Exhausting nighttime retreats. Constant lap threat and German armor clusters appearing at the least expected moment. This is what September 1939 looked like for many Polish soldiers. Could it have been prevented?
Preparing for the upcoming German invasion, the Polish command, headed by Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz, decided that our troops would be deployed along the hundreds of kilometers-long border with the Third Reich and Slovakia. Such a strategy was adopted because they did not want to hand over the industrialized and agriculturally developed areas in the west and north of the country to the Nazis without a fight.
"Maintain combat capability"
This concept, however, took its revenge painfully. Despite the bravery and sacrifice of our soldiers, concentrated Wehrmacht attacks quickly broke through the Polish defense lines and the invaders set off in pursuit of the retreating units . Was there anything that could have been done to avoid this scenario?
Erich von Manstein, one of the best German commanders of the Second World War, the creator of a brilliant plan to invade France in 1940, had his opinion on this subject. On the pages of the book "Lost victories" he authoritatively stated that:
The Polish command should have done everything possible to maintain the combat capability of the troops until the offensive of the Western powers forced Germany to withdraw most of its forces from the Polish theater of operations.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein pointed to a key error in the Polish defense assumptions made before the German invasion in 1939.
Even if the loss of industrialized areas also implied defeat as a result of a prolonged war, keeping the fighting strength of the troops still offered the possibility of their recovery. Under no circumstances should the Polish troops be encircled to the west or on both sides in the initial phase of the conflict Vistula.
After reading these words, you immediately think that it is much easier said than done. Especially if the opponent has an advantage in numbers, and in addition a much more modern and mobile army. So what alternative could the German field marshal propose? In his opinion:
it was not allowed to concentrate the main Polish forces, as it happened in 1939 - near the borders. It had to be moved back enough to properly recognize the main directions of German attacks, and fought in the area of the "corridor" and in the Poznań voivodeship with relatively weak forces, and adequately reacted to the expected main strike coming from Silesia. Above all, it was necessary to maintain sufficiently strong operational resources.
The article was based on a book by Erich von Manstein entitled "Lost Victories" (Bellona 2018).
Waiting for allies
When writing about the "corridor", Manstein meant a narrow belt separating the Third Reich from East Prussia. It provided Poland with access to the Baltic Sea, and thus its defense was one of our priorities.
However, if not on the borderlands, then where should Polish troops be deployed? According to the field marshal, the only correct option was:
set up a decisive defense on the Bóbr - Narew - Wisła - San line , taking into account the possible shift of defensive operations in the south as far as the Dunajec, in order to maintain at least the industrial area in the central part of Poland between the Vistula and the San.
The German officer emphasized at the same time that when carrying out delaying actions everything had to be done to "protect the deep flanks in the north and south from being outflanked" .
Obviously, a significant shortening of the front line is a very rational proposition, but would adopting such a strategy allow us to win against the German aggressor in 1939? Manstein in "Lost Victories" leaves no illusions. He writes, admittedly, that it would save the Polish army "from a complete surprise from the German side in the border region", but due to the huge advantage of the Wehrmacht alone, we had no chance of a final victory .
In his opinion, it was crucial to resist as long as possible in order to give the allies time to fully mobilize and start the offensive. However, the question that remains unanswered is whether if we had defended ourselves much longer, would there really be a large-scale offensive in the West?
Manstein had no doubts that Poland had no chance against the Wehrmacht without the help of the West.
On the other hand, one may wonder if the handing over of the western parts of the country without a fight would simply end up annexing them. After their occupation, Hitler could reach a settlement with the West and thus the Czechoslovak scenario would repeat itself. Was it possible? We'll never know that again.
Source:
Trivia is the essence of our website. Short materials devoted to interesting anecdotes, surprising details from the past, strange news from the old press. Reading that will take you no more than 3 minutes, based on single sources. This particular material is based on the book:
- Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Bellona 2018.
Buy the book at a discount from the publisher's bookstore:
