Started on June 22, 1941, Operation Barbarossa was a plan of attack drawn up by Hitler as early as December 1940 with the aim of invading the Soviet Union. The failure of the Luftwaffe against England the previous year had forced the Nazi dictator to abandon his plan to invade the island in October 1940, but led him to consider another, more important conquest, that of the USSR. Four million fighters (more than 200 divisions including some forty Allied contingents), 3,300 tanks and 5,000 planes were thus launched against the Soviet Union. Although repeatedly warned of an impending German attack, Stalin organized no defense preparations. Barbarossa's success or failure will determine the outcome of the world war that began in September 1939.
Why Operation Barbarossa?
At the origin of the German decision to launch Operation Barbarossa is a strategic bet on the part of Adolf Hitler. Faced with the unexpected resistance of the British Empire after the fall of France, the dictator feared the attitude of Moscow, which took advantage of the German-Soviet pact to advance its pawns in Eastern Europe. On the other hand Hitler knows that economically Germany is at the mercy of Stalin's goodwill. He therefore decided to mount a decisive campaign to seize most of the European part of the USSR. This will allow the Third Reich to ensure its long-term economic survival (through the exploitation of both resources and men) and to ward off the specter of a war on two fronts by depriving London of its last potential ally on the continent.
Planning for this war of conquest, which was to provide Germany with the living space mentioned in Mein Kampf, began at the end of the summer of 1940. If the work provided by the staffs is meticulous, it is based on erroneous information. A constant of the Second World War, the German intelligence services seriously underestimated the numbers of the Red Army in terms of both men and equipment. Imbued with Nazi ideology, the German officers neglected the political and industrial mobilization capacities of the USSR. Betting on a short campaign, they skip the preparation of winter equipment...a mistake that they will pay a high price for in December 1941.
In his directive n°21 of March 3, 1941, the führer sets out his conception of the war that is looming in the east. It is “a clash between two ideologies…The Judeo-Bolshevik intelligentsia…must be eliminated.” To this end, it is planned to resort to intervention groups (“Einsatzgruppen”) which will act behind the front. These units under the orders of the SS, will be responsible for the infamous “Holocaust by bullets. »
An initial balance of power favorable to the Germans
Militarily, Operation Barbarossa (named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa) is based on three Groups of armies, which brought together more than two thirds of the German divisions of the time (more than 150 including 17 armored). These are seasoned troops (especially for armored spearheads), confident of victory following the German triumphs of 1939, 40 and 41. The North Army Group (26 divisions, Marshal Von Leeb) must seize of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
Army Group Center (49 divisions, 2 Armored Groups, Marshal Von Bock) is the strongest. He must annihilate by encirclements the bulk of the Soviet forces in White Russia, then push on to Moscow. Finally, Army Group South (41 divisions including several Romanian, Slovak and Hungarian, Marshal Von Rundstedt) must seize Ukrainian wealth before advancing towards the Caucasus. These 3 army groups can count on the support of the Luftwaffe, which aligns nearly 4,000 aircraft in the east.
Faced with the German device, the Soviets will oppose 4 fronts, gathering in the days immediately following the invasion about 190 divisions . Nevertheless, the Soviet formations are less provided than those of the Germans, and the management suffers seriously from the consequences of the purges of the end of the 1930s.
On the other hand Stalin believes, despite numerous reports and clues, that Hitler will not attack and that the German preparations are nothing but blackmail. Thus on June 22 the Soviet formations will be taken by surprise, even receiving orders forbidding them to provoke the German forces.
The first weeks of Barbarossa were a disaster for the USSR. In July 1941, Stalin, who seemed to have been morally reeling for a while at the announcement of the German attack, intimated to his generals an excessive resistance which would favor German plans focusing on mobility. Soviet formations, despite sometimes fierce resistance, will often be surrounded by Panzerdivision and German troops before being crushed by infantry. Nevertheless the Nazi triumph could not be complete due to the shortcomings of the Wehrmacht.
The impossible success of Operation Barbarossa
Indeed, in the vastness of Russia with basic infrastructure networks, German logistics quickly show their limits. The large part of the German army was then still advancing at the pace of horses, which quickly slowed down the pace of operations. The armored vehicles designed to evolve in Western Europe do not support the efforts imposed on them and the rate of availability of equipment has reached alarming levels. The Luftwaffe struggles to find suitable bases and its fighters lack range.
The execution of Barbarossa still suffers from the dispersal of means resulting from Hitler's desire to carry out a offensive on 3 sectors. This divergence of efforts can only aggravate the logistical deficiencies and ultimately push the German army to be unable to express its full potential. As a result, Moscow's decisive decision-making effort will be delayed, in particular because of Hitler's insistence on seizing the industrial basin of Donbass.
Finally, the troops hired by Berlin are still insufficient to completely clear the conquered areas. Many Soviet soldiers thus escaped captivity (a very unenviable fate) and formed partisan groups. Finally, contrary to the optimistic estimates of the German High Command, the Red Army manages to constantly rise from its ashes by aligning ever more men and equipment. Regardless of casualties, Stalin continually throws new forces into the battle. In the game of war of attrition, the Reich, ill-prepared for a long war, can only lose...
The specter of war on two fronts
All these elements, combined with the patriotic outburst of the Soviets and the rigor of the Russian climate, will cause Hitler a serious disappointment. In December 41 his exhausted forces reached the gates of Moscow, will have to retreat for the first time in the war. Despite a brilliant start, Barbarossa did not keep its promises. Despite millions of soldiers dead, wounded or prisoners, the Soviet Union did not collapse and with the support of the United States (at war against Germany on December 11, 1941) it can even consider continuing the war many months. Hitler has lost his bet and will have to manage the war on two fronts, which he had sworn to avoid.
In December 1941, a counter-offensive led by Zhukov pushed back the German army, thus causing it to suffer its first defeat since the start of the war. The lightning war (Blitzkrieg) then gives way to the war of attrition. In the spring of 1942, the Germans again intensified their attacks, slowed down during the winter because of the cold. It is in the direction of the south and the south-east, towards the Don, the Crimea, and especially in the direction of the Caucasus and its oil that the German troops are heading this time. It is planned to take the Volga and Baku.
From June 28, a new offensive is launched, which allows the Germans to take Kharkov, a major metallurgical center, and to advance in Crimea, but will get bogged down in the Caucasus. This setback will be the prelude to the defeat of Stalingrad at the beginning of 1943, which will definitively bury Barbarossa's objectives.
Bibliography
- Barbarossa - 1941. Absolute War. Past tense, August 2019.
- Operation Barbarossa:The June 22, 1941 invasion of Russia in Stalingrad. Translated from the German by Raymond C. Albeck by Paul Carell, 1964.
- Great game of fools:Stalin and the German invasion of Gabriel Gorodetsky. The beautiful letters, 2000.