A specialist in Afghanistan, a country he has traveled since 1988, Gilles Dorronsoro is a professor of political science at the University of Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. At the head of a European research program on the dynamics of civil wars, he returned, at the time of the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan, to an intervention that he considered doomed to failure from the start.
U.S. Army 82nd Airborne Division Commander Chris Donahue, the last soldier to leave the ground at Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. His departure ended the U.S. mission.
Sciences et Avenir:after 20 years of war, the last American soldier left the soil of Afghanistan, Monday, August 30, 2021. But this country is it really a "graveyard of empires" as a famous quote goes?
Gilles Dorronsoro :this expression - which does not mean much - was born following the three successive invasions of Western imperialisms since the 19th century. First the British, then the Soviets and the Americans. But the circumstances of these interventions are not comparable, and it is to forget a little too quickly that Afghanistan had previously already been included in a number of empires. Contrary to what this so-called formula implies - the supposed inability of the great imperial powers to "hold" Afghanistan - this country has instead been a place where many empires have flourished. Starting with that of Alexander the Great (4th century BC) whose successors ruled the region for centuries, before the Kushans (4th century AD), who were in contact with Rome, Persia and China. Then came in the 10th century the Ghaznavids, a Turkish Muslim dynasty and the Timurids in Herat, from the 14th to the 16th century.
Roman mosaic representing the conqueror Alexander the Great (4th century BC). Entered Afghanistan at the head of his troops in 329-327 BC. BC, Greek and Macedonian settlers were not long in establishing themselves in this kingdom. Credits:Diego Cupolo /Nur Photo /AFP
It is in fact the marginalization of Afghanistan that has caused the militarily superior great powers to recoil before the exorbitant cost of occupying this country difficult to control because of its geography:more than 2,000 billion dollars for the 20 years of American war. They therefore preferred a negotiated solution.
"In 20 years, more than 60,000 Afghan soldiers have lost their lives fighting the Taliban"
What about the "Great Game"?
The First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839-1842 certainly ended in disaster for the British, massacred by the thousands during the retreat from Kabul, but that did not fundamentally change anything. The 2 th The war of 1878-1880 was instead driven by issues of rivalry with Russia, with both empires attempting to entrench the country within their sphere of influence, in what came to be known as the "Great Game". And in 1880, the Afghans were forced to come under British rule. For the 3 e pseudo war of 1919, it is rather skirmishes before Afghanistan became independent that same year. As far as British imperialism is concerned, we are therefore far from failure. For the Soviets, like the Americans for that matter, Afghanistan no longer represented a goal worth investing so many billions in. Hence the withdrawal of coalition forces, also requested by the Afghans themselves in 2014. This easy formula of the "graveyard of empires" and the country of perpetual conflict is inaccurate. It is above all a way of exonerating oneself to justify the American failure. This is a culturalist explanation. It also makes us forget that in 20 years, more than 60,000 Afghan soldiers have lost their lives fighting the Taliban.
In 2021, you published a book titled "The Transnational Government of Afghanistan. Such a Predictable Defeat" … In what was the foreign presence in Afghanistan "such a predictable defeat" to you?
The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was carried out with a level of improvisation, incoherence, and incomprehension of Afghan society that made this failure, if not inevitable, at least extraordinarily likely. I had already developed this thesis in the 2000s, which I can now summarize in three points, the first of which is the West's refusal to take the Taliban seriously. We had to deal with a mostly deficient expertise with - in general - the inability to understand how the Taliban operated. They were described as a divided group, without a central command, when it was quite the opposite. We associated the Taliban with a tribal movement when it was not one, and we did not see that their project was precisely the return of a form of state. Moreover, Westerners have been unable to provide the foundations of a state, nor to rebuild it. The second point is that, in the neo-liberal atmosphere of the 2000s, there was the transition to "all private" and the refusal to support state institutions.
That is?
In very concrete terms, the so-called reconstruction of Afghanistan was carried out very largely by the private sector, with very little coordination between the different sectors:public policies were decided abroad and then implemented in disorder by international actors who – by favoring the private sector – have organized a system of resource capture. This was done for the benefit first of large Western companies and then of Afghan politico-economic actors.
What do you think is the third point that explains the Western defeat?
It is about violence. In Afghanistan, its practice has largely taken place outside the law. In particular for special operations or the training of militias, in particular by the CIA. All this management of violence reflected a misunderstanding of the expectations of the vast majority of the Afghan population who wanted stabilization around the rule of law. Westerners did just the opposite! Night raids, bombings, drone attacks, etc , all this terrorized the population and turned it against the foreign occupier.
For years, as part of your research, you associated with the Afghan population and you delivered to all provinces of the country. When did you begin to perceive this reversal?
The first article in which I took a public position dates from December 2001. In the journal Culture et Conflits , I expressed my concern that the people chosen by the Americans to exercise power were often unsavory figures - like the former warlord Abdul Rashid Dostom - and that there would be therefore great difficulties in rebuilding a State with such personalities. On the other hand, as early as 2002, I wrote an article on the neo-Taliban. Not to say that this organization was radically different, but to explain that there was a renaissance of this movement.
"Isis-K is made up of radical Pakistani militants and groups that seceded from the Taliban"
Exactly. Today, in addition to the Taliban, other groups have appeared in the Afghan political landscape. In particular Al-Qaeda, but also the Islamic State (IS), behind the latest deadly attack at the airport of Kabul which claimed more than 200 victims. Who are these groups?
In 2014, when the caliphate of the Islamic State (IS) was proclaimed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in Mosul (Iraq), a small group of militants often from radical Pakistani movements (Tehrik-e-Taliban, etc. .) as well as some Afghans, created on Afghan and Pakistani territory the "Islamic State in Khorasan", the local branch of the Islamic State that we now know under the acronyms of Isis-K, ISPK, or Daesh-K. This group is made up of both radical Pakistani militants as well as a few groups that have seceded from the Taliban, most of whom have been detained in Guantanamo. He wanted to get into the political game both against the Taliban, because they do not recognize the authority of Abdul Ghani Barradar, Mullah Omar's successor, but also against Al-Qaida, with the traditional opposition between Islamic State and Al-Qaida.
What are the differences between the Taliban, Al-Qaida and ISIS?
The Taliban and their Al-Qaeda allies oppose the Islamic State. To sum up, I would say that the Taliban are a nationalist, fundamentalist movement, whose objective is to create an emirate in Afghanistan, on a rigorous basis, with an intransigent interpretation of Islam, while wanting to integrate into international order. For example, they recognize the UN as well as the borders, unlike the Islamic State. Al-Qaida meanwhile is a transnational movement mainly composed of Arabs (Yemenis, etc.), with franchises everywhere, which has pledged allegiance to the Taliban.
And the Islamic State?
It is a split from Al-Qaeda, which is constituted on a quite different basis, since their priority is the anti-Shiite fight. Their program is clearly genocidal. I would cite as an example, the attacks of the Islamic State in Kabul against a maternity hospital, on May 12, 2020, or in the Shiite Hazara district, a school for young girls, on May 8, 2021. This movement is not led by Ulemas (theologian's note), like the Taliban. It is made up of hyper-radicalized, hyper-violent militants, breaking with all traditional structures. One of the specificities of the movement is to declare its enemies apostates (takfir ), which is tantamount to a death sentence. This concerns the Shiites, but also the Sunnis who refuse to pledge allegiance to them.
Some consider that the current Taliban, who could be called the neo-Taliban, are perhaps more popular than the Taliban of Mullah Omar…
It is undeniable that this movement has changed and it wants to rebuild a fairly classic constitutional framework. Its leaders, for example, want to return to a formula close to the old constitution of Afghanistan. These Taliban also have a much more assertive desire than the previous ones to use modern technology while we remember that the "first version" Taliban had banned television. They also pay real attention to international mechanisms such as negotiations and the search for regional alliances. This movement matured in 20 years. Which does not mean that they will respect human rights…
Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during his meeting with Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Tianjin, north China, July 28, 2021. Credits:Li Ran /Xinhia/AFP
"Mullah Baradar has become the man of negotiations with the Americans"
China has made approaches towards the Taliban. On July 29, 2021, Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar…
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is going to be the head of the Afghan government one way or another. Originally close to Mullah Omar, he took refuge in Pakistan after December 2001, where he became the head of what was called the Shura of Quetta. Either the direction of the Taliban movement. He was one of the essential leaders. He has tried several times to start peace negotiations with the West, which is in a way his trademark. For this reason, he was stopped in 2010 by the Pakistanis, who refused a negotiated solution because they wanted strategic advantages. It was the Americans who obtained his release and he settled in Doha (Qatar) where he spent several years. Since then, he has become the man of negotiations with the Americans.
How do you see the situation developing now?
There are two scenarios. The first, positive, is for a dialogue to be set up with the Taliban and for the latter to moderate some of their policies in exchange for international economic aid - which is what they are looking for. The second, more worrying, would be to witness a radicalization of the movement, which would transform this country into a perfect rear base for the most fundamentalist groups.
Interview by Bernadette Arnaud