The terrible 22, the Asia Minor disaster, probably the biggest in the history of Hellenism, will always be a milestone that intersects its modern history. A catastrophe which, apart from the end of the centuries-old Greek presence in the East, also marked the end of the Great Idea. That is, the vision based on which all Greeks in their historical homelands, "redeemed", would join a single strong Greek state.
Written by Christos Alexandrou
Historian-Political Scientist
From the beginning of the establishment of the state, there was a more or less common awareness that its limited initial borders should be expanded to include other Greeks.
A comment on the Big Idea
Before the signing of the founding protocol in 1830, Ioannis Kapodistrias exemplified the Great Idea by telling foreigners, among other things, that the borders of Greece reached to where rivers of blood were shed during the great massacres of 1821, noting by name, Chios, Cyprus, and Kydonias.
While at the Poros Conference, Cypriot envoys were discussing with Kapodistrias the possibility of including the island within the borders of the state under formation.
However, the dependence of the newly formed state on the "protecting powers", its weaknesses and pathologies, which increased the dependence, did not allow national integration. The state did not manage to strengthen itself enough to claim its major goals. In trying to achieve them, tragic failures have led large parts of the nation to ruin.
Certainly, objective factors are taken into account:a state limited geographically and in terms of population, industrially underdeveloped, without wealth-producing sources, difficult geography.
At no time in the first century of its existence, nor later, was a national strategy drawn up to realize the vision of the Great Idea. A strategy which would have as its first and main feature the preparation, by increasing the power of the Greek state, so that when the appropriate opportunities were offered, they would be properly exploited.
Thus national integration was inevitably left on autopilot. It would be implemented if and when international and regional circumstances allowed, without necessarily the major contribution of the free state.
This is roughly what happened with the annexation of the Ionian Islands and Thessaly. The inability of the state, i.e. to act autonomously and effectively, was shown in the Crimean War, but mainly in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, while when Greece tried to act independently in 1897, it suffered a crushing defeat.
At the same time as this defeat, the tragic extent of the country's dependence was demonstrated. Its territorial claims were therefore from the beginning isolated and timidly projected. They first concerned the territories adjacent to the borders of the state:Thessaly, Iptane Islands, Crete, Epirus. Later it would come - if it came - the turn of Thrace, Cyprus, Ionia, the Dodecanese - when developments would allow it.
Since the dynamic emergence of South-Slavic nationalism, mainly of its Bulgarian component, especially since the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 with the temporary creation of Greater Bulgaria, the Greek national idea had to face yet another opponent.
This fact "divided" the elites as to who was the most important, as well as urgent in terms of dealing with the danger. Too many saw the need for friendship and alliance with Ottoman Turkey in order to counter the Bulgarian thrust, even jointly with the Porte.
The Balkan wars were somehow an exception to the constant Greek weakness. The political system was "forced" by "new forces" to take a step forward, to "overcome" itself, and achieve the doubling of Greece.
As is known, both the favorable regional situation and the foresight and policy of Eleftherios Venizelos, both at home and abroad, came together in this. The nation had proved that it could.
A comment on national division
The triumphs of 1912-13 were succeeded, as is well known, by the maelstrom of national division, which brought to the surface in a traumatic way the great dilemmas facing Greece, as well as wider internal divisions. The split did not simply express a confrontation between two options.
On the one hand that of Eleftherios Venizelos regarding the need for Greece to participate in the Great War, in order to realize post-war national claims, and on the other that of the "royalists" who insisted on the security of neutrality.
It also brought to the surface other deeper elements. On the one hand, the trend that believed in extroversion, believed in the strength of the nation and was ready to take the risk in order for Greece to grow. On the other hand, he expressed the tendency of "small and honest" Greece, in fact "ancient Helladic", which considered that it was better not to risk getting involved in the games of the powerful.
In this attitude there was also the position that above all is the "Greek kingdom" and the Greeks outside always come second. The first approach was embraced mainly by the newly liberated Greeks of the New Countries, the islands of the Eastern Aegean and of course the unredeemed Hellenism.
The conflict, as is well known, was fierce, to be finally won by the Venizelian faction and Venizelos, after the "state of Thessaloniki" returned in June 1917 to Athens, immediately bringing the whole country into the war on the side of the Allies.
After his return, however, he demonstrated a harsh revanchism towards his opponents, unprecedented in the political history of the country until then. This is a fact that undoubtedly contributed to his defeat later, in those infamous elections of November 1920.
Elections which were held with the division returning, both because of the acute pre-election controversy, and because of specific incidents. These were the attempt on the life of Venizelos immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, the aberrations that followed in Athens culminating in the assassination of Ionos Dragoumis, and a few weeks later, the accidental death of King Alexander.
An event that made it imperative to restore "legitimacy", i.e. the return to the throne of the exiled Constantine, who according to his followers temporarily abandoned the throne.
During the pre-election period, a part of the royalist "United Opposition" openly manifested an anti-Asia Minor anti-Hellenism. It was reflected, among other things, in incidents such as the tearing up of maps of "Greater Greece", even inside the Parliament.
The culmination of the whole problematic situation was that the Greek Communists, as well as the Muslims in northern Greece and the islands, voted for the coalition of the royalists and not for Venizelos, in order to "end" the war and for Greece to leave Asia Minor, as the royals promised.
Until the elections of November 1920, however, a lot had intervened, which no one could foresee when Greece, about a year and a half before, landed forces in Smyrna. The outcome of World War I found the country in the best possible position and Venizelos was fully justified.
Being on the side of the victors, it not only remained unscathed, but stood to reap great territorial annexations, since its great rivals – the Ottoman Empire and secondarily Bulgaria – belonged to the vanquished. The Great Idea was entering its most favorable moment since the foundation of the state.
From the dream to the greatest disaster
Venizelos at the Peace Conference, initially, may have set the country's claims, apart from Western Asia Minor, on a line from Panormos to the coast opposite Kastellorizo, Northern Epirus, Thrace and the Dodecanese. But it was obvious that his gaze was fixed on Ionia.
It is also clear that at those times he was not concerned with the strategic weaknesses of the venture, as they had been formulated a few years earlier by Ioannis Metaxas. But why should they bother him in front of such a unique opportunity? What could go wrong?
The Allies were preparing to dissolve the Ottoman Empire into its constituent parts. The state that would be created to house the Turks would be small in terms of territory and population, somewhere in the center of Asia Minor.
In other words, it would happen, roughly the same as with the Habsburg Empire. No one was able to calculate what would follow, and indeed the almost total reversal of what would be signed in August 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres.
In the talks of the Conference of Paris – which began in mid-January 1919 – it quickly became apparent that the conclusion of the Treaty in question would not be an easy task. Those concerned - English, French, Italian - began to suspect with suspicion what the "other" would be up to.
In the wider region of the Middle East the interests were many and of course conflicting, even though Germany and the Soviet Union had been excluded from the region. They were mainly English and French, but also new emerging local players.
Britain had not universally prevailed, so that the wider region, as its own sphere of influence, would "rightfully" have the first say in what should happen. That is to say, what, proportionally, happened to France in relation to defeated Germany.
A complete British predominance in the Middle East would very likely have had different results for Hellenism. Thus eventually a silent intra-Alliance rivalry emerged very quickly, which over time grew to reach its climax with the French-Kemal Alliance in November 1921.
But before the Franco-Kemal agreement and peace, there was also the involvement of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, in March 1921, who was the first and most generous helper of Kemal, in money and military material. A development which was also unthinkable in May 1919 when Greece was landing troops in Smyrna.
It should be noted that the French retreating from Cilicia also benefited Kemal doubly, since the latter was able to save forces and direct them against the Greeks in the west, while they also handed him rich war material.
The "order" itself to Greece to land troops and take over the administration of the Smyrna area was also a victim of the developing intra-alliance rivalry. This was done unplanned, "secretly" by the Italians who were also interested in the area, even though they had no population base in it.
The "mandate" did not contain clear terms regarding Greek jurisdiction. Shortly after their transfer to Smyrna, the Greek forces quickly began to operate at short and long distances, in order to protect the Greek element against whom persecution and looting had begun by disorderly and not only bodies.
But the victim - and this was the really damaging one - was the prohibitions on the Greek army to act freely, initially even within the very zone which was intended to be awarded to Greece. And this since the latter was perceived as the "long arm" of Great Britain.
Despite persistent requests from the Greek side, in March 1920 the Greek forces were allowed to pursue the enemy outside the Smyrna zone, but only to an extent not exceeding three kilometers, and after the end of the operation to return to the zone.
It was a free gift. Thus Greece was deprived of the freedom to act quickly and repressively against the emerging Kemalist movement, which it might have neutralized in its infancy. As time passed, the problem became more acute, since the enemy was organizing and increasing his strength, while increasing the dangers and blows to the Christians outside the Smyrna zone.
Freedom of movement was finally allowed in June 1920, when the meager British forces in the Straits were attacked and the British Prime Minister requested Venizelos' help. Otherwise it was unknown what would happen.
It is possible that the Turks would take the initiative and attack the Greek army in an organized manner. The request for help from the British also meant the release of the Army of Asia Minor to act with complete freedom of movement for the complete subjugation of Kemal.
The Greek forces, which had already been ready months earlier when Venizelos sought permission to attack, quickly advanced north and northeast with only minor casualties. The result was that the territory under Greek occupation in Asia Minor tripled.
With the consent of the Allies, Greece also occupied Eastern Thrace almost without resistance, reaching just outside of Constantinople. Despite the successful character of the operations, the subjugation of Kemal was not achieved. As it was not achieved even in the following operations, under the authority of the royals.
In particular, the offensive in the Spring of 1921 failed, while the great offensive of the summer of the same year, despite its victorious character, failed to destroy the bulk of the Kemalist forces. Kemal, taking advantage of the territorial depth of Asia Minor, withdrew in time further east, saving most of his forces.
The confrontation of the Allies, especially after the removal of Clemenceau, de facto weakened their will to impose the planned – and since August 1920 – the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Treaty was being undermined long before it was even signed.
It was no coincidence that it was signed last of those that "sealed" the end of the First World War - treaties of Versailles, St. Germanus, Neuilly and Trianon. Nor that it was also the first to be replaced only about two and a half years later, by the Treaty of Lausanne. Which, by historical irony, is the only one of those Treaties that still exists to this day.
The loss of power by Venizelos in the infamous elections of November 1920 is another pivotal point, reducing Greek power in the erasing Greek entrapment. Upon assuming power, the royalists immediately requested negotiations with the Turks for a peaceful settlement of the "issue".
And this is not so much because they had promised "the return of our children back" before the elections, but because of the realization that the victory over Kemal was no longer an easy task. In the peace effort that followed in London, at the beginning of 1921, the Turks neither more nor less demanded the complete withdrawal of Greece from Asia Minor.
The failure of the negotiation efforts led the Greek side to new military operations in the Spring as mentioned, which were ill-planned and sloppy and failed. In the summer they were repeated, better prepared and while in the meantime other classes had been registered.
These operations were the largest from the Greek side during the war. They inflicted significant blows on the enemy and succeeded in capturing the strategically important cities of Eski Sehir, Kutahya and Afyon Karahisar. However, Kemal and a large part of his army escaped destruction and retreated towards Ankara, organizing new defense lines.
The Greek leadership was faced with the great dilemma:to continue the advance towards the enemy's capital, in order to attempt the final blow or not. As is known, it was decided to continue the campaign towards Ankara, as the last attempt to defeat Kemal. The blow from her failure was great, both in casualties and in terms of morale.
The fate of the campaign, however, was not predetermined. Her success was certainly not easy, but not impossible either. But its failure now sealed the exhaustion of the Greek side, which was not only military, but diplomatic, economic, moral.
If it was only military, and if it was due to the failure of the campaign in question, it could be restored since for a whole year afterwards, until August '22, there was no hostilities. This time margin allowed the Greek forces to "recover".
Πλην όμως ο Κεμάλ δεν μπορούσε πλέον ηττηθεί από τις ελληνικές δυνάμεις και μόνο. Έτσι είχαμε έναν στρατό από τον οποίο είχε διαγραφεί η προοπτική της νίκης. Μετά και από τις επιχειρήσεις του Καλοκαιριού του 1921 το κατεχόμενο έδαφος είχε πενταπλασιαστεί. Η επιτήρηση του, οι συγκοινωνίες, ο εφοδιασμός έγιναν πολύ πιο δύσκολα.
Η μόνη πολιτική λύση που μπορούσε να υλοποιηθεί ήταν η πλήρης αναδίπλωση και αποχώρηση από την Μικρασία. Ήταν και το μόνο που δεχόταν ο Κεμάλ, με ό,τι αυτό θα συνεπαγόταν για τους γηγενής Έλληνες, είτε άμεσα είτε μακροπρόθεσμα.
Η ελληνική πλευρά για ένα ολόκληρο χρόνο, από τον Αύγουστο του ’21 μέχρι τον μοιραίο του ’22, βρισκόταν παραλυμένη. Δεν ήταν σε θέση να αναλάβει κανενός είδους πρωτοβουλία, ενώ ήδη, εδώ και καιρό δεν είχε να περιμένει τίποτα από τους Συμμάχους. Οι τελευταίοι, ανάμεσα τους και η Βρετανία πλέον, προέκριναν την αποχώρηση της.
Παρ’ όλα αυτά υπήρχε μια και μοναδική επιλογή, δύσκολη αλλά ρεαλιστική. Οι ελληνικές δυνάμεις να συμπτύσσονταν στη ζώνη της Σμύρνης, στο έδαφος δηλαδή που επιδικάστηκε στην Ελλάδα από τη Συνθήκη των Σεβρών. Το γεγονός ότι σε αυτή την επιλογή συμφωνούσε τόσο ο Βενιζέλος όσο και ο Μεταξάς είναι ενδεικτικό.
Πλην όμως και οι δύο ήταν στο περιθώριο. Κάτι τέτοιο απαιτούσε τόλμη και αυτοπεποίθηση τα οποία απουσίαζαν. Η προοπτική αυτή θα ανακούφιζε πολλαπλά την ελληνική πλευρά, και οπωσδήποτε η άμυνα απέναντι στους Τούρκους θα ήταν πολύ πιο ισχυρή.
Μια τέτοια εξέλιξη θα λειτουργούσε συσπειρωτικά και εμψυχωτικά για όλο το έθνος, αφού το στοίχημα να κρατηθεί η περιοχή θα έμενε ανοικτό. Το μεγάλο μειονέκτημα ήταν ότι ο υπόλοιπος μικρασιατικός Ελληνισμός θα χανόταν είτε δια σφαγών είτε δια προσφυγοποίησης.
Αν θέλαμε να απαριθμήσουμε συνοπτικά τα λάθη των βασιλικών από την στιγμή που ανέλαβαν την εξουσία και μετά, και τα οποία έγιναν εν γνώση τους θα προκαλούσαν ζημία, σίγουρα ένα από αυτά ήταν επαναφορά του βασιλιά του Κωνσταντίνου.
Μια επαναφορά η οποία έδωσε την ευκαιρία στους Γάλλους να ταχθούν ανοικτά πλέον εναντίον της Συνθήκης των Σεβρών και να ζητούν την αναθεώρηση της. Ενός Κωνσταντίνου, κατά τα άλλα ασθενούντος, ο οποίος δεν είχε κανένα ρόλο να παίξει πλέον, παρά μόνο να εξυπηρετήσει τη μικροπολιτική των κυβερνώντων.
Το σημαντικότερο όμως ήταν η αποστράτευση ή ο παροπλισμός εκατοντάδων ικανών και εμπειροπόλεμων ανώτερων και ανώτατων αξιωματικών, ως «βενιζελικών». Τη θέση τους πήραν σωρεία αποστράτων, ανάμεσά τους και αποδεδειγμένα ανίκανων ή ακατάλληλων.
Το κορυφαίο όσο και τραγικό παράδειγμα αποτέλεσε ο τελευταίος αρχηγός της Στρατιάς της Μικράς Ασίας, ο Γεώργιος Χατζηανέστης. Ασφαλώς οι διχογνωμίες και οι διαφορές στο εσωτερικό του φιλοβασιλικού συνασπισμού έπαιξαν τον δικό τους ρόλο, όσο και η μη πρόσκληση του Βενιζέλου να βοηθήσει διπλωματικά.
Σήμερα μπορούμε να πούμε με σχετική ασφάλεια ότι για να μπορούσε η Ελλάδα και ο Ελληνισμός να επιβιώσουν στην Μικρά Ασία θα έπρεπε η Συνθήκη των Σεβρών να είχε εφαρμοστεί στην ολότητα της, σε ολόκληρη την τουρκική χερσόνησο.
Το κράτος της Αρμενίας δηλαδή να επιβίωνε στα σύνορα που του καθόρισαν, οι κουρδικές περιοχές να αυτονομούνταν, επιπλέον οι Γάλλοι να κρατούσαν τα «κεκτημένα» τους στην Κιλικία και οι «ζώνες επιρροής» των Συμμάχων να λειτουργούσαν.
Μακροπρόθεσμα κανείς δεν θα μπορούσε να προβλέψει τις εξελίξεις. Σίγουρα οι «ζώνες επιρροής» ήταν πολύ δύσκολο επιβιώσουν, το αργότερο θα διαρκούσαν μέχρι το τέλος του Β΄ Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου οπόταν και θα καταργούνταν, όπως οι «εντολές» της Βρετανίας για το Ιράκ και τη Παλαιστίνη, και της Γαλλίας για την Συρία και τον Λίβανο κ.ά.
H θέση ότι ο μικρασιατικός Ελληνισμός μπορούσε να επιβιώσει βάσει διεθνών συμφωνιών που θα τον προστάτευαν, διατηρώντας την ταυτότητα και τη φυσιογνωμία του, ως μια έκφανση «κοινοτισμού», είναι ταυτόχρονα ουτοπική όσο και ιστορικά αφελής.
Οι διώξεις του είχαν αρχίσει μια δεκαετία προηγουμένως και τίποτα δεν φαινόταν ότι θα μπορούσε να τις σταματήσει. Αν όταν διατύπωσε αυτή τη θέση ο Ιώνας Δραγούμης, κάτω από την πίεση μεγάλων γεγονότων και πριν ακόμα διαλυθούν οριστικά οι πολυεθνικές αυτοκρατορίες, μπορούσε να έχει μια βάση, τι βάση μπορεί να έχει σήμερα που ακόμα εκφέρεται;
Αν ο Δραγούμης είχε κατά νου το επίπεδο προστασίας και δικαιωμάτων που απολάμβαναν οι λαοί στην Αυστροουγγρική αυτοκρατορία, μπορούσε να υποθέσει ότι, έστω και δύσκολα, ήταν εφικτό το ίδιο επίπεδο να επιβληθεί και στην Οθωμανική Τουρκία. Η τελευταία όμως είχε ήδη πάρει ένα άλλο δρόμο, είχε ήδη διαπράξει μια πρωτοφανή γενοκτονία.
Πόσο μάλλον στην πορεία με το τουρκικό κράτος που εξελίχθηκε όπως εξελίχθηκε, βασισμένο στη καταπίεση και τις διώξεις. Διεθνείς συμφωνίες και συμβάσεις δεν προστάτεψαν τον Ελληνισμό της Κωνσταντινούπολής, της Ίμβρου και Τενέδου, γιατί θα προστάτευαν το μικρασιατικό Ελληνισμό;
Οι επιλογές ήταν δύο, κρίσιμες όσο και με ρίσκο:Ή η Ελλάδα θα έπαιρνε την ευκαιρία και θα πήγαινε στη Μικρά Ασία, με απώτερο στόχο να ενσωματώσει όσο μπορούσε περισσότερο έδαφος ή θα άφηνε τον Ελληνισμό στην τύχη του πιέζοντας διπλωματικά για την προστασία του.
Εκ του αποτελέσματος, σήμερα όλοι μπορούμε να πούμε ότι ήταν καλύτερα να μην πάει. Σε αυτή την περίπτωση τουλάχιστον τα πράγματα θα έπαιρναν τον δρόμο τους πιο «ομαλά» και λιγότερο αναίμακτα:αυτόν της προσφυγοποίησης.