they were too close to each other, and so compact that they could not support each other properly; the lansquenets raised the pikes of these Lutherans and, from below, killed them at will.”[34]
The “bad war” until San Quentin
The tactical evolution from Pavia to the end of the Italian Wars was relatively little. As Hans Delbrück pointed out, the increase in the number of infantry squads and the consequent decrease in the number of fighters in each cadre, which became apparent in a pitched battle for the first time at Mühlberg, did not mean a perceptible change in the tactics, which continued to be dominated by the clash of pikes between squads.[35] We do see, however, a growing integration between the different arms and greater flexibility in formations. In the battle of Cerisola (1544) , the arquebus adopted, in the French and imperial armies, a clearly offensive role, although subordinated to that of the pike. The French Blaise de Montluc wrote in his Commentaires :
The insertion of a row of arquebusiers – despite that Martin du Bellay speaks of gunmen in the case of the Lansquenets[37]– was an innovation without continuity, but which anticipated a greater weight of firearms in the clash between the infantry cadres for years to come. At Cerisola, as in most battles of the first half of the 16th century, it was hand-to-hand combat that decided the day, which Montluc describes in detail. In his Commentaires we find the instructions that he transmitted to his Gascons on how to hold the pike and fight with it against the imperial lansquenets:
This distinction on the way of wielding the pike It is interesting, since, in fact, if we look at the previous engravings and miniatures, we see that the Swiss infantrymen grasp the pikes by the central part of the shaft, unlike the practice that would end up being imposed, consisting of doing it by the back , as shown by the Wapenhandelinghe (“Exercise of arms”) by Jacob de Gheyn II, produced around 1607. Be that as it may, we find ourselves again – let us remember the words of the Venetian ambassador Quirini in 1507 – before a manifestly offensive use of the pike and, in case doubt, here is what, according to Montluc, happened when the French squadron collided with the imperial lansquenetes:
While the Gascons were breaking up a German squad, the Swiss in the French army were close to collapse at the hands of a second squad of Lansquenets who, according to García Cereceda, “had very manfully lashed out with the esguízaros and rótoles three rows and vanguards.”[40] The victory leaned on the French side when the heavy cavalry of the Gallic left wing attacked the squadron of lansquenettes on the imperial right from the flank.
Montluc's story infers that the clash of pikes occurred at great speed and very violently . As Delbrück pointed out, pressure from behind is what allowed the enemy to break, since the men in the first ranks were the oldest, strongest and best protected, so that the edge of the weapon was less lethal than it might be. suppose.[41] We find an obvious example of this in the next great infantry confrontation of the Italian Wars, the battle of Marciano (1554) , in which the Imperials and their Florentine allies defeated the French and their Sienese allies. Antonio di Montalvo, a witness to the battle, wrote that the Gauls advanced resolutely, shouting “France, France, victory, victory!”, while the Imperials did the same. A sunken path separated both armies, and the Field Master of the Third of Lombardy, Francisco de Haro, knew how to exploit this element. Montalvo tells that:
In the end, after fifteen minutes of body wrestling At close quarters, the Spanish, attacking from slightly higher ground, were able to exploit the gap to exert greater pressure, and put the French to flight. On the other flank, Colonel Madruzzo's lansquenets charged the Swiss squadron of the French army and broke it at the first attack. Logically, the contemporary fresco by Giorgio Vasari for the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence reflects the clash of spades, although the technical aspects and the clothing of the soldiers should not be taken literally, as they mix elements of the time with others of inspiration Greco-Roman.
In San Quentin (1557) , a new tactical element entered the scene that triggered, along with the adoption of the musket a decade later, a new series of tactical transformations:the herreruelo or reiter , that is, armored cavalry equipped with pistols and other short firearms. In this battle, the German and Gascon infantry of Enrique II was largely destroyed by the action of this new weapon. It was in the War of Flanders and the French Wars of Religion that the art of warfare and infantry combat continued to evolve, as we will see in the next chapter.
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- Delbrück, H. (1990):The Dawn of Modern Warfare . Lincoln, London:University of Nebraska Press.
- Oman, C. (1937):A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century . London:Methuen &Co.
Notes
[1] Keen, M. (1999):The Changing Scene:Guns, Gunpowder, and permanent Armies , in Keen, M. (ed.):Medieval Warfare:A History . Oxford:Oxford University Press, p. 286.
[2] Machiavelli, N. (1857):Il principe:e discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio . Firenze:Felice LeMonnier, p. 264.
[3] La Marck, R. de (Lord of Fleuranges); Goubaux, R. (ed. ) (1913): Mémoires du maréchal de Florange, dit le Jeune Adventureaux , II. Paris:Renouard, H. Laurens, successeur, p. 225.
[4] Quirini, V. (1507):Relazione di Vinvenzo Quirini , in AA.VV. (1862):Relationships of Venetian ambassadors to the Senate during the second sixteenth , S. I, Vol. VI. Firenze:Società editrice fiorentina, pp. 21-22.
[5] Barillon, J.; Vaissière, P. de (ed.) (1897):Journal de Jean Barrillon, secrétaire du chancelier Duprat, 1515-1521 , I. Paris:Société de l’histoire de France, p. 120.
[6] La Marck, op. Cit. , I, p. 193.
[7] Vaissière, P. de (ed.) (1909):Une Correspondance de Famille au commencement du XXIe siècle. Lettres de la la maison d’Aumont . Paris:Société de l’Historie de France, p. 9
[8] La Marck, op. Cit. , I, p. 196.
[9] García Cereceda, M. (1873):Tratado de las compañas y otros acontecimientos de los ejércitos del Emperador Carlos V en Italia, Francia, Austria, Berbería y Grecia, desde 1521 hasta 1545 , I. Madrid:Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, pp. 26-27.
[10] Oznaya, J. de (s. f.):Historia de la Guerra de Lombardía, batalla de Pavía y prisión del rey Francisco de Francia , en AA. VV. (1862):Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España , XXXVIII. Madrid:Imprenta de la viuda de Calero, p. 386.
[11] La Marck, op. cit ., II, p. 228.
[12] Cereceda, op. cit ., I, p. 123.
[13] Oznaya, op. cit. , p. 393.
[14] Quirini, op. cit ., p. 21.
[15] Quirini, op. cit ., p. 21.
[16] Bellay, M. de (1569):Les memoires de Mess. Martin du Bellay, seigneur de Langey . Paris:A l’Olivier de P. L’Huillier, p. 11.
[17] Oman, C. (1937):A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century . London:Methuen &Co, p. 77.
[18] Giovio, P.; Baeza, G. de (trad.) (1562):Historia general de todas las cosas succedidas en el mundo en estos 50 años de nuestro tiempo . Salamanca:Andrea de Portonarijs, p. 51.
[19] Delbrück, H. (1990):The Dawn of Modern Warfare . Lincoln, London:University of Nebraska Press, p. 55.
[20] Giovio, op. cit ., p. 226.
[21] La Marck, op. cit ., I, p. 127.
[22] Giovio, P. (1581):Delle Istorie Del Suo Tempo , II. Vinegia:Segno delle Colonne, p. 81.
[23] Mora, D. (1570):Il Soldato. Vinetia:Gabriel Giolito de Ferrari , p. 75.
[24] Schön, J. (1858):Geschichte der Handfeuerwaffen:Ein Darstellung des Entwickelungsganges der Handfeuerwaffen von ihrem Entstehen bis auf die Neuzeit . Dresde:Rudolf Kuntze, p. 79.
[25] AA. VV. (1581):Delle lettere di Principi, le qvali o si scrivono da Principi, o a Principi, o ragionano di Principi , III. Venetia:Francesco Ziletti, p. 188.
[26] Beccarie, R. de (Señor de de Pavie de Fourquevaux) (1548):Instructions sur le faict de la Guerre . Paris:Michel Vascosa &Gaiot du Pré, p. 29.
[27] Grassi, G. de (1570):Ragione di adoprar sicuramente l’arme si da offesa, come da difesa . Venetia:Giordano Ziletti, p. 103.
[28] Smythe, J.; Hale, J. R. (ed.) (1964):Certain Discourses Military . Ithaca, N. Y.:Cornell University Press, p. 45.
[29] Verdugo, F. (1871):Comentario del coronel Francisco Verdugo . Madrid:M. Rivadeneyra, p. 41.
[30] Salazar, D. de (1536):Tratado de re militari. Tratado de cavalleria hecho a manera de dialogo entre Don Goncalo Fernandez de Cordova y Don Pedro Manrique de Lara . Alcalá de Henares:Miguel de Eguya, fol. XXVII.
[31] Salazar, op. cit ., fol. XI.
[32] Guicciardini, F.; Felipe IV (trad.) (1890):Historia de Italia; donde se describen todas las cosas sucedidas desde el año 1494 hasta el de 1532 , Libro X, Cap. IV. Madrid:Librería de la Viuda de Hernando. p. 35.
[33] Anónimo (s. f.):Relación de los sucesos de las armas de España en Italia, en los años de 1511 a 1512, con la jornada de Rávena , en AA. VV. (1882):Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España , LXXIX. Madrid:Miguel Ginesta, pp. 282-282.
[34] La Marck, op. cit ., II, pp. 265-266.
[35] Delbrück, op. cit ., pp. 56-57.
[36] Lasseran-Massencome, B. de (Señor de Montluc) (1822):Commentaires de messire Blaise de Montluc, mareschal de France . Paris:Foucault, p. 33.
[37] Bellay, op. cit ., p. 319.
[38] Montluc, op. cit ., pp. 27-28.
[39] Montluc, op. cit ., p. 29.
[40] García Cereceda, op. cit ., III, pp. 186-187.
[41] Delbrück, op. cit ., p. 55.
[42] Montalvo, A. di (1863):Relazione della guerra di Siena . Torino:V. Vercellino, p. 106.