Anyone who grew up in the 1970s or 1980s probably remembers the widespread threat of nuclear attacks by the imperialist west. Not a day went by without television showing films of test nuclear explosions and maps presenting plans for an attack on the Polish People's Republic. Raised in the shadow of the atomic mushrooms, we seldom asked ourselves if war would break out. Rather, the question was when will it happen.
We learned from defense training textbooks where to hide in the event of a nuclear explosion, and if our schools were built in the 1950s or 1960s, we had a good chance to find nuclear shelters under their basements.
Were the war and the Holocaust really close as we were threatened? We've all read about the false positives that nearly resulted in a nuclear war. Perhaps the most famous is the case in September 1983, when Soviet early warning systems detected the launch of first one rocket, then four, from US territory.
If the computers were to be trusted, one should immediately prepare for a counterattack. But Stanisław Petrov, who was on duty, decided that starting a war with so few missiles would be pointless and decided not to believe computers. He risked everything and probably saved our lives. The Americans did not attack. The systems misjudged the situation.
When everyone is anticipating war and getting ready for it, it can even trigger a minor incident. However, during the Cold War, were we close to the real outbreak not by accident but as a result of careful planning?
Warsaw Pact and NATO
To begin with, it should be realized that, contrary to Soviet propaganda, the Warsaw Pact, established in 1955, was not a defensive but an offensive institution. Contrary to the countries organized in NATO, the USSR leading the Warsaw Pact planned a pre-emptive strike and did not take defensive warfare seriously j. The development of such a position was influenced by several factors. Not the least important of them was the trauma of the Soviet generals during World War II, when the Russians let the Germans surprise them and were literally crushed by the German attack.
Moreover, NATO countries had no (apart from a possible political) interest in attacking the countries on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Destroyed by war, poor countries with less developed industries were not a tasty morsel. The West grew rapidly and grew rich without war. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, could benefit a lot from taking over the industry of abhorrent capitalist Europe.
The stamp issued on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact
The difference in the management of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is also not without significance. It is much more difficult to convince an alliance of independent nations (NATO) to start an invasion than the armies of countries subordinated to one leader. Moreover, the US that played a major role in NATO may have felt relatively unchallenged - it remained out of reach of Soviet missiles for a long time, and an invasion of the US was practically impossible.
This is one of the reasons why most of the hot conflicts during the Cold War were more about spheres of influence. And one of the most dangerous moments in history came when the USSR tried to change the threat imbalance and deployed ballistic missiles to Cuba in 1962. In response, the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, ordered a blockade of Cuba.
Two fleets faced each other and the war was hanging in the balance. Although Kennedy, thanks to the information from the agent in the USSR, Oleg Penkowski, knew that the USSR was not ready for a real conflict, he did not take into account the so-called human factor. Confident Americans played hard - they persisted. After detecting Soviet submarines, they sent them signals to surf, and when that did not work, they dropped small explosives, the so-called sound indicators. They could not do real damage to the ships, but they did affect the psyche of their crews. The commander of one of them, Captain Sawickij, under the influence of unprecedented stress, gave the order to prepare for launching a torpedo with a nuclear warhead. According to Soviet sources, it happened because he lost his temper. The attack did not take place because it was stopped by the crew.
But what if it fired?
Although Oleg Penkovsky was right in reporting to the Americans that the USSR was not ready to start the war, one should ask:was NATO ready then?
Well, not in Europe.
While Western Europe was rebuilding itself from rubble and focused primarily on economic development, the USSR and its satellite countries remained states of war. This is where people didn't ask:"will war break out?" but “when will this happen?”. All industrial development, post-war reconstruction of roads and railroad connections were subordinated to the war plan. Even education in the USSR and the planning system for citizens of that state of life included military planning. Experts write that 95% of Soviet society received military training, and in the event of a conflict, the state would apply to everyone:from young people to the elderly.
Although Americans may, years later, boast of the unquestionable success of recruiting Oleg Penkowski, in fact, in the 1960s, they were losing the intelligence war, though not necessarily solely through their own fault. The scale of infiltration of British intelligence is evidenced by the case of the so-called Cambridge Fives - Five Brits in high intelligence and working for the Russians.
Kim Philby
The most famous of them, Kim Philby, headed Section IX of MI6, the purpose of which was… to coordinate actions against the USSR. Such high-ranking spies not only shared information with the enemy, but also instructed their NATO superiors to further agents. Americans were shocked to discover that British physicists sent to work on nuclear weapons, officially vetted by intelligence, were working for the USSR. A series of mishaps by British intelligence led to a situation in which the Americans not only stopped believing him, but even tried to isolate him from their own data and significantly limited the flow of information. It is not surprising that Philby, after being exposed, was not arrested and managed to escape to Russia.
It is worth mentioning that British intelligence, unlike American intelligence, did not have the option of arresting spies, but had to use the help of the police to do so. The fact that the situation in MI6 and MI5 was far from the ideas shaped on the basis of Bond movies and novels is evidenced, for example, by the procedures related to the recruitment of "Bonds". Well, in the sixties in Great Britain, recruitment was still based on the so-called "Positive verification". It means that the candidate for an employee was ordered to write a CV in detail, and then it was checked whether the facts provided by him were correct. So if he did not write himself that he was, for example, a member of the Communist Party or a Soviet spy ... no one verified it.
Both Great Britain, the United States and other NATO states were democratic states, their citizens were not in the habit of spying on each other, they could belong to any party (including communist) and their personal freedom was unimaginably greater than that of the citizens of communist states. As a result, it was relatively easy to recruit them by the Warsaw Pact interviews, whether voluntary, based on idealistic beliefs or, for example, the result of blackmail.
The situation was completely different on the other side of the barricade, in totalitarian countries that suppress the freedom of the individual, subject their citizens to permanent control and reward denunciation. As a result, the interviews of the University of Warsaw had an army of agents in the west, while the NATO interviews suffered spectacular defeats in this field. Therefore, NATO obtained most of the information thanks to modern technologies:photos from satellites and spy planes, wiretaps.
Similarly, to the disadvantage of NATO, there was a disproportion of the armed forces in Europe.
On October 23, 1954, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, the number of allied ground forces in Europe was set to 30 divisions. This number was not achieved until the 1980s. In 1956, the North Atlantic Alliance had only 20 divisions, moreover, they were divisions belonging to different countries, which must have caused logistical problems in the event of a war. At the same time, the Warsaw Pact only in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, created on the territory of the GDR, had 22 tactical unions, exclusively Soviet troops (and would be supported by the troops of the GDR if necessary).
The Central Group of Soviet Forces, located in Czechoslovakia, could immediately move to help. And just beyond the German border, in Poland, there was the Northern Group of Forces. Unlike NATO forces, they were all subordinated to one state - the Soviet Union. And although in the 1960s the Soviet commanders no longer stood at the head of the allied forces (Poles, Czechs, Hungarians), all officers from the University of Warsaw were trained in the USSR. The standardization of equipment also spoke in favor of the University of Warsaw. All the armies of the University of Warsaw used the same rifles, transporters and tanks, while each NATO country used different equipment, often produced by itself. "Janek Kos" could, if necessary, get into a Czechoslovak tank assembled in the Soviet Union and immediately start fighting. An American who would, for example, switch to a French tank during the war would have more problems with that.
Operation Danube
In his study of the topic, Colonel Colonel dr hab. Juliusz S. Tym, quotes the British military theorist Alistair Buchan:
Compared to the Soviet forces, NATO forces, especially in Central Europe, give the impression of the armed forces of an 18th century coalition. They lack the ability to quickly develop and a uniform supply system, i.e. two conditions the fulfillment of which may make the West independent of the alternative to the use of nuclear weapons.
Forces?
Even in the 1980s, the ratio of forces was in favor of the University of Warsaw. At that time, over 900,000 soldiers from 6 NATO countries were stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. NATO had around 8,500 tanks and over 1,100 aircraft. The Warsaw Pact in the territory of the states bordering Germany - East Germany and Czechoslovakia - had, respectively:40 land divisions with 13,700 tanks and over 2,000 aircraft. The juxtaposition of WMD potential looks disturbing :both nuclear superpowers had a total of 18,545 nuclear warheads with a total power of 9,721 MT.
On the other hand, NATO had a decisive advantage at sea. Although the USSR carried out the reform and expansion of the fleet initiated by Admiral Sergei Groshkov, its effects began to be really visible in the 1970s, and the greatest extent concerned the expansion of the fleet of nuclear submarines capable of carrying nuclear warheads and holding the United States in check. During the Cuban crisis, a nuclear-torpedo ship was able to almost start a war however, during ground combat in Europe, the importance of the fleet would be limited. In view of the glaring disproportion of surface units, it would also not allow the Warsaw Pact to invade the USA.
Knowing their limitations, the Russians knew that they would have to launch a swift, victorious attack on Western Europe, subjugate it, then conquer Great Britain, and thus confront the USA with a fait accompli before it could send significant reinforcements.
They planned to support the military offensive with propaganda, so as to first convince the world that they were defending their borders and that the real aggressor was the West, and, above all, to force the USA to accept defeat in Europe, and thus recognize the USSR's domination in the international arena and force the USA isolationist politics. Contrary to apocalyptic visions, no one wanted total annihilation, although both sides planned to use nuclear weapons. While the Soviet plans were relatively permanent, NATO's concepts of using weapons of mass destruction underwent quite significant changes.
In the late 1940s, the United States adopted the Mass Retaliation Doctrine, stipulating that any (and therefore also conventional) attack by the USSR had to face massive nuclear retaliation. As scary as it sounds when we mention the power imbalance at the time, it was the only chance for salvation for the West. This doctrine functioned until the 1960s, when it was replaced by the Strategy of Flexible Response. To Polish ears (after all, we would have participated in the war on the side of the University of Warsaw) it sounds more pleasant. It assumed the abandonment of a massive nuclear attack, and put more emphasis on the use of conventional weapons and land forces. The use of nuclear weapons was to be adequate to the actions of the enemy.
Before we breathe a sigh of relief, however, we must realize that nuclear weapons would be used anyway. Moreover, Poles would probably suffer the hardest from it. For in 1984 NATO adopted the "Follow-on Forces Attack" (FOFA) concept in relation to the Central European War Theater. In simple terms, this meant taking all steps, using nuclear weapons, to prevent the Soviet second-line troop from reaching the front.
The "first throw" would be the unions stationed in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Supplements for them were to come from the Soviet Union via Poland and Germany. It is precisely these additions that NATO would launch missiles, turning Poland and the eastern part of Germany into a radioactive wasteland. The benefit for NATO would be twofold - it would wipe out a significant part of the enemy's troops and destroy the entire infrastructure on the shortest route from Russia to Germany. The Warsaw Pact would be able to issue a "third throw", but this time reinforcements would have to go to the front along a longer route. The FOFA might not have decided about the outcome of the war, but for Poland it would have ended with annihilation on an unprecedented scale. The first estimate was about 14 million dead.
Interestingly, in the war planned in this way, this "evil empire", and therefore the Warsaw Pact, assumed a more careful use of nuclear weapons (but remember about the proportions, "more cautious" means dropping a dozen or so missiles, only in the first phase of the attack, on Denmark and the bombing strategic objects in Germany). It is doubtful, however, that the Soviet staff officers were guided by humanitarian reasons. The purpose of a possible war was to seize Western Europe and take over its industry. Turned to dust and irradiated, for example, the Ruhr would be of no use to the conquerors.
War breaks out…
When we were preparing the war background for our novel with Radek Rusak, we thought that after so many years we would find a lot of material on the strategies adopted in the 1960s. We were wrong. Although this period is not a blank page, most studies concern the seventies and eighties of the twentieth century. So we relied heavily on them, assuming that no military concept appears out of nowhere (even if some may be revolutionary), but is rather an evolution of assumptions made earlier. What would the Third World War look like in such a case, when we already know the potentials of both sides and their basic strategic assumptions?
Everything indicates that the Warsaw Pact would attack first. With not only a great advantage in numbers, but also based on the old Russian and Soviet assumptions that war requires sacrifice, the Soviet staff officers would prepare for great losses in the first stage of operations. It would start with the attacks of special units that have been prepared for such an operation, supported by tactical nuclear strikes. Both the Russian Spetsnaz and Polish commandos practiced on Western equipment and in Western uniforms, both American and German. According to plans, they were to land on enemy territory in enemy uniforms to deepen the chaos and gain a certain advantage at the start. Apparently, Polish commandos intended immediately after landing to throw off enemy jackets and fight in Polish uniforms. The Russians had no such resistance.
Kennedy Administration during the Cuban Missile
The purpose of the special units would be primarily to neutralize NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, but also to occupy and maintain strategically important bridgeheads. These were not small-scale plans - Denmark was planned to be excluded from the game thanks to nuclear strikes and the Polish-Russian commando landing. Denmark is an excellent example of the difference in approach between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was obvious for the Soviet staff members that the Russians and Poles would jointly implement the activities planned in Moscow. The Danes, on the other hand, firmly rejected the American demands that US troops be placed in Denmark to secure this NATO flank. Denmark's sons intended to fend for themselves and, in the event of war, to hold positions until the arrival of allied reinforcements. Perhaps they did not realize the degree of determination of the Warsaw Pact.
And it was a significant determination. Offensive planners, in the seventies and eighties, assumed shockingly high losses on their own side. For example, in the case of the invasion of Bornholm, which began with the landing of the 26th Special Assault Brigade, 40% of the losses were assumed already at the stage of flight and landing, and therefore even before Polish commandos would open fire. The "don't leave our own" principle was also not respected.
The commandos from the 1st Assault Battalion were trained to do their own thing after completing the task; they could count neither on evacuation nor on air support, let alone any reinforcements. In turn, in the planned attack on Hamburg, an operational parachute landing was planned. It was planned that two Soviet airborne divisions would go into action, but in calculating the losses it was assumed that only one would arrive, i.e. about 50% of the losses were assumed before the paratroopers were engaged in combat. About 160 Polish soldiers from the special battalion from Lubliniec were to land in the Ruhr Area. More than twice as many of them would be sent - around 350 soldiers, but again it was assumed that a significant proportion of the planes would be shot down. Those who managed to get there, divided into groups of seven, were to destroy primarily economic infrastructure facilities.
It was decided to sacrifice such elite units because time was the most important thing for the course of the war. It was predicted that NATO would eventually gain air superiority, so one of the primary goals was to neutralize or take over the airports. Where:"neutralization" means nuclear strikes where it could be afforded. Many airports, for example the great civil airport in Munich, were planned to be saved at the expense of high paratroopers' losses, so that they could serve the air force of the University of Warsaw as soon as possible.
The ideas for transferring Spetsnaz to enemy territory were sometimes original. Before the military operations began, soldiers were to be sent on "trips" by tourist buses (in fact such actions were taken in the late seventies), and civilian planes were also to be used for transport (here, too, enormous losses were assumed). In the case of the attack on the already mentioned Hamburg, it was assumed that Polish and Russian commandos would dock at the port on board of merchant ships simulating normal transports of goods. And all this, with the planned hitting this port with a warhead with a force of 50 KT.
At the same time, the Central Group of Soviet Forces was to attack the center of Germany (in the first wave of the 28 divisions of the USSR and East Germany), whose aim was to reach the Rhineland on the second day of fighting, and to enter France on the fourth day. This offensive, supported by tactical nuclear strikes against selected targets, would be based on an attack with massive armored and mechanized compounds. However, the Spetsnaz would again deal with the elimination of 42 French medium-long-range strategic missiles, which could inflict losses on the attackers so severe that it was almost impossible to continue the offensive. As always, with huge own starts.
It was assumed that the French would not hesitate to use their missiles because they did not have to fear retaliation. For economic reasons, France was to be seized in a usable condition. Moreover, officers who remembered World War II predominated among the French generals. Their hand would not have flinched when ordering to bomb the territory of Germany through which the Red Army was just breaking. National animosities and prejudices on the part of NATO were not at all lower than in the Warsaw Pact. And they were less suppressed.
In turn, the First Western Front would move from Czechoslovakia to Austria. No significant resistance was expected here. After the relatively quick occupation of Austria, the troops of the 1st Western Front would attack Germany from the south.
If Western Europe were captured in a week, the gates to England would be open. And after taking it, the Soviet Union hoped that, thanks to a simultaneous diplomatic and propaganda offensive, it would force the US to withdraw from Europe and focus on a defensive isolationist policy. It was important to launch the offensive as soon as possible and to neutralize most of the nuclear launchers that, if used properly, could turn the tide of the war. That is why it would be so important during this war to use special units on a previously unknown scale.
Could it be done?
On paper, yes. In the 1960s and 1970s, the ratio of forces spoke in favor of the Warsaw Pact. The technological development of the West was significant, but not yet so great as to change the tide of the struggle.
At the end of the seventies, that began to change. The technology divide grew and tipped the scales in NATO's favor. Soviet analysts were almost counting down the days to the last moment when the attack would still have a chance of success. It is quite commonly believed that the great international maneuvers of the University of Warsaw "Shield 76" were a preparation for the war. The above-mentioned strategies were practiced during them. The previously described Spetsnaz coach trips around Europe really set off in 1978. In the West, however, it was realized that something was wrong. Not only had so many tourists been let out from behind the eastern curtain at the same time, but it also caused some puzzlement that they were all short-haired athletic young men. Consequently, the borders were closed for further "excursions".
Planning an invasion always has a lot of question marks. The commandos attacking French launchers could lose. The landing on Denmark could have been unsuccessful due to the great losses of the attackers. The Germans and the Americans were able to put up more resistance than anticipated.
And most of all, he could bring equipment. When we talk about the superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces over NATO, we focus primarily on numbers:so many planes, tanks, people. We compare technologies as if they were reliable. Meanwhile, during Operation "Danube" (Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), about 35% of the equipment broke down , primarily in the BTR-60 infantry transporters. Anyway, the unreliability of Russian equipment was legendary. In the case of the war, in which the speed of attack played a decisive role, such a high defectiveness of the vehicles could determine the success of the offensive.
In the above discussion, I did not write much about the reaction of other countries to the war. How would Tito act? And most of all - this topic was a dream for both Soviet and American analysts - what would China do? However, this is a topic for a separate story.